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Summary of Thesis 
For children to become competent intentional agents they must constantly 
navigate between understanding how the world is, and how the world could be: they 
navigate between the actual and the possible. From their earliest experiences of the 
world and their interactions with those who inhabit it infants can extract information 
from and make inferences about the causal structure of both the physical and social 
worlds in which they reside. Seeing how an event in the world can change that world 
provides children with an opportunity to consider what else could have, and could be 
done to produce a similar change in the future. Imitating others allows children to 
replicate goal successes through the replication of some or all of another agent’s 
behaviors. Imitation provides a short-cut to a possible world through standing on the 
shoulders of giants. In this thesis we investigate imitation and language through the 
lens of how well children aged four-years navigate these actual vs. possible worlds. In 
Chapters 2 through 4 we characterize our sample’s Counterfatual Reasoning, 
Executive Functioning and Mental State Understanding. In Chapter 5 we utilize an 
experimental paradigm to assess the imitative behaviors of our sample and relate 
these to the earlier indices of cogitive development. We test the hypothesis that 
children who reason more successfully about counterfactual situations and are better 
able to infer behaviors based on mental states, are concurrently better equipped to 
imitate in order to achieve a given instrumental goal. We wanted to relate these 
cognitive reasoning skills not only to their proclivity for imitating different aspects of 
others’ intentional acts but also their use of language as a tool. In Chapter 6 we 
investigated our sample’s imitation of different aspects of language. Furthermore 
from our experimental paradigms we derived a measure of linguistic competence for 
use in Chapter 7 in an attempt to characterize our sample’s use of language as a tool. 
V 
 
This thesis provides the first investigation of  the relationship between children’s 
reasoning about the actual versus the possible and their concurrent ability to move 
between the actual and the possible through their own physical or linguistic 
manipulations. 
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Chapter 1. Navigating the Actual and the Possible: An Introduction 
For children, becoming a competent intentional agent requires that they learn 
to navigate between understanding how the world was, is, and how it could be.  
Children are constantly required to navigate between the actual and the possible in 
their lives: it is this navigation between the actual and possible that this thesis is 
interested in. Children must incorporate information from the past, present and future 
when making their decisions. As humans, the ability to detach from a present reality 
and reason about past or future realities is arguably one of our central cognitive skills 
(Markovits & Barrouillet, 2002). In addition we learn to perceive the world in a less 
egotistical way and are able to think about situations from the perspective of others: 
we are able to reflect on their experiences and understandings of the world in addition 
to our own. With experience of the causal worlds in which we reside comes the 
increasingly complex ability to generate and reason about different possibilities and 
alternatives that are temporally or perceptually distinct from the current state of 
affairs (Diamond, 2013). That is we can model worlds that didn’t or haven’t 
happened, or worlds as experienced or observed by others, and subsequently reason 
about and make decisions based on these independently generated models. It is this 
ability to navigate the actual and the possible that provides us as humans with the 
machinery to support unrestrictive choices and behaviors.  
Experiential cues such as conditional probability and temporal regularity are 
thought to contribute to young children’s developing knowledge about the causal 
world (e.g., Frosch, McCormack, Lagnado & Burns, 2012; Tenenbaum, Kemp & 
Griffiths, 2006).  With experience they begin to mentally move backward and forward 
in time, applying nascent causal knowledge to models of the world in order to make 
inferences and predictions about how they may have been or may be altered to 
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achieve a different outcome. These predictions may go on to provide their own 
additional causal information to further inform our future instrumental and social 
decision-making and behaviors. Flexible thinking allows for the assimilation of new 
causal information and symbiotically new causal information supports flexible 
thinking. 
1.1. Executive Functioning 
The number and diversity of decisions we make throughout a lifetime are 
unfathomable: from the inconsequential to the life changing, the simple to the 
complex. Many behaviors that we engage in are based upon pre-defined associative, 
stimulus-response pairings, for example when we learn to stop at a red light and go on 
a green: if the light is red then we stop, if the light is green then we go. This 
constitutes a very basic form of conditional reasoning. Many tasks designed to assess 
an individual’s executive functioning rely on the imposition of novel conditional rules 
in an attempt to capture the ease and speed with which we select one option over 
another. Using a novel task affords a glimpse at decision-making processes free from 
belief or prior knowledge constraints. Executive functions (EFs) themselves shall be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, but briefly they refer to the domain general 
processing abilities required for goal directed thought and action (e.g. Carlson, 2005; 
Gioia, Isquith & Guy, 2001). In the context of this thesis investigating the ease with 
which children apply newly presented if/then causal statements is an important 
starting point from which to challenge their nascent actual versus possible 
navigational abilities. Once we can have a sense of children’s domain general 
conditional reasoning ability we can then look to more specific forms of conditional 
reasoning that place additional demands on the reasoner. Learning to incorporate 
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temporal information, or social information into a decision for example increases its’ 
complexity.  
1.2. Counterfactual Reasoning 
Conditional reasoning provides a basis from which inferences can be drawn: If 
this happened/happens then that would have happened/will happen. Conditional 
reasoning can be applied to a diverse range of physical and social scenarios and relate 
to both physical and abstract causal relationships. However, basic conditional 
reasoning in isolation, such as stopping on red and going on green, is not the most 
demanding strategy we can adopt. It can be carried out free from context and with 
little or no regard to the actual set of circumstances being experienced (Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, 2002). Counterfactual reasoning, however, is a more complex form of 
conditional reasoning (Perner & Rafetseder, 2011). Counterfactual conditional 
reasoning requires a model of the world being generated that is as close as possible to 
the actual and varies only as a function of those elements that are necessarily altered 
(e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Perner & Rafetseder, 2011). These models allow 
inferences to be made about novel situations that have not happened and as such can 
lead to innovative and flexible predictions and responses being produced. This ability 
is part of what gives humans their unique cognitive flexibility to navigate between 
and constrast the actual and the possible in such a way as to learn from the resulting 
counterfactual conclusions. This ability is truly fascinating as surprising outcomes can 
be reached that are neither true nor false in the actual world due to their counterfactual 
nature. Counterfactual outcomes, as we reflect on them in this thesis are those that 
were once possibilities, but never came to fruition. That is not to say, however, that 
the same causal counterfactual principles could not be used in the future in pursuit of 
the same or similar effects. Counterfactual reasoning, although temporally removed 
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from the actual, can inform the possible. This ability to move between how the world 
was and how the world could or could have been allows us to generate and select 
from almost infinite behavioral possibilities: flexible thinking allows for the uniquely 
human capability for flexible decision-making.  
From their earliest social interactions infants can infer and extract information 
about the causal structure of both the physical and social worlds in which they reside. 
As motor development progresses and linguistic skills emerge children become 
increasingly able to make their own behavioral manipulations and interventions in the 
world, through actions on objects and vocalizations to others. Seeing how an event in 
the world causally impacts upon that world provides children with an opportunity to 
consider what else could have been, and could be done to produce a similar change in 
the future. Imitation is the replication of some or all of this modeled event sequence. 
Imitating the actions and speech of others allows children to achieve instrumental and 
social goals through the replication of some or all of another agent’s behavior and 
negates the need for innovation in many situations: imitation provides a short-cut to a 
possible world through standing on the shoulders of giants.  
1.3. Mental State Understanding 
Reasoning conditionally about the behavior of others, however, requires an 
enhanced set of skills when compared to reasoning about more concrete causal 
relations. Where cause and effect relationships such as motion or loss of integrity can 
be directly observed, the causal structure of human intentional action can largely pass 
undetected. A person may act in an intentional way based upon desire, belief, 
knowledge access or emotion, properties that may only be inferred not observed by 
another. Mental state understanding (MSU) skills in typically developing children 
emerge during the pre-school years and are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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When a child sees another person push a ball they can identify a cause/effect 
relationship directly. When a child sees another agent choose one of two equally 
appealing confectionary options they can infer a preference, but not directly observe 
it. Classic mental state understanding tasks such as the Sally-Anne task probe how 
well children reason about another’s intentional behavior when their knowledge 
access is superior in the given experimental situation (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 
1985). Around age four typically developing children begin to reason in accordance 
with another’s false belief rather than their own knowledge. They show an increasing 
amount of sophistication at identifying the boundaries between their own knowledge 
and how that effects their own actions, and how the knowledge available to others 
similarly affects theirs. 
1.4. Imitation 
During imitation this boundary, between ones own and others’ causal 
knowledge and resultant intentions can become entwined. An individual’s causal net 
or framework can be updated based on their own, and others interventions on the 
world. On the one hand children bring a wealth of their own causal knowledge and 
their own intentions to any situation. On the other hand, however, others may have 
more experience or expertise in a given situation and hence you may draw 
information from their choice of behaviors and perceived goals. During imitation 
tasks children are expected to infer the intentions of another agent and ultimately 
replicate their actions to the same instrumental end. Imitation, as opposed to mimicry, 
(discussed at length in Chapter 5) relies on this intentional understanding and as such 
often generates some initially paradoxical behavioral manifestations. Faithful or over-
imitation refers to a situation in which one individual replicates both the goal of 
another’s behavior, and crucially also the manner in which it was achieved. This is in 
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contrast to selective imitation where only those behaviors causally instrumental to 
goal success are replicated (again discussed in detail in Chapter 5). In many 
ecologically valid scenarios faithful-imitation is an eminently sensible strategy to 
adopt as individuals would be expected to, and will often chose the most efficient 
means through which to achieve their goals, and as such their intentional actions need 
not be altered, simply replicated. However, in some situations unnecessary or even 
counter-productive elements make their way into the behavioral sequence. Further, 
some situations can render certain elements of a behavioral sequence irrelevant. A 
child watching a peer climb on a box to switch on a wall light may copy their actions 
despite being several inches taller and not needing the extra height provided by the 
box to carry out the same action. Children from the age of 18-months increasingly 
incorporate these superfluous, redundant actions into their replications of another’s 
intentional behaviors in an experimental setting (Nielsen, 2006). They replicate not 
only the intended goal, but also the intentional actions of the model and they do so 
more often than not in our target age group. Such over-imitation findings are robust 
and over-imitation persists even when children have the necessary causal knowledge 
to identify the additional actions as unnecessary (Lyons, Young & Keil, 2007; Nielsen 
& Tomaselli, 2010). Findings such as these show just how much emphasis children 
put on the intentions of others, even at the expense of physical economy. As a result 
their flexible representations of causal structure go beyond just physical need, but also 
incorporate social, intentional information. 
Imitation is a smart strategy, in a way similar to counterfactual reasoning, as it 
reduces the requirement for personal, explicit trial and error experience of the world. 
Understanding that there is a high level of self-other equivalence between you, and 
other agents you may observe, makes possible this additional opportunity for causal 
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learning independent from one’s own practical experience. Observing the behavioral 
steps another intentional agent undertakes to achieve some physical or social goal 
provides a similar short-cut to counterfactual reasoning (CFR) when it comes to 
planning and executing one’s own behaviors. Seeing someone else operate a novel 
object, or use language in some communicatively novel way affords one the 
opportunity to represent said actions or utterances, reason about their causal 
implications and, if the context arises, replicate some or all of the observed behaviors 
to their own ends. Just like the mental modeling and rehearsal involved in 
counterfactual reasoning, where using one’s own knowledge of, and inferences about 
causal structure can guide future behaviors, imitation too provides an additional 
source of causal information above and beyond one’s own experimentation that can 
be used to guide future behaviors. Both practices, counterfactual thinking and 
imitation, reduce the need for hands on, trial and error experience of an object or 
situation having been able to acquire knowledge through some other cognitive 
strategy. Where counterfactual reasoning asks children to reason about something that 
once was, but no longer is possible, imitation tasks observe how children reason about 
and respond to something that has happened and can happen again. For counterfactual 
reasoning children must generate a novel world, different only by virtue of a 
counterfactual alteration. Imitation requires children to reverse their role in the world 
from observer to agent, they move from what someone else did to what they could do. 
When children imitate they have at their disposal the recent memory of another’s 
behavior and often the required steps to reach some desirable goal state. For 
counterfactual reasoning there is much less available information or contextual 
support as the to be reasoned about scenario did not happen and could not now 
happen. However, there are many striking similarities between the demands of both 
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tasks. Both CFR and imitation require a judgment to be made based upon some 
passed event. In CFR a model of this passed event must be altered to reflect some 
counterfactual change. In imitation the passed event must be translated from the 
perspective of another into the actions of the self. The act of imitation requires that 
the imitator is aware of the causal structure of the behavior in question to achieve a 
given goal. It further requires mental state understanding as imitation specifically 
refers to the replication of intentional goals. Furthermore over-imitation necessarily 
requires intentional understanding as children who over-imitate copy not only the goal 
but also those actions that although carried out intentionally, are instrumentally 
redundant to a perceived goal. 
1.5. Language 
Language is a powerful causal tool that can be used to achieve goals both 
physical and social in nature. Language connects us to other people: we can impact 
upon and shape their thoughts as they can do with ours through a shared language.  As 
such, language affords us formidable collective powers (Pinker, 1995, pp. 16). When 
we talk about the imitation of behaviors we would often think first of physical 
behaviors such as playing with a toy or game. However, one of the most freely 
available modeled behavioral resources that typically developing children experience 
is spoken language.  By the age of four, language is one of the most striking socio-
cognitive skills that continues to rapidly develop. Spoken language, and 
communication more generally, is a central part of the human experience. Language 
learners have numerous aspects of language to attend to when constructing their own 
utterances such as their choice of words, grammar, syntax and cadence. Language, 
however, is a unique ability in that it is both necessarily imitative and productive. To 
be understood, children must be replicating items from the shared lexicon of their 
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native language whilst simultaneously using these tokens, and the structures in which 
they reside flexibly to achieve their novel communicative goals. Language, however, 
goes beyond servicing communicative goals. It gives children a framework in which 
to conceptualize complex and/or abstract ideas, to think about possibilities, to reflect 
on things temporally distant, and to give and receive information about things not 
present or observable. Language is tool with many functions, none less than allowing 
us to reflect on alternatives to the actual, and realize the possible. 
Not only does language allow us to communicate about the actual versus the 
possible: language itself embodies the actual versus possible distinction. Language 
can be highly conventional using only utterances heard before, highly innovative 
combining linguistic units in a novel way, or somewhere in between. It is the 
combination of imitative and novel aspects that led us to include language as a 
measure in our study. We chose two language tasks to collect a breadth of information 
about linguistic imitation.  
Children copy behaviors to induce physical outcomes: children also copy 
behaviors to induce psychological outcomes for both themselves and others. Children 
begin copying actions and vocalizations in selective, instrumental ways but with time 
they begin to copy many intentional behavioral features, both causally important and 
redundant in nature. They move from thinking and behaving in terms of some 
physical, instrumental goal to becoming more socially oriented in their endeavors. As 
mentioned earlier this move from instrumental to social imitation is a prevalent and 
highly robust strategy used by four-year-olds in the action domain. We were 
interested in concurrently extending this line of research into the linguistic domain. Is 
the strategy of imitation one uniformly deployed across a diverse number of tasks or 
is imitation a highly selective strategy that works independently across different 
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contexts? We were also interested in whether one’s imitativity in both the action and 
linguistic domains was positively associated with language competence more 
generally, i.e., its effective use as a tool. 
1.6. Research Aims  
In this thesis I investigated various forms of conditional reasoning, and the 
imitation of actions and speech through the lens of how well children navigate actual 
versus possible worlds. We wanted to generate an idea of how competent children 
were in their counterfactual and conditional reasoning. Chapter 2 introduces 
counterfactual conditional reasoning and provides an outline of its suggested 
developmental trajectory. We investigated the performance of our sample on two 
measures designed to assess counterfactual conditional reasoning in young children. 
We contrasted performance on concrete versus more abstract tasks, and also 
contrasted conditions where prior knowledge may or may not bolster performance to 
help elucidate the circumstances under which children at this age were more or less 
successful at reasoning. The chosen tasks probed our sample’s competence in 
reasoning about a world different by virtue of temporal and perspectival affordances, 
and as such contingent on a diverse set of causal structures. Some of the items could 
be answered based on prior knowledge alone where others required more complex, 
and crucially context dependent reasoning procedures.  
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the exploration of our sample’s domain general 
cognitive abilities, such as those characterized as executive functions. Two 
standardized measures of executive functioning taken from the NIH Toolbox (Version 
1) were administered to our sample. These included the Flanker task of inhibitory 
control and the Dimensional Card Change Sort task of cognitive flexibility. As 
mentioned earlier, during counterfactual and mental state reasoning children need to 
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be able to disengage from current reality, the actual, and switch their attention to a 
new representation of the world, the possible. The ability to select one answer from 
another, reject one option in favor of another, switch attention between different 
features and flexibly integrate information from multiple contrasting sources are some 
of the hall marks of maturing executive functions.  
Executive functions make it possible for us to represent information abstractly, 
move flexibly between these contrasting representations and, plan and execute 
responses based upon them. Executive functions constitute those abilities required to 
think abstractly and manipulate ideas and are crucial for the discovery and retention 
of new information about the world (Anderson, 1998). The tasks used to assess 
executive functions, counterfactual reasoning tasks and indeed mental state 
understanding measures share a need to infer, based on current reality, some feature 
of a future, counterfactual or mental state reality. Each are subject to tension between 
two or more conflicting options, representing different representations of the world, 
the actual and the possible.  
Chapter 4 focuses on mental state understanding and how children’s reasoning 
about others’ minds may impact upon their reasoning and decision making in other 
realms. We first wanted to assess how well our sample could predict the behaviors or 
mental states of others. We then explored the possible relationships between mental 
state reasoning, executive functioning and counterfactual reasoning. These proposed 
relationships were then tested to identify their existence and strength statistically.  
In Chapter 5 we present experimental data on the pattern of children’s object 
imitation and how this is influenced by the causal necessity of modeled actions. 
Children saw two novel objects, in different conditions, on which two actions could 
be completed. For one condition both actions were causally necessary, for the other 
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only one of the two completed was causally necessary. Children’s patterns of 
response to these objects and conditions were then correlated with their reasoning task 
performances collected in Chapters 2-4. We hoped to speak to the question of whether 
children’s imitation of causally necessary and unnecessary actions was related to both 
their causal counterfactual and mental state reasoning competencies. 
In Chapter 6 experimental data on children’s imitation of various features of 
language is presented. This chapter focused on the levels of imitation and innovation 
in the productive language of our sample. Experiment 1 features children’s imitation 
of simple sentences, some of which contain grammatical or ungrammatical 
repetitions. These two target conditions were chose to chime with the causally 
necessary and unnecessary conditions of the object imitation paradigm. Experiment 2 
focused on the imitation of novel lexical items and syntactic structure during a novel 
verb-learning paradigm. We wished to investigate the patterns of imitation children 
produced in response to these varying features of language and whether any 
conceptual contiguity was seen with the imitation of actions. Finally Experiment 3 
specifically examined the relationships between the imitation of these different 
features of language and the object imitation response patterns presented in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 7 language remained the focus for study, however, we moved from 
being interested in the paradox of imitation and innovation both being hallmarks of 
linguistic productivity to language’s functionality as a tool within the world. 
Specifically we investigated the relationship between the reasoning competence of 
our sample and their imitation of our three key features of language. Furthermore we 
outlined the relationships between their skills at reasoning counterfactually and about 
mental states to their linguistic competence as assessed by a novel composite score 
extracted from our experimental measures.   
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Finally Chapter 8 the General Discussion integrates the experimental data that 
has been reported in the earlier chapters. The relationship between: children’s 
reasoning about events in the world that are temporally or cognitively set apart from 
their own egocentric view and their actions and utterances in the world is explored. 
We assess the hypothesis that children who reason more successfully about 
counterfactual situations, and are more able to infer behaviors based on mental states, 
are concurrently better equipped to imitate in order to achieve a given instrumental 
goal. We relate their counterfactual and mental state reasoning skills to their 
proclivity for imitating different aspects of others’ intentional acts, including actions 
on objects, the repetition of ungrammatical language and the use of novel verbs in a 
complex syntactic structure. In addition we probe the possibility that imitation as a 
more general strategy across both action and verbal domains can account for 
linguistic competence more generally. 
All the experimental data we collected was an endeavor to delve deeper into 
two interconnected theoretical questions. Firstly, we wanted to understand how well 
our sample reasoned with conditional rules in a range of situations, and how well they 
could successfully select a possible incongruent, counterfactual or psychological 
world based upon features of an actual target world. Secondly, we wanted to 
investigate whether this same sample’s reasoning performances related to their 
selection and execution of possible actions or utterances modeled in the actual world.  
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Chapter 2. The Road to Reason: Conditional and Counterfactual Reasoning at 
Age Four 
2.1. Abstract 
From moment to moment, as we explore the physical and social worlds that 
we inhabit, we are exposed to information from which we may infer causality. 
Regardless of whether this information reaches us passively, or we have sought it out, 
we are potentially able to use it to formulate or improve our own behaviors (Hume, 
1739/1978). Infants who are new navigators of the world are less able to use causal 
information in this way. In some cases the causal information required for a task has 
never been available to them: in other cases the ability to successfully process causal 
information that they have encountered is not fully functional. Children are not 
restricted to putting causal information to use in a physical way, they may also use 
newly obtained causal information to mentally rehearse current or future scenarios. In 
addition children’s reasoning based on causal knowledge need not be restricted 
temporally, that is reasoning only about present or future events: they may also reason 
causally about events in the past.  
In this chapter I will discuss the development of children’s causal conditional 
reasoning in the context of counterfactual thinking, making inferences about a 
situation that is counter to fact. I will examine the tasks traditionally used to assess 
childhood counterfactual reasoning ability and compare them with newer, exigent 
measures exposing the limits of young children’s counterfactual reasoning 
performance. I will present experimental data collected from a group of four year-old 
children using both traditional and newer, more demanding reasoning measures. The 
experimental data contrasts performance between the tasks. In addition the effect of 
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typicality, or congruence between subject matter heuristics and counterfactual 
outcomes is explored.  
 
2.2. Introduction 
Everyday we find new information and learn new skills. We may, after several 
attempts, succeed in operating a novel object, or we may observe someone else 
operating this object and in future utilize the same, or similar skills with the same or 
similar object. Perhaps we offer, or we may see someone else offer, our friend some 
chocolate when they appear sad, and observe them magically become a little cheerier 
as a consequence. Not only do we observe such relations but we also have the ability 
to reflect on, or even extend them. Perhaps, for example, we see the power of the 
chocolate in current reality and this triggers our memory of a past reality where 
another person was sad. We may then mentally simulate the effect chocolate might, 
but no longer could have had on this person. This type of mental rehearsal is called 
counterfactual reasoning and constitutes a powerful tool for adults and children. 
Children become able to cognitively test the causal information that they possess, for 
example in response to a poor outcome in their physical or social world, be it an 
enigmatic object or an upset friend. Children can mentally contrast the actual and 
counterfactual outcomes of a situation given some key change in the causal chain. 
Such complex abilities are based on causal and conditional reasoning as expanded 
upon below. 
Causal knowledge is the cornerstone of planning and predicting future 
outcomes in the world (Hagmayer, Sloman, Lagnado & Waldman, 2007) and such 
knowledge increases with age (Sobel, Tenenbaum & Gopnik, 2004). Through 
observation, events that frequently occur together are inferred to have some 
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cause/effect relationship (Hume, 1973/1978). Causal reasoning is a form of inductive 
reasoning as conclusions are based on knowledge about what happens all or most of 
the time given a set of circumstances. Additionally through intervention, or action in 
the world potential causal structures can be identified or tested (Hagmayer et al., 
2006). Existing causal knowledge obtained through causal reasoning can go on to 
support more complex forms of conditional reasoning. Where causal knowledge 
specifically refers to the identification of cause and effect relationships between 
events/objects, conditional reasoning more broadly refers to reasoning based on if-
then relationships that need not require additional identification of causal structure 
(Ali, Schlottmann, Shaw, Chater & Oaksford, 2010). Conditional reasoning refers to 
the extraction of inferences from statements with an if-then structure and is central to 
human inference (Ali et al., 2010). The if element forms the argument’s antecedent, 
with the then component forming the argument’s consequent. Formal logicians often 
use abstract rules such as “a → q” to investigate conditional reasoning performance 
(eg; Markovits, 1985). However, semantically meaningful statements can also be 
utilized: “If it snows, then the class will be cancelled”. Without basic causal reasoning 
abilities, that essentially work to provide some structure to our representation of the 
causal world, we would not be able to make conditional inferences without being 
expressly informed of the relevant causal structures involved. An example of 
conditional reasoning being supported by existing causal knowledge follows. When 
asked a question such as “If the egg falls from the counter, what will happen then?” 
adults can plausibly infer that the egg will crack based on their prior experience of 
gravity and egg fragility. The latter question is an example of Basic Conditional 
Reasoning (BCR). More specifically, the given example requires reasoning about 
imagined events based on previous causal reasoning. Basic conditional reasoning 
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tasks can be described as timeless due to their propensity to be expressed in the 
present or neutral tense and relate to established regularities in the world (Perner & 
Rafetseder, 2011, p.91-98). They can be introduced and reasoned about in isolation. 
Basic conditionals have been described as mostly independent from context and as 
having antecedent events that are possibilities, and consequents that can transpire as a 
result of these possibilities being fulfilled (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Basic 
conditional reasoning relies upon default assumptions that are plausible or typical in 
any given context and do not rely on some specific content knowledge pertinent to a 
specific sequence of causal events (Perner & Rafetseder, 2011, p.91). Basic 
conditionals can refer to “if-then” or “if-then possibly” type statements and often 
include a causal relationship, be it absolute or possible.  
Counterfactual Reasoning (CFR) requires a strategy that is taken counter to 
actual events. In contrast to basic conditional reasoning, the assumptions used during 
CFR must be imported from the event’s sequence itself and not rely solely on 
plausible assumptions (Perner & Rafetseder, 2011, p.91). Unlike basic conditionals 
where the antecedent is a possibility, counterfactual antecedents are necessarily 
impossible in the context of current reality, but treated as possible in the context of a 
counter-reality (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p.4). Say the event sequence was 
described as follows, “A toy egg was rolled to the edge of a counter but stopped 
before it reached the end and fell to the floor.”  Then the following counterfactual 
antecedent was introduced, “What if the egg wasn’t a toy, would it have cracked?”  
The correct counterfactual conclusion (although not possible in the context of the 
actual world) would incorporate all the events from the actual event sequence 
including the assertion that the egg stopped before it reached the end of the counter. 
As a result the counterfactual and actual consequents would be the same: the egg 
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remains intact by virtue of it never reaching the end of the counter. If, however, not 
all the events were imported, such as the egg stopping before the edge, the 
counterfactual consequence would be different and the egg would have broken. 
Although this consequence is still plausible, with people focusing on the altered 
consequent of the egg’s properties, it does not remain true to the actual sequence of 
events.  
CFR has the potential to go far beyond this simple scenario, however, when 
the causal knowledge being used is inferred from much sparser probabilistic 
information, what Tenenbaum, Griffiths and Kemp (2006) refer to as an “inductive 
leap”. From a young age children are able to make causal judgments and predictions 
based on inferences drawn from diverse sources, often not specifically related to the 
problem in hand. Attempts have been made to characterize how children combine 
their probabilistic knowledge and new “data” and experience when decision-making. 
Studies applying the formal mathematical approach of Bayesian belief networks, for 
example, combine both probabilistic information and causal relationships within 
directed causal graphs representing causal relationships between variables (e.g., 
Glymour, 2001; Schulz, Gopnik & Glymour, 2007). Bayes nets then allow for flexible 
representations of causal structure to be based on both observations and interventions, 
with information obtained from both these sources resulting in an update or change to 
the representation of causal structure. These causal nets provide flexible 
representations of causal structure that can be continually altered or embellished to 
reflect new information. In addition such causal nets support judgments about the 
impact of interventions and counterfactual situations. In combining Bayesian and 
development approaches, some studies have put forward strong claims that children’s 
nascent representations of causal structure can indeed support predictions about 
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intervention and counterfactual reasoning (e.g., Gopnik, Glymour, Sobel, Schulz, 
Kushnir & Danks, 2004; Schulz, Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007; Schulz et al., 2007). In 
particular experimental evidence suggests that between the ages of three and four 
years children’s learning moves more towards a Bayesian structure, that is less reliant 
on association alone, and indeed supports the generation of novel actions based on 
their causal graphs (Sobel, Tenenbaum & Gopnik, 2004). 
Returning then to CFR, reasoning about the possibilities in a counterfactual 
world, is highlighted as a critical component of adult cognition (Markovits & 
Barrouillet, 2002). Being able to consciously appraise the outcomes of our own, and 
other’s actions in the landscape of what could have been, or could be, has beneficial 
effects on our decision making, analytical reasoning, feelings of regret and relief, and 
emotions and motivation (Smallman & Roese, 2009; Kray, Galinsky, & Wong, 2010; 
Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; McCrea, 2008). Being able to incorporate causal 
information not only about what was, but crucially what could have been, gives us 
additional information upon which to base our future decisions. Counterfactual 
thinking abilities increase the amount of causal knowledge that we might have access 
too, making for a more informed decision, in so far as the results of our counterfactual 
musings were causally sound. 
Recall the previous example once again, “A chef places an egg on the counter: 
the egg falls and cracks”. A counterfactual question often negates an antecedent of 
the statement’s consequent, for example “What if the egg hadn’t fallen?” One 
possible response is what Riggs, Peterson, Robinson and Mitchell (1998) describe as 
a ‘realist response’ (a term borrowed from the earlier mental state understanding 
literature of Wimmer & Perner, 1983). A realist response is given when the reasoner 
answers in line with the actual world and not the counterfactual. In this case a realist 
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response would be saying the egg would still crack. Adults, however, can be expected 
to easily conclude the egg would not have cracked in the majority of cases. When true 
counterfactual reasoning is taking place the reasoner must be generating more than 
one target model. The first target model represents the actual sequence of events. 
Additional models are also based upon the same representational target. However, the 
content of these models must differ as a function of the altered element or elements 
involved, and include any causal repercussions these alterations exert in the target 
world (see Figure 2.1.). Counterfactual worlds are inextricably bound to the reality 
from which they depart and must be coordinated for successful CFR to have taken 
place (Byrne, 1997, p.108; Rafetseder, Schwitalla & Perner, 2013). As discussed 
earlier counterfactual reasoning is only successful when all elements of the 
counterfactual event sequence remain the same, with the exception of those 
necessarily altered by the counterfactual premise. As such it is necessary for the 
actual and counterfactual worlds to be co-ordinated in the mind of the reasoner as so 
far as to maintain this nearest possible world (Lewis, 1973). In Figure 2.1 element 1b 
is based upon element 1a and differs only in the counterfactual antecedent. Causal 
knowledge can then be used to generate element C, based on element 1b. If additional 
changes are made then the counterfactual conclusion cannot be valid. Although much 
of this section, and indeed the literature, focuses on concrete physical counterfactuals 
the same principles can be applied to social situations. Take for example reasoning 
about the effect of one individual’s behavior (offering chocolate) on another 
individual’s mood. 
In an event sequence like the egg falling off the table the effect of prior 
knowledge often produces an interesting effect on reasoning. Counterfactual 
reasoning questions involving situations that are typical or regular can instead be 
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successfully reasoned about using a basic conditional reasoning strategy. Often our 
knowledge or memory of such situations can generate default assumptions about 
causal relationships, independent to the actual context being presented. In Figure 2.1 
the basic conditional comes straight from prior knowledge rather than the generation 
of some new model based on the actual world. Recall that the CFR question was 
“What if the egg hadn’t fallen?” Using a simple basic conditional reasoning strategy 
involving only one fictive representational model extracted from past experience, (if 
an egg doesn’t fall, then it doesn’t break), is just as effective as reasoning 
counterfactually, that is from two models, one of actual events and one of fictive 
events. This introduces a problem for CFR research: the ability to reason 
counterfactually can only be attributed when the use of any other reasoning strategy 
would result in an incorrect inference. This distinction between basic and 
counterfactual conditional reasoning is important in the context of this thesis as we 
wished to explore the limits of children’s reasoning abilities about actual and possible 
worlds and, how these abilities might contribute to other social and cognitive skills. 
Being able to effectively navigate the causal repercussions of changes to the world 
provides the basis for many future decisions about ones own interaction with objects 
and people in the world. As such the distinction between basic conditional, and the 
more challenging counterfactual conditional reasoning affords very different 
opportunities for judgment and decision making. The ability to mentally rehearse a 
counterfactual situation provides a short cut for children, as they do not need to have 
experienced an alternative course of action to be able to predict its causal outcome. 
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Figure 2.1. Visualization of the Difference Between Basic and Counterfactual 
Conditional Reasoning. 
 
Given the distinction between these two forms of conditional reasoning we 
wanted to examine both in our sample of four year-old children. We tested basic and 
counterfactual reasoning ability to understand firstly, if they are related to one another 
and secondly, if they are related to other cognitive indices. In the following sections 
we will explore some of the measures used to gauge children’s reasoning ability and 
the conclusions drawn from them. 
It is problematic then that some measures specifically developed to investigate 
counterfactual reasoning can in fact be successfully answered using basic conditional 
reasoning principles. This paradox is especially pertinent when examining the ability 
of children and young adults to reason counterfactually. As a result only situations in 
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which basic conditional reasoning and CFR generate conflicting answers can be used 
to identify which individuals can successfully utilize CFR strategies (Rafetseder & 
Perner, 2010; Rafetseder, Christi-Vargas & Perner, 2010; Rafetseder et al., 2013).  
Such an example can be seen in the sweet story (Figure 2.2. Rafetseder, et al., 
2010). The situation is set up like so, “Mum buys sweets and leaves them in the 
kitchen. Simon can only reach the top shelf because he has a broken leg and cannot 
bend down. Julia can only reach the bottom shelf, as she is not as tall as her brother. 
When they find sweets the children always bring them to their rooms. Mum buys 
sweets and leaves them on a high shelf. Simon comes into the room” Consider being 
asked the following question after listening to the story, “What if the little girl had 
come into the kitchen, where would the sweets be now?” If the reasoner applied a 
basic conditional reasoning strategy relying on default assumptions about the desire 
for sweets they would conclude that should a young girl come into the kitchen and 
there be sweets, she would take the sweets to her own room. This basic conditional 
reasoning strategy ignores much of the relevant causal information such as the fact 
that the sweets are still on a high shelf and cannot be reached by said little girl. 
Similarly had the reasoner been asked, “What if the mother had put the sweets on the 
bottom shelf, where would the sweets be now?” Again the basic conditional reasoning 
strategy would focus on the assumption that someone would get the sweets and 
therefore conclude the sweets would be in the little girl’s room, ignoring the fact that 
the boy remained the character who entered the kitchen subsequently, not the little 
girl. Only a true CFR strategy, one that appropriately imported all the relevant 
information about; the sweets’ location, the character’s abilities, and the searcher’s 
identity could successfully answer this problem. If the girl and not the boy had come 
in, or had the mother put the sweets on the bottom shelf - the sweets would remain on 
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the shelf in the kitchen. In the majority of developmental investigations, however, 
tasks that can satisfy this requirement of disentangling CFR and basic conditional 
reasoning have not been used (Rafetseder & Perner, 2011).  
2.2.1. Assessing the Development of Counterfactual Reasoning 
In the developmental literature the majority of paradigms used to assess CFR 
are counterfactual conditionals in which children must reason about consequences 
given false antecedents (eg: Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998; Rafetseder 
et al., 2010; Beck & Crilly, 2009; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010; Rafetseder et al., 2013). 
Typically children will be asked about one of the antecedents causally related to the 
outcome event in the story, “What if X hadn’t happened, where would Y be now?” or 
similar. Harris, German and Mills (1996) showed children aged 3-4 years a story in 
which a protagonist with muddy shoes walks over a clean floor. Children were then 
asked what would happen if the agent’s shoes had been removed. The majority of 
children (75%) successfully inferred that the floor would be clean, leading to the 
claim that they were reasoning counterfactually. Indeed the children were reasoning 
counter to fact: however, a simple basic conditional reasoning strategy based on 
children’s existing causal knowledge would also result in the correct answer: if a 
person with clean socks walks across a clean floor, then the floor will be clean. Both, 
Beck, Robinson, Carroll and Apperly (2006) and Rafetseder and Perner (2010) 
suggested that CFR questions that may be successfully answered in isolation are 
easier than those in which reference to the actual sequence of events is necessary. 
Indeed 3.5 year-olds perform better in CFR questions in which the correct location is 
one semantically linked to the story’s main character, thereby creating a default 
assumption as to where the actor would be (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). The typical 
condition in the Doctor story (see Figure 2.3.) benefited from the default assumption 
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about where a Doctor would normally be – a hospital. This is in contrast to conditions 
where the correct answer required the Doctor to be in a semantically unrelated 
location like a park that carries no default association. Despite the boost in 
performance for the typical condition, across condition performance was still poor in 
3 and 4-year-old samples (Robinson & Beck, 2000; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). 
Evidence such as that presented by Rafetseder and Perner (2010) suggests that 
young children may not be consistently reasoning in a truly counterfactual way. Tasks 
that may only be consistently answered successfully through the use of counterfactual 
conditional reasoning highlight the fragility of children’s developing reasoning 
abilities. In the absence of other supporting factors or congruent expectations children 
struggle to reliably identify a counterfactual outcome.  In the case of the kind of story 
tasks mentioned, young children do not have the same strength of prior expectations 
and knowledge to aid their decision-making as in the dirty floor task. Story tasks that 
set up novel situations about the location and accessibility of a pack of sweets provide 
little opportunity for past experience of a similar scenario being imported into the 
counterfactual model when compared to a task relating only to the effects of dirty 
shoes upon a clean floor. Similarly an expectation about the location of a person or 
object can only be present if that person or object, and representations of their 
semantically related locations, are familiar and easily accessible in memory. A lack or 
weakness of any default assumptions at the group level about Doctors or other 
familiar professionals that could have been used to drive basic conditional reasoning, 
then may impact upon the poor performance shown in conditions where these defaults 
would have been congruent with the counterfactual conclusion (Rafetseder & Perner, 
2010; Robinson & Beck, 2000).  
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Given the integral positioning of counterfactual reasoning within adult human 
cognition its development provides an exciting area for examination in the wider 
context of cognitive and communicative development. Counterfactual reasoning 
allows children to generate inferences about how any behaviors they intend to carry 
out would work to achieve their goals: it allows them to mentally test the impact of 
these possible actions on the actual world. As children begin to appreciate their own, 
and others intentionality the task of mentally forecasting the causal repercussions of 
one’s actions or vocalizations is considerable. Reasoning about how reality could be, 
or crucially in the case of counterfactual reasoning, could have been changed, is a 
priceless resource for those starting out on their own journey as an intentional agent. 
Often the content of a reasoning question can have dramatic influences upon 
an individual’s ability to reason successfully. Location and state change 
counterfactuals involve physical, observable movements or changes for the objects 
being reasoned about. This contrasts with CFR tasks involving necessarily abstract or 
unseen changes such as those involving mental states. Given that CFR requires the 
generation of, and comparison between different mental representations of the same 
situation, counterfactuals that refer to concrete, and therefore more easily represented 
situations, will be more successfully dealt with than those requiring more abstract 
representational inputs. Mental state reasoning is one such example of a skill where 
pre-school children continue to perform poorly, as representing the minds of others is 
more challenging than representing the movement of a visible object (Birch & Bloom, 
2004). Using paradigms that depict concrete observable actions helps remove the 
additional difficulties young children have with reasoning about any abstract or 
unseen properties within a vignette. Beck et al. (2006) reported that children as young 
as 3-4-years were competent, achieving an 87% success rate, during concrete 
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counterfactual questioning about a ball being dropped down an inverted Y shaped 
slide. In this “standard” condition they were asked “What if the ball had gone the 
other way, where would it be?” Furthermore Harris et al. (1996) also attributed 
impressive counterfactual reasoning ability to 3-4-year-olds. 75% could conclude that 
a model floor would be clean had a protagonist taken off their muddy shoes (Harris et 
al., 1996).  
Despite this evidence, 3-year-old children completing more complex belief-
free (although not intention free) counterfactuals involving increased amounts of 
causal information often answer as realists (e.g., Riggs et al., 1998). Recall realist 
answers are given when the reasoned answers in line with the actual world rather than 
the counterfactual world. Returning to the egg example then a realist answer to the 
counterfactual question “What if the egg hadn’t fallen?” would be “The egg would 
have cracked.” Realists do not alter the outcome despite the causal information 
available. In the Riggs et al. (1998) study children were asked to reason about a 
fireman named Peter who was ill in bed, but on hearing there was an emergency raced 
to help: where would he be had the fire not started?  Many responded that Peter would 
still be at the fire. They fail to inhibit what they know to be true and persevere with 
answering that the outcome would be the same, regardless of changes to events earlier 
in the causal chain. Children seem to begin relinquishing this realist strategy only in 
their 4th year (Riggs et al., 1998; Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004), and, only then, 
answer in accordance with the counterfactual outcome at the group level. 
Rafetseder et al. (2010) challenged the conclusion that even results such as 
these are evidence for true counterfactual reasoning ability. Instead they suggest that 
many tasks purporting to index nascent CFR skills are instead driven by the 
application of the basic conditional reasoning processes discussed earlier (Rafetseder 
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et al., 2010). Children are argued to reason in isolation from the actual events and 
construct only one model, compatible with the premise, rather than the two + 
representations necessary to attribute CFR. 
To demonstrate children’s adherence to basic conditional reasoning processes 
Rafetseder et al. (2010) utilized an exigent task in which CFR & basic conditional 
reasoning produced conflicting conclusions (see Sweets Story in Figure 2.2). We too 
opted to use different conditions that could dissociate basic and counterfactual 
conditional reasoning skill. In Rafetseder et al. (2010) the sample of 3-6-year-olds’ 
performance is poor when compared to the 87% of correct responses reported by 
Beck et al. (2006) by 3-4-year-olds on a standard CFR question “What if it had gone 
the other way?” Indeed only 6% of the sample in Rafetseder et al. answered 
subjunctive past (counterfactual) questions correctly. That is only 6% were able to 
maintain the pertinent information within the story to correctly identify that the 
sweets would remain in the kitchen.
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Figure 2.2. Example of an exigent counterfactual reasoning paradigm in which only 
true counterfactual reasoning can reliably produce the correct response. Adapted from 
Rafetseder, Cristi Vargas, and Perner, (2010). 
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Figure 2.3. Example of a typical (congruent) story used to assess the effect of 
typicality on counterfactual reasoning judgments. Adapted from Rafetseder & Perner, 
(2010).  
 
6-year-olds alone did perform better at around 24%, a figure still far below the 
success rates of adult subjects (100%). A subsequent paper identified 12-14-year olds’ 
as reaching statistically similar attainment levels as adults (88:100), with questions in 
which BCR and CFR lead to incompatible conclusions (Rafetseder et al., 2013). In 
this chapter we aimed to unite these findings that young children perform well on 
traditional location change counterfactuals when compared to the exigent story tasks 
developed by Rafetseder and colleagues where performance is strikingly poor 
throughout childhood. The traditional tasks could be successfully answered using 
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basic or counterfactual strategies, whilst the exigent tasks could crucially only be 
reliably completed using a counterfactual strategy. 
Young children who have relinquished a realist strategy and engage in CFR 
tasks do seem to appreciate that if the antecedent is false, then the consequents will 
change, therefore rejecting realist answers. In tasks that can be solved using default 
assumptions then the basic conditional reasoning abilities in place can help formulate 
the correct response. However, applying basic conditional reasoning in situations 
where there are 2+ other locations or states available, and where neither of these 
locations have a significantly more salient relationship to the person or object 
involved in the transformation, means children may randomly select one of the other 
options, (Rafetseder, Eckmaier & Perner, unpublished manuscript). The use of basic 
conditional reasoning before CFR could then lead to distinctive patterns of responding 
in children, given that the material being reasoned about brings to bear some pertinent 
prior knowledge. If basic conditional reasoning relies on default assumptions about 
the object or person whose location or state stands to change, then it follows that for 
situations in which defaults would aid CFR children’s performance should increase.  
In the example Sweets Story (Figure 2.2.) children reasoned that the sweets 
would be in the room of whichever child came into the kitchen, regardless of causal 
validity. Rafetseder and Perner (2010), wished to elucidate whether a typicality bias 
about familiar professions would similarly influence responding.  The addition of a 
typicality bias gave the authors a way to identify whether highly salient default 
reasoning assumptions did indeed interfere with CFR in young children, by way of 
altering performance. Indeed as seen in the previous section performance was greatly 
improved in typical conditions (see Figure 2.3.) where the CFR and typical locations 
were congruent, that is the correct CFR response was the location most semantically 
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salient to the protagonist. This provides further evidence that in such CFR tasks, 
young children rely more so on basic conditional reasoning than CFR. Something is 
stopping children from performing well on these types of tasks. 
It seems clear then that those tasks traditionally used to assess CFR reasoning 
ability are potentially only giving conclusive evidence of one distinct form of 
conditional reasoning – basic conditional reasoning. CFR attribution can only be 
made using tasks that require those processes supporting basic conditional reasoning 
to be inappropriate for reasoning success in this case.  Some additional ability or set 
of abilities is required to ensure reasoning can go forward successfully. It is clear that 
the structure and content of such tasks are generally cognitively demanding. But it 
also seems likely that one cannot develop CFR without first developing basic 
conditional reasoning processes. Basic conditional reasoning, like counterfactual 
conditional reasoning relies on the understanding of possibilities (Beck et al., 2006). 
In the case of the basic conditional the possibility is not temporally bound. In the 
counterfactual, however, the possibility can only exist in one reality, one that is 
temporally abstract due to its opportunity of fruition having passed.  
In addition to being governed by different temporal constraints, basic 
conditional reasoning involves reasoning from 1 model, where CFR demands 
reasoning from 2+. Basic conditionals can exist in isolation whilst counterfactuals are 
inextricably bound to the realities from which they have departed.  Is performance on 
these types of task correlated? And if so do any additional cognitive indices feature 
prominently in this relationship? 
2.2.2. The Relationship Between Counterfactual Conditional Reasoning and 
Other Cognitive Abilities 
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One potential bottleneck for young children when reasoning are their 
executive functions (EFs). Executive functions are introduced further in Chapter 3. 
From a basic stance EFs allow children to select a response from a set of options. 
Children’s comprehension and subsequent selection may not be congruent – therefore 
incorrect answers may be due solely to weak executive functions. Inhibitory control 
broadly refers to the ability to inhibit a pre-potent tendency associated with some 
stimulus (Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994). Inhibitory control is one of the domain-
general processes included under the umbrella of executive functions. Inhibitory 
control is hypothesized to be crucial to CFR due to the need for children to inhibit a 
realist response, a response type seen often in 3 year-old children (Riggs et al., 1998). 
Recall, a realist response is one in which the participant ignores a counterfactual 
transformation and fails to acknowledge that the situation would change. Children 
who give realist responses could be failing to reject the lure of the most salient, pre-
potent, actual world response.  
Cognitive flexibility and working memory then are thought to be utilized due 
to a need both to generate and compare representations of the actual, and 
counterfactual worlds in order to reason successfully (Guajardo et al., 2009).  If 
children are not able to generate and switch between world-views, of the actual and 
possible/counterfactual, then they will be unable to consistently perform well in CFR 
situations. It seems the basic task demands of CFR necessarily involve a certain level 
of EF proficiency to satisfy the procedural task demands. 
However, investigations directly scrutinizing the role of EF in CFR have 
yielded mixed results, and have generally been restricted to traditional CFR tasks: that 
is those theoretically passable through BCR alone. Beck et al. (2010), utilized a CFR 
battery to better assess its’ relationship with EF. Although they failed to find an effect 
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of working memory on children’s reasoning they did report a predictive effect of 
inhibitory control and receptive language.  Beck et al. (2010) argued this effect was 
realized through children’s increased ability to inhibit what they know to be true 
(preventing realist answers). Additional support for a reasoning and inhibitory control 
link in older children was reported in Simoneau and Markovits, (2003). However, a 
study of regret, assessed using CFR stories, found that switching (CF), and not 
working memory or inhibitory control, was a significant predictor (Burns, Riggs & 
Beck, 2012). Earlier work by Riggs et al. (1998) dismissed inhibitory control as a 
predictor of CFR as future hypothetical problems (that require the same inhibitory 
control demands to complete as reasoning problems) were solved significantly more 
readily. In addition, manipulating the inhibitory control demands of a task did not 
alter performance in Robinson and Beck (2000). Guajardo et al. (2009) found 
working memory and cognitive flexibility positively predicted 5-year-old’s ability to 
generate antecedent counterfactuals.  
From the numerous mixed results it seems clear that with different conditional 
reasoning tasks, varied demands will be made of the reasoner. Certainly the process of 
inhibiting realist answers, and comparing reality to a possible scenario require EFs. 
However, these domain general abilities alone will not suffice across differing tasks. 
No single EF has emerged as a clear predictor of conditional reasoning: rather a more 
general developmental progression has been suggested. It is reasonable to hypothesize 
that in the pre-school years, a time in which there remain large developmental and 
individual differences in EF, measures that assess domain general cognitive functions 
will relate with performance in some way. The size and strength of the relationship, 
however, will crucially depend on the task in question. 
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Beyond EF demands, however, each type of counterfactual task can differ 
along numerous dimensions. For children to reason successfully, that is make valid 
inferences, they must understand the causal relationships embedded in the content. 
Specific content may be more or less familiar, causal relationships may be more or 
less concrete, simple or complex and, the amount and diversity of information can 
differ vastly. It is not only children’s procedural, cognitive ability to reason that is 
being tested, but also their ability to reason about the causal affordances of certain 
scenarios. To return to the example of the egg: children who have the necessary 
cognitive capacities may not have the necessary causal knowledge, through lack of 
experience, about the fragility of eggs. If there is no causal structure from which to 
reason about counterfactual changes, then performance will be poor. The robustness 
of any causal structure representations can indeed impact upon counterfactual 
judgments being made (Frosch, McCormack, Lagnado & Burns, 2012). Alongside 
EFs then, solid causal knowledge about the content is needed in order to solve 
counterfactual reasoning tasks. 
Rafetseder et al. (2013) further pointed out that it is unlikely to be weak EFs 
alone that account for the specific problems faced by children during CFR, as 
opposed to basic conditional reasoning. Instead they put forward the claim that 
problems are due to children not understanding the “nearest possible world 
constraint” (Lewis, 1973. in Rafetseder & Perner, 2010; Stalnaker, 1968). Children 
are not adhering to the process of retaining the structure of the world faithfully in all 
but those features necessarily altered by the counterfactual statement. This nearest 
possible world constraint constitutes a form of task specific knowledge related 
uniquely to CFR, as basic conditional reasoning need not be modeled in this form. 
Only elements that are causally dependent on the counterfactual assumption need to 
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be changed. All other causally independent elements must be retained. Young 
reasoners do not appreciate the complexities of what does and does not need to be 
integrated in the counterfactual model (Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). This problem 
does not occur in basic conditional reasoning due to the lack of additional models 
being generated and concurrent reliance on default assumptions about causal 
structure. Evidence for this comes from CFR problems in which either the location or 
the searcher is altered in the counterfactual world. In this case children fail to 
integrate the location or searcher information that was not altered, whether that 
information was causally before or after the transformation that was made, as in the 
Sweets Story (Rafetseder et al., 2010). At this point the influence of typicality, and 
how it diverges from the actual sequence of events is marked. Instead of retaining the 
particulars of the world being reasoned about in all cases except those altered by the 
counterfactual statement, children often revert to reasoning based on a typical world. 
Rather than utilizing the nearest possible world as dictated by the context, they use a 
more prototypical version of the world. This familiar, typical world benefits from 
having more stable representations of causal structure, based on real world experience 
and aligned with the child’s self generated representation of causal structure. Often 
this overriding propensity to reason in a way that is congruent to typicality results in 
success, as shown by traditional CFR measures. However, when typicality and reality 
are incongruent, then basic reasoning processes alone are insufficient. 
Utilizing the Sweets story again presented earlier (see Figure. 2.2.) for both 
subjunctive-past questions children overwhelmingly replied that the sweets would be 
in the little girl’s room despite the fact that in both counterfactual worlds the sweets 
would remain on the shelf. In the 1st transformation question only the location of the 
sweets, and not the identity of the searcher changed (the sweets would remain on the 
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shelf). In the 2nd transformation although the sweets’ location remained the same, the 
searcher differed. Julia could not reach the sweets in this location but children again 
decided the sweets would be in her room regardless. This provides evidence that 
reasoning is resistant to where the transformation occurs, performance is still poor and 
this seems best explained as a result of a failure to integrate the relevant causal 
information from reality into the counterfactual model. It seems then that working 
memory cannot be wholly to blame (as the location of the transformation does not 
systematically alter success). Additionally, in even the youngest group, there were 
relatively few realist errors, suggesting that inhibitory control, at the group level at 
least, cannot be accounting for performance. It is not that children are failing to 
understand the world has changed, it is that they are not using a correct 
representation, that in which only causally necessary changes are made, on which to 
base their inferences. 
Counterfactual reasoning ability, as measured by more traditional tasks has 
also been related to other developing cognitive abilities and skills. CFR mediates 
emotions such as regret and relief: in these cases it modulates perception of the 
current reality (Beck & Crilly, 2009; O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2012; 
Rafetseder & Perner, 2011), improves creative association generation in this case 
modulating future reality (Kray, Galinsky & Wong, 2006) and, correlates with 
pretense abilities (Buchsbaum, Bridgers, Weisberg & Gopnik, 2012). 
Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004) found high inter-correlations between 
theory of mind skills and counterfactual reasoning. This echoed work in 3-4 year olds 
that suggested around 25% of variance in theory of mind was explained by CFR 
performance (Riggs et al., 1998). Support for a theory linking CFR and theory of 
mind has also been found in autistic children (Peterson & Bowler, 2000). However, 
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only 3-16% of the variance in theory of mind found by Guajardo and Turley-Ames 
could be accounted for by CFR alone. Language and age explained a larger 
proportion of variance. A later study (Guajardo, Parker & Turley-Ames, 2009) 
included CFR, theory of mind and EF measures and again reported only limited 
unique variance in theory of mind being attributable to CFR. Instead they found a 
mediation pattern through working memory and cognitive flexibility performance. 
Furthermore Perner, Sprung and Steinkogler (2004) found dissociation between 
theory of mind and CFR in 3 to 5-year old children, prompting them to describe a link 
between the two as pure speculation. The relationship between counterfactual 
reasoning and other cognitive abilities will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4 
of this thesis.  
2.2.3. Aims 
 We had multiple aims for this first experimental chapter. We chose to use two 
different paradigms, the Slide task adapted from Beck and Guthrie (2011) and the 
Story task presented in Rafetseder and Perner (2010). We chose these two tasks to 
examine and compare both basic conditional and counterfactual conditional reasoning 
in the same sample. Our first two aims were to replicate the findings of these original 
investigations. 
The easier of the two tasks then, that requiring only basic conditional 
reasoning, was a location change counterfactual adapted from Beck et al. (2006) and, 
Beck and Guthrie (2011). This task, henceforth called the Slide task, involved a ball 
being rolled down an inverted Y shaped pipe-slide following which counterfactual 
questions about the ball’s location were asked. Reasoning performance was reportedly 
above chance in the Standard condition of this task for both the younger and older 
groups described in Beck and Guthrie (2011). 49% of the younger group (mean age= 
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3.9 years) and 74% of the older group (mean age= 5.0 years) answered both standard 
questions correctly. The standard question asked children to indicate where the ball 
would be had it gone the other way. In the second condition of the Slide task, the 
Open condition, children saw the same scenario but were asked “Could the ball have 
gone any other way?” This question is much less constrained and theoretically 
children could answer in an almost infinite number of ways and not be correct or 
incorrect. There are many possibilities associated with this form of counterfactual 
question. Our first aim then was to replicate the above chance performance rates in 
the standard condition. As our sample had a mean age of 4.4 years we expected 
between 49% and 74% of our sample to answer both standard questions correctly. 
The second, more challenging task was replicated from Rafetseder and Perner, 
2010 and shall be referred to as the Story task throughout. Here a short story was told 
about a protagonist moving through three locations given some emergency. After the 
story children were asked a counterfactual question about this protagonist. This task 
was chosen so that at least one condition would concretely assess true counterfactual 
reasoning ability while the others could be answered by basic conditional reasoning 
alone with a reliance on a typicality heuristic. In comparison to the location change 
Slide task the vast majority of the sample of three to six year olds reported in 
Rafetseder and Perner (2010) failed this task. For our third aim then we further 
expected that children would be more successful in the typical condition of this task 
when compared with the atypical condition. In the typical condition the correct 
answer was also the semantically congruent location and this congruency was 
reported to significantly improve performance in the original version. 
Moving to our fourth aim for Chapter 2 then we chose multiple tasks so that 
we would have a range of challenges for children to compare. For the first task (the 
52 
 
slide task) basic conditional reasoning only was required for success. In the second 
task the two conditions afforded us the opportunity to look at scenarios where either 
both basic and counterfactual conditional reasoning could be used (typical condition), 
or only counterfactual conditional reasoning would suffice (atypical condition). 
Difficulty was expected to go in that order. These tasks were administered in a within 
participants design so we could compare performance. Performance was expected to 
be high in four year olds where basic conditional reasoning alone was required as in 
the Slide task. Where counterfactual reasoning only could suffice, performance was 
expected to be low, the atypical condition of the Story task.  
There are several additional key differences between the Slide and Story tasks 
that can also be expected to generate differences in performance. First of these is the 
availability of the relevant causal structure. For the Slide task the causal structure of 
the event sequence is concretely defined and visually observable in the apparatus: the 
ball can either fall to the left or to the right, and one of these will be the realist 
location. In the story task, however, there are three locations introduced that are 
physically independent of one another and with no inherent causal structure visually 
discernable. Unlike the causal path of the ball, the causal path of the story protagonist 
relies on the verbal information presented in the story itself. Therefore an abstract 
representation of the causal structure must be generated from which to reason 
successfully. 
Secondly there is no intentional agent involvement in the Slide task. An 
inanimate object, the ball, drops down one of two chutes at chance. In the story task, 
however, the unseen intentions of the protagonist must be taken into account, a 
decision must be made about their trajectory that is no longer based on chance. 
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Finally, the counterfactual question being asked in both tasks is quite different. 
For the Slide task the counterfactual is “What if it had gone the other way, where 
would it be?” For the story task the much more complex “What if event x hadn’t 
happened, where would the protagonist be now?” For the Slide task there is not only 
linguistic markers as to the correct location i.e., “the other,” but there is no causal 
chain to alter and reconstruct given the very simple causal pathways involved. In the 
story task, however, no such linguistic support is given in the question and there must 
be a second contrasting representation generated that defines a new causal structure 
given the removal of a key causal event. No such removal or change is required to the 
representation of the Slide task’s structure. 
We were not only looking for differences in the tasks, however, but also 
positive correlations between them. Our fifth and final aim then was to identify 
whether performance on the two types of task was related. Often in the literature 
counterfactual reasoning has been assessed using one measure only. We wished to 
have a more comprehensive and challenging assessment of CFR. Secondly we wanted 
to generate individual performance scores for each child’s CFR that we could then use 
to relate to their performance on our other cognitive measures. These analyses are 
reported in Chapter 4, sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 where the relationship between 
conditional reasoning, executive functions and mental state understanding are 
explored.  
Given this thesis’ primary goal of assessing how children’s navigation 
between actual and possible worlds impacts upon their behavior, counterfactual 
reasoning is the natural place to start. Counterfactual reasoning demands children 
reason concurrently about what is, what was and what could be, and it is this skill that 
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goes on to drive many of our successful manipulations of the world to achieve our 
intentional goals.  
 
2.3. Method 
2.3.1. Participants 
Fifty-five 4.4-year olds took part. N=28 of these had previously taken part in a 
longitudinal study from birth to 24-months named First Steps, (see Ellis-Davies, 
Sakkalou, Fowler, Hilbrink & Gattis, 2012). First Steps was set up to longitudinally 
assess various aspects of socio-cognitive development through the collection of 
experimental, observational and parent report data. Thirty-seven infants remained in 
the study at eighteen months and twenty-eight remained at fifty-two months. An 
additional twenty-seven participants were recruited for the fifty-two month phase to 
increase the sample size for the current study. These additional children were tested 
concurrently with the original sample participants. Participants were recruited through 
community groups. Children came from a range of socioeconomic and maternal 
education backgrounds.  The majority were first language English speakers (N=45), 
with 10 bi-lingual or second language speakers. Testing took place over two visits on 
campus at Cardiff University. Participants were given £15 of shopping vouchers and a 
small gift bag on completion of the two visits. A total of five task groups were given 
to children in the course of these two testing sessions: counterfactual reasoning; 
mental state understanding; executive functioning; imitation and; language. The 
counterfactual reasoning tasks of interest in this chapter were both completed in the 
second testing session. 
2.3.2. Design 
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 A within subjects design was utilized. All participants received all tasks and 
conditions. Tasks types were administered in the same order across participants. 
Children first completed all conditions of the stories tasks. Once completed the testing 
room was cleared and then the apparatus and testing procedure for the Slide task were 
introduced. This order was chosen for operational reasons. In the Story task twelve 
separate locations were used presented, three for each vignette. These scenes 
comprised of landscapes, small toy figures and props that took several minutes to 
assemble and as such were prepared prior to the participant’s arrival at the University 
to avoid the disruption of data collection. The Slide task had no such set-up 
constraints as the required materials were smaller in number and could be stored 
easily behind testing curtains and produced when required with minimal set up being 
required. 
2.3.3. Materials 
The location change Slide task was adapted from Beck, Robinson, Carroll and 
Apperly (2006) and Beck and Guthrie, (2011). Two slides were made from semi-
circular tubes each 12cm in diameter. These slides were affixed to a wooden board 
with the inner surface of the tubes facing forward so the slide’s contents could be seen 
at all times. The yellow slide was a straight tube with one opening at either end. The 
blue slide resembled an inverted Y shape with one opening at the top and two at the 
bottom (see Figure 2.4.). One yellow and one blue ball were used. These balls were 
only seen descending down their correspondingly colored slide, the blue ball always 
was shown going down the blue slide. The yellow ball was only shown going down 
the yellow slide. 
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Figure 2.4. Photo of the inverted Y shaped pipe-slide used in the location 
change slide task. A lightweight blue plastic ball was dropped down at point A and 
could travel down the slide to exit at either point B or point C. Children in the 
standard condition were asked “What if it had gone the other way, where would it 
be?” The correct answer would be to select the option B or C that contrasted with 
where the ball actually went during the model. An incorrect answer would be to select 
the same exit option as the model. 
 
The Story task was adapted from Rafetseder and Perner (2010). Four vignettes 
about a Policeman, Doctor, Fireman and Teacher were used. For each of these stories 
small scenes were created, clearly depicting the three locations included in the 
dialogue (See Appendix A). The scenes were set up using cardboard illustrations and 
Playmobil toys. All actors in the stories were distinguishably different and were 
depicted by Playmobil figures. For the Doctor story the three locations were a 
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hospital, a park and a swimming pool. For the Fireman story the three locations were 
a fire station, a sitting room and a forest. For the Policeman story the three locations 
were a police station, a convenience store and a car park. Finally, for the Teacher 
story the locations were a classroom, a playground and a TV room. These scenes were 
set up on the four corners of a large black rug (150cm x 100cm). Each was separated 
from one another so as to distinguish the groups of three locations that belonged 
together. The child sat in the middle of the mat while the tester sat outside the mat and 
moved position for each story.  
The vignettes all followed the same structure with three separate locations. 
“Before work a Doctor was sitting in the park enjoying the beautiful weather. She left 
the park to go to work in the hospital. When she got there he received an emergency 
phone call. Look, there has been an accident at the swimming pool and little Jacob has 
slipped and hurt himself. Jacob needs a Doctor. The Doctor lifts her emergency first 
aid case and walks from the hospital to the swimming pool to help Jacob.”  A 
comprehensive script for all the stories can be found in Appendix A. 
2.3.4. Procedure  
Parents and children were invited to the on-campus lab for the two visits over 
the course of the fifty-two month testing phase. Each of these visits began with a short 
warm up time before the tasks were introduced in a separate room. The CFR tasks 
were administered during the second visit in a purpose built testing room with inbuilt 
digital audio and visual recording capabilities.  
The Story task came first with the play scenes set up in four corners of the 
room on a large dark colored play mat covering the floor. Examples of the scenes can 
be found in Appendix A. For each vignette children were first asked to point out the 
various locations and were corrected if they identified them incorrectly. The four 
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story contents were counterbalanced with all four having both typical and atypical 
structure versions. Children either heard a typical-atypical-typical-atypical order, or 
an atypical-typical-atypical-typical order. Children were told one story at a time with 
each being followed immediately by two questions relating to that story, one control 
and one counterfactual question. In total then each participant was asked four control 
and four counterfactual questions. The question structure was the same for each of the 
four stories; control – “Where is the (protagonist) now?” and cognitive flexibility- 
“What if the (incident) hadn’t happened, where would the (protagonist) be now?” 
Once this procedure was finished children were asked to help the experimenter tidy 
up the story scenes and figures so as to make room for some new toys. 
The two brightly coloured slides and balls were placed in the centre of the 
play mat. It was explained that the yellow ball could only go down the yellow slide, 
and the blue ball could only go down the blue slide. The yellow slide was straight 
with one opening at either end. The blue slide was an inverted-Y with one opening at 
the top and two at the bottom (See Appendix B). The yellow slide served as a filler 
item between some of the target trials. Trials were carried out in the same order for 
each participant. The four counterfactual questions were asked in a fixed alternating 
order (filler-standard-open-filler-standard-open). There were two target conditions 
both administered using the blue inverted Y shape slide, the standard condition and 
the open condition. After the experimenter let the ball roll down the blue slide the 
subject was asked “What if it had gone the other way, where would it be” (standard 
condition) or “This time it went that way, could it have gone anywhere else” (open). 
For the standard condition there was a very clear alternative answer, the chute that the 
ball had not gone down on that occasion. For the open condition the semantics of the 
question are quite different and could instead prompt a myriad of possible answers not 
59 
 
necessarily true or untrue in the context. The ball could have gone towards the ceiling 
having been abducted by aliens. Conversely the question could be interpreted in a 
deterministic way hence any other possibility would be ruled out. 
Answers were coded by a primary and secondary coder from the recordings 
after all sample data had been collected. The primary coder was the experimenter. The 
secondary coder was another PhD student who was blind to the hypotheses of the 
experiment. For both tasks coding began once the experimenter had finished asking 
the target question. For the Story task children’s responses were coded when they 
either pointed to or verbalized a location in the story. If they did not respond the 
question was asked a second time. After two repetitions a forced choice option was 
given, (10%> of sample). Responses were coded as in incorrect if participants 
indicated either of the two remaining locations, one of those always being the realist 
location. Examples of the correct and incorrect answers can be found in Appendix A. 
Responses were also coded as incorrect if they indicated or referred to any other 
location not presented in course of the story. 
For the Slide task children scored one point for each target trial if they 
indicated the exit of the slide not taken during the model. For each condition this gave 
a maximum possible score of two. Responses were coded as incorrect if the 
participant indicated the exit the ball had taken (realist answer), the entrance to the 
slide, to any other location not presented during the model or any other 
incomprehensible answer. Inter-rater reliability for both reasoning tasks was 100%. 
  
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Slide Task 
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Each participant was asked four target questions, two open and two standard. 
Their final coded answers for each target question were used in this analysis giving a 
score of 0-2 for both the standard and open conditions. The mean score for the open 
condition=1.1. The mean scores for the standard condition=1.5.  At the group level 
Standard Slide performance exceeded chance set at 1 with the degrees of freedom 
equally N-1, t(54)=4.91, p<.001. 64% of our participants answered both Standard 
slide questions correctly. In the Open slide condition performance was not different 
from chance t(54)=.65, p=.5, with only 38% of children answering both of the Open 
questions correctly.  Interestingly, however, only 8 children (15%) got both Standard 
questions wrong while 17 children (31%) got both Open questions wrong. Across 
participants performance on the Open question is at chance level (See Table 2.1.) and 
is significantly worse than Standard performance, t(53)=3.2, p=.002 (see Figure 2.5.). 
Performance on the two conditions does correlate positively and just reaches 
significance r=.27, p=.046. 
 
Figure 2.5. Mean scores for the Open and Standard conditions of the slide task. Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
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Table 2.1. Total number of participants who answered 0, 1 or 2 reasoning 
questions correctly for both of the questions for the slide task. 
 Number Correct 
Condition  0 1 2 
Standard 8 12 35 
Open 17 17 21 
 
 
2.4.2. Story Task  
Total story performance was the combined score for the two atypical and two 
typical conditions (0-4). A one sample t-test was carried out for total story 
performance against chance levels set at 2. Scores did not differ significantly from 
this chance level, t(54)=.88, p=.38. Performance in the typical condition (M=1.2) 
exceeded that of the atypical condition (M=.98). At the group level, performance in 
both conditions was not significantly different from chance. However, in the case of 
typical condition performance was approaching significance against the chance level, 
t(54)=1.9, p=.062. Even when children who had committed realist errors were omitted 
from the analysis, in order to examine only those children who were able to inhibit 
realist responses, the difference between the two conditions did not reach 
significance. 
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Figure 2.6. Mean performances on the Typical and Atypical conditions of the Story 
task. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Although the means for our Story tasks varied to those reported in Rafetseder 
and Perner (2010), the pattern of performance was similar with performance in the 
typical condition exceeding performance in the atypical condition (Figure 2.6.). 
However, in our sample, the difference between performance in these two conditions, 
typical and atypical was not significantly different from chance as measured by a 
paired samples t-test, t(54)=1.9, p=.08. Mean performance across the conditions 
correlated positively with one another, r=.3, p=.027. There were more typicality error 
types (M=.8), than atypicality error types (M=.5) (see Figure 2.7.). However, this 
difference was only approaching significance, t(54)=1.8, p=.07. 
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Figure 2.7.  Column chart showing number of typical and atypical errors recorded 
during the stories task. 
 
2.4.3. Relationship Between Tasks 
 The open condition proved difficult for children and as Beck et al. (2006) 
pointed out there was no single correct answer available for children. In the open 
question children could theoretically have identified and infinite number of other 
possibilities as to where the ball could have gone, this was reflected in some children 
pointing to the ceiling or elsewhere in the room when asked the open question. 
Additionally the form of these questions was designed to elicit other possibilities from 
the children and not specifically identify one counterfactual outcome, this is despite 
asking the children to mentally represent another course that at one point could have, 
but could no longer have been taken. Given that we wished to compare performance 
on two specific types of causal reasoning in which a defined correct and incorrect 
answer could be identified it was deemed prudent to remove the open condition 
results from this phase of the analysis as a direct comparison could no longer be 
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drawn. Due to the performance distribution on the open condition of the Slide task it 
was decided to remove it from the comparison analyses with the story task. 
Mean performance in the standard condition of the Slide task (M=1.5), 
exceeded that of the Story Task as analyzed using a paired sample test (adjusted 
M=1.1), (Figure 2.8.). This difference is significant, t(54)=-.42, p<.001.  
 
Figure 2.8. Means performance on the Slide and Story tasks. Error bars represent 
standard error. * Represents a significant difference between bars p<.05. 
 
Table 2.2. shows the correlations between the conditions of our two tasks. 
Across task significant moderate positive correlations were demonstrated between the 
Standard condition and the Typical condition, in addition to the Atypical condition 
(see Table 2.2.). As expected the Standard condition was significantly easier than both 
the Typical (t(54)=-2.4, p<.05), and Atypical conditions of the story task (t(54)=4.5, 
p=.001).   
 
Table 2.2. Pearson’s correlations between the stories task and standard condition of 
the Slide task.  
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 Typical Atypical Standard 
Typical 1 .298* .275* 
Atypical  1 .36** 
Standard   1 
 * p<.05 **p<.01  
 
In addition, following a regression analysis of the error types made in the 
Stories task, performance on the Standard condition of the Slide task emerged as a 
significant negative predictor of the number of Realist errors across the Story Task 
R²=.25, F(1,53)=17.7, p<.001. Realist errors are those in which the subject continues 
to place the protagonist at the same end location as in the initial dialogue, despite the 
false antecedent being introduced. Participants making fewer realist errors in the 
standard Slide task also generated fewer realist errors in the Story task. When realist 
errors are partialled out the correlation between tasks disappear.  
There were more Typical errors =34 (incorrect selection of the typical 
location), than Atypical errors =22 (incorrect selection of the atypical location). 62% 
of children made one or more typicality error, whilst only 40% made one or more 
atypicality error. However, this difference just failed to reach significance t(54)=1.8, 
p=.07. 
Finally we wanted to establish whether the order of performance seen, with 
the Slide task, standard condition being passed first and the story task second was 
statistically significant, i.e., that passing the Slide task was a precursor to passing 
Story task. The Slide task was significantly easier than the story task and when 
performance was cross-tabulated it was evident that children very rarely passed the 
Story tasks having failed the Slide task. Success on the standard Slide task was a pre-
requisite for success in the story task, Pearson χ2=11.73, df=1, p<.001. 
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2.5. Discussion 
 Our first aim was investigate how our results compared with those of previous 
authors using the same tasks (Beck et al., 2006; Beck & Guthrie, 2011; Rafetseder & 
Perner, 2010). The location change counterfactual Slide task’s standard condition saw 
64% of participants answer both test items correctly with a mean of 1.5. It is difficult 
to make a direct comparison with the data reported in Beck and Guthrie (2011) as 
their sample groups had a mean age of 3.9 years for the younger group and 5.0 for the 
older. However, their mean scores for the standard condition were 1.3 and 1.6 
respectively so as expected our sample of mean age 4.4 scoring 1.5 fell between these 
two. Also as expected, the 64% of children who answered both standard questions 
correctly also fell between the two groups reported in Beck and Guthrie (2011), 49% 
for the younger group and 74% for the older group. In the open condition our samples 
mean score of 1.1 again fell between the two means reported in Beck and Guthrie of 
1.2 for the younger group and 0.8 for the older (Beck & Guthrie, 2011). As with our 
sample, both of their groups were better than chance in the standard condition but not 
the open condition. We too identified the previously reported pattern of unpredictable 
responding in the Open condition of the Slide task (Beck & Guthrie, 2011). Due to the 
erratic performance in this condition for our sample we chose to withdraw the open 
condition results from future planned analyses. The structure of the question was not 
being consistently interpreted as a counterfactual, or even a basic conditional 
reasoning problem given the chance responding reported. The patterns of 
performance, and how they relate to other measures should be investigated more 
comprehensively in future works but are not suitable to be included here specifically 
as an index of counterfactual reasoning. 
 Story task performance for the atypical condition in our study reached almost 
50% with a mean of .98: children were performing at chance levels. The typical 
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condition was slightly more successful with a mean of 1.2. These scores are markedly 
higher than those for the 4.4 year olds reported in Rafetseder and Perner (2010). 
However, only 13 children of this age were tested in the original study compared to 
55 in the current study. 
Rafetseder and Perner (2010) further reported that the majority of the four 
year-olds in their study picked out the realist location. This response was fairly rare in 
our sample with only 13 of the 55 children generating one or more realist errors. Only 
30 realist errors were recorded out of 220 responses (14%). We must then disagree 
with their conclusion that four-year-old reasoners preferentially pick the real location 
in this task.  
Rafetseder and Perner also reported that younger three-year-old participants 
answered in a basic conditional reasoning congruent way, that is they preferentially 
made typicality errors in the atypical condition but answered correctly in the typical 
condition. This younger group of children made fewer realist errors than the older 
group. The authors suggested that the younger children reason in a very basic 
conditional reasoning structure where they focus on the problem in isolation and 
answer in a semantically congruent way. The older children, however, are suggested 
to make more realist errors as they understand that the question relates to where the 
protagonist is now, but fail to integrate all the relevant information about said 
protagonist in relation to the counterfactual antecedent so answer with reality. Only 
when children become even older (Rafetseder & Perner suggest) do they begin to 
reject the realist answer but still not have integrated information successfully enough 
to reliably pick the correct location, when it is semantically incongruent. In our 
sample only 7% of children answer as realists across the board, 7% answer 
systematically in a basic conditional way and 13% answer in a consistent 
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counterfactual manner. That leaves the overwhelming majority of 71% answering 
using a mix of strategies. We must conclude then that by fifty-two months of age 
children do not answer as realists when given counterfactual reasoning problems, 
however, they do not appear to have adopted a consistent strategy when it comes to 
reasoning about counterfactual situations. 
Also in contrast to the findings reported by Rafetseder and Perner we did not 
find a significant difference in performance between the typical and atypical 
condition. Although showing the same trend with performance slightly better in the 
typical condition in which the correct answer was also the semantically congruent 
option, there was not enough of a typicality bias present to statistically alter the group 
response patterns in our sample. This result was initially surprising due to our use of 
the same paradigm as their original study. However, Rafetseder and Perner (2010) 
report this specific between condition difference only in reference to their sample as a 
whole. Their complete sample numbered 133, more than double that of our own. In 
addition the age range of this sample was greater with children aged 3;2 to 6;10 years 
taking part. Our sample consisted wholly of children aged 4;4 years. Rafetseder and 
Perner’s 4;4 year sample contained only 13 individuals and no typical versus atypical 
condition difference was reported for this portion of the sample alone. Visually 
inspecting Figure 1., of their results suggests that it is at this age, 4;4 years, at which 
typicality begins playing a more dominant role with performance in the atypical 
condition being poorer to a greater extent in the latter age groups than the former. 
Perhaps then had our sample been several months older, or larger, we may have 
replicated their initial finding. 
Our final aim for this chapter then was to determine whether performance on 
the two types of CFR task was related. The Slide task represented a more established 
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form of counterfactual in which the location of an object would have been different 
given a counterfactual antecedent. The story task provided a more exigent measure of 
CFR that challenged children to integrate elements of reality up to the point where 
they diverged from the counterfactual statement. The story task could only be 
successfully navigated using CFR and not a more basic conditional reasoning process 
that would have been equally successfully regardless of the particulars of the 
counterfactual situation. Despite the difference in difficulty between the two types of 
task there was a strong correlation between performance on the standard condition of 
the Slide task and performance on the stories task. This appeared to be due to the 
pattern of realist errors observed across tasks. It seems then although the demands are 
very different for the tasks, and performance on one is significantly superior to the 
other, there is still a strong positive relationship between them. 
2.5.1. Limitations 
 The inclusion of the Open condition in the Slide task proved problematic. 
Participants answered at chance levels and the structure of the question was, as the 
name suggests, very open. Children were asked “This time the ball went that way. 
Could it have gone anywhere else?” No counterfactual change has been made and 
there was no change to the causal structure suggested. These elements combined led 
to the question being ambiguous and not a sensitive test for the kind of reasoning 
ability we were interested in. We wanted to see how well children could reason about 
causal structures in a counterfactual way. The other questions all suggested a 
counterfactual antecedent of sorts and as such provided clues for children to reason 
accordingly. Beck and Guthrie (2011) also reported difficulties with this question 
finding responses unpredictable. 
 With regard to the Story task in the context of this thesis it may have been 
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beneficial to have included a different exigent measure capable of identifying true 
counterfactual reasoning. The example of the Sweets story given in Figure 2.2 for 
example may have served as a useful template for us to generate similarly structured 
questions in order to give participants a CFR score. The Sweets story example, unlike 
our chosen story task, did not include contrasting conditions in which prior 
knowledge could have impacted upon performance. Although the comparison 
between the typical and atypical condition was an interesting one it may have 
benefited us to have included additional examples of true counterfactual reasoning. 
Having multiple questions, all reliant on true CFR would have afforded us the ability 
to identify children who were consistently able to reason counterfactually   
2.5.2. Conclusions 
 At age four most children are able to reason about an alternative outcome to a 
past event when; the options are limited, the causal structure is visible and the 
question is unambiguous. Being given all the causal information necessary for 
successful reasoning in a concrete and structured way allows children to reason 
successfully about how a change in a past world could result in a change to a 
counterfactual world.  
 When there are several possible counterfactual options, however, and when 
the causal structure of the counterfactual world is not so concretely visible children’s 
reasoning performance is reduced. Having a less structured and more complex 
problem highlights the immaturity of young children’s counterfactual reasoning 
ability. Children are very inconsistent with how they reason about counterfactual 
worlds of this sort, worlds that involve other intentional agents and require the 
integration of multiple pieces of information from reality alongside new pieces of 
information held within the counterfactual statement. 
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 Despite there being distinct differences in performance between these two 
forms of counter to fact reasoning task, there is a strong positive relationship between 
them. Being able to reason in a more structured problem space predicts reasoning 
ability in a less constrained and more challenging counterfactual situation. Such 
results suggest that conditional reasoning ability is fairly consistent across tasks. 
Children who are able to reason more effectively about the consequence of a 
counterfactual antecedent in a highly constrained, concrete situation are also more 
likely to reasoning effectively about the significantly more abstract altered 
movements of a person, in a more complex causal situation, given a counterfactual 
antecedent. Children show contiguity in understanding how an event happening in a 
past reality could impact upon a future reality differing only by virtue of the altered 
element. In the following chapters we shall investigate other expressions of causal and 
conditional reasoning and how effectively they can operate at fifty-two months.  
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Chapter 3. Executive Functions and the Selection of One Response Over All 
Others 
3.1. Abstract 
 In order to make valid inferences about a certain problem children must have 
specific content knowledge about the problem itself in addition to the domain general 
processes necessary to reason about and execute any appropriate responses. Where 
conditional reasoning tasks require the utilization of knowledge obtained, executive 
functioning tasks require the utilization of knowledge provided. Executive 
functioning tasks require no inductive reasoning as the conditional rules and resultant 
actions are distinctly stated. Conditional reasoning tasks require inferences to be 
drawn based on the information provided or obtained through causal reasoning. 
Executive functioning tasks therefore have two inherently informative aspects to their 
construction in the context of this thesis. Executive functions are not only required for 
tasks measuring children’s reasoning about the actual versus the possible but they are 
themselves measures of actual versus possible responses.  In this short chapter I will 
introduce several of the accounts of executive functioning most dominant in 
contemporary literature. Next I shall discuss briefly executive functioning’s 
development and measurement techniques in young children. Finally I will present 
data collected using two standardized executive functioning tasks (the Flanker and 
DCCS from the NIH Toolbox, Version 1) with the same sample of children reported 
in Chapter 2. Our aim was to generate individual executive functioning scores that 
could be compared with our other collected measures of cognitive and communicative 
development. In addition we will go on to assess the relationship between executive 
functions, counterfactual reasoning and mental state understanding in Chapter 4. 
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3.2. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I discussed the ability to reason about specific changes 
to the world. Executive functioning (EF) refers to the higher order processes required 
for all effortful, purposeful and goal directed thought and action, (e.g. Carlson, 2005; 
Gioia, Isquith & Guy, 2001). The main abilities that fall under this umbrella term, 
inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility and working memory have been greatly 
studied in both developmental and adult data sets (see Diamond, 2013 for a review). 
In essence executive functions allow us to represent information, move between these 
different representations and, plan and execute responses based upon them. They 
constitute the abilities required to think abstractly and manipulate ideas. Executive 
functions are crucial for the discovery and retention of new information about the 
world (Anderson, 1998). As such they have been shown to support children’s 
development in a diverse range of areas including social interactions, cognition, 
mental health, school readiness, school success and beyond into adulthood (e.g. 
Anderson, 2002; Blair & Razza, 2007; Diamond, 2005). Verbal ability is also often 
strongly related to EF performance (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Hughes, 1998). 
Executive functioning abilities develop across childhood and into adolescence. Age is 
a significant factor in performance for many of the tasks used to investigate EF 
(Carlson, 2005). Additionally performance on difference EF tasks can mature at 
different rates (Walsh, Pennington & Groisser, 1991).  
For the purpose of this thesis we choose to include measures of inhibitory 
control and cognitive flexibility in our test battery of executive functioning. These 
two measures of executive functioning were chosen due to their structure being 
inherently complimentary to our interest in the actual versus the possible. Both of 
these executive functions are measured using paradigms that challenge participants to 
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select one of two possible responses based on conditional rules referring to an actual 
presentation. Both the Flanker and DCCS challenge children to reason about a 
possible world given an actual world.  
3.2.1. What are Executive Functions? 
There are many more or less altered descriptions of what executive functions 
do. Anderson (1998) describes the ability to shift between response sets, learn from 
mistakes, devise alternative strategies, divide attention and process multiple sources 
of information. Luria (1973) determines EF to be responsible for the synthesis of 
external stimuli, preparation for action, formation of programs, allowing actions to 
take place and verifying the success of said actions. In a recent review Diamond 
(2013) refers to executive functions as a family of top-down cognitive processes 
deployed when reliance on more automatic processing would be inappropriate. She 
deems these processes as necessary when playing with or manipulating ideas or, 
resisting temptation. What these, and other (e.g. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Zelazo, 
Müller, Frye, Marcovitch, Argitis, Boseovski, ... & Carlson, 2003) descriptions 
converge on is the idea that executive functions are at the interface between the 
intention and planning to act and, the subsequent actions and their appraisal: 
executive functions facilitate the movement between reality, the actual world to a 
future, possible world. As discussed in Chapter 2 the ability of children to incorporate 
their’ past experiences and knowledge to their future decision making has huge 
benefits. To achieve an optimal possible state of affairs it is necessary to react to 
reality in the most successful way possible. This requires information about the past 
and prior knowledge being combined in such a way as to initiate the actions and 
behaviors most likely to bring about desirable results. Mature intentional behavior in 
humans goes beyond a simple stimulus response relationship. We may usually get up 
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to answer the telephone when it rings, but if it happens during dinner, at the same 
time as a sales call the day previously, we may instead ignore the ringing as if it is 
important a genuine caller will leave a voicemail. Information from numerous and/or 
diverse sources can be reflected upon in order to come to a reasoned decision, as 
opposed to uniformly deploying the most salient or familiar type of behavior, 
regardless of the specific attributes of a given physical or social situation. In this way 
responses can be innovative and appropriate in a way that goes beyond an automatic 
processing and appraisal of the world. Executive functions are what facilitate these 
possibilities through allowing reflection and inhibition of the most common response.  
Being able to flexibly respond to the actual world to move towards a better possible 
one is the hallmark of strong EF. Executive functions facilitate us recruiting the 
pertinent prior knowledge related to current reality; they allow us to abstractly 
manipulate, appraise and select possible courses of action or behaviors and they work 
to ensure these optimum outcomes are achieved. In this chapter we discuss the tasks 
used to assess EF, and expand upon how the successful deployment of EF is the 
juncture at which children move from the current state of affairs, to a new and better 
world. 
EFs can be identified in terms of what they accomplish more so than how they 
accomplish it (Zelazo et al., 2003). Tasks designed solely to assess EF rely on novelty 
and complexity in order to judge how adept children are at executing “if-then” rules 
in an experimental context. Novelty of both stimulus and task limits any practice 
effects influencing results. EF tasks are interested in the general processes not 
knowledge content of reasoning about the actual versus the possible. CFR and MSU 
tasks in contrast are interested in the process of reasoning as applied to counterfactual 
knowledge and mental state knowledge. Zelazo et al. (2003) identified four main 
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strands of account that focus on different aspects and proposed mechanisms of 
executive function that are briefly described below: Complexity theories, working 
memory, inhibitory control and re-description accounts. 
Complexity theories such as the Cognitive Complexity and Control theory 
(CCC), (e.g. Zelazo & Frye, 1998; Zelazo et al., 2003) suggest that with age and 
experience children are able to represent and reflect on cognitive rules in an 
increasingly hierarchical fashion. Initially children struggle to respond appropriately 
to if-then type statements if there is some form of conflict between rules, for example 
in a card sorting tasks where test cards differ on two dimensions, shape and color. 
When cards are initially sorted according to shape, then participants are asked to sort 
the same cards by color, if there is no integration between the two-rule dichotomies, 
participants will continue to sort along the initially implemented dimension. They 
must appreciate that one card can be either red or blue, whilst also being either a 
square or a triangle. In addition they must be able to selectively attend to the relevant 
dimension in response to the explicit if-then rule presented by an experimenter. 
According to CCC, only when different rules can be incorporated in a higher order 
structure are they able to flexibly move between behaviors based on these rules, 
allowing correct pre and post switch sorting to occur. CCC presumes that children are 
able to represent a nested model of the target stimuli, in this case a card, where two 
sets of conflicting rules can reside concurrently: one set distinguishing the cards on 
the dimension of color, and one set distinguishing on the basis of shape. Prior to such 
hierarchical integration then children will tend to perseverate with a certain pattern of 
responding. This is described as being result of their inability to efficiently build and 
use a suitable problem representation and switch attention to a new dimensional 
feature of the stimuli in question. With increasing levels of task complexity then 
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performance will become harder due to the rules needing to be represented in this 
hierarchical fashion, from which behavioral inferences must then be extracted. 
In contrast, memory accounts (e.g. Gordon & Olson, 1998; Morton & 
Munakata, 2002) claim it is not the complexity of rules that dictate performance on 
EF tasks. Instead, it is the number and/or strength of rules to be held in memory and 
acted upon that determine performance. As memory capacity increases or memory 
processing mechanisms mature, an increasing number of rules can be comprehended 
and applied. Evidence in opposition to such theories has been presented by Zelazo et 
al. (2003). Zelazo and colleagues contrasted performance on a task utilizing four rules 
and two rules and no performance difference was evidenced. More rules do not 
necessarily result in poorer performance, it is the dimensionality of the rules that 
impact upon complexity and performance (Zelazo et al., 2003). 
Accounts that focus on the development of inhibitory processes, specifically in 
EF performance, deem the ability of a mechanism to suppress behavior as key (e.g. 
Carlson, Moses & Hix, 1998; Luria, 1973). Other related accounts postulate inhibitory 
control, alongside memory developments as the mechanism responsible to EF 
performance (e.g. Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1991; Roberts & Pennington, 1999). 
Such accounts blame poor EF performance on an inability to overcome some pre-
potent response when challenged to behave in accordance with some other explicitly 
presented if-then rule. Pre-potent responses can include semantically congruent 
responses such as pressing a button on the right when a right arrow is presented. Pre-
potent responses can also be generated when participants are asked to follow some if-
then rule regarding a stimulus, then a new rule is presented relating to this same 
stimulus. For example being asked to sort blue/red pictures of squares/circles by 
color, and then by shape. In young children 2-5 years of age, sorting based on color 
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will become a transient pre-potent response due to having applied this rule repeatedly 
in the recent past. Inhibition failures, however, need not only occur at the point of 
response control. Kirkham, Cruess & Diamond (2003) suggest that an inability to 
inhibit a certain representation of the problem will hinder performance. Children can 
understand new to-be-applied rules but fail to disengage their attention from 
previously applied or otherwise more salient rules when executing behavior. 
According to Kirkham et al. (2003) children find it challenging to switch their 
attentional mindset despite being able to identify the relevant dimensions. Kirkham et 
al. (2003) have labeled this phenomenon as “attentional inertia” and characterize it as 
a source of cognitive rigidity in contrast to the flexibility that is characteristic of 
mature executive functioning. The authors also highlight the difficulty children face 
in redirecting their attention to a newly relevant dimension. Children’s representation 
of their world, and the tasks they are undertaking within it seem to become more 
flexible with age as children become better able to switch between different 
representations and subsequently alter their behaviors. 
Redescription accounts (e.g. Perner, Stummer, Sprung & Doherty, 2002) 
suggest that children’s difficulty in switching between rules is based upon an inability 
to re-describe a single stimulus in terms of a different dimension. Red objects are red 
objects, blue are blue, when asked to think of these colored objects along some other 
dimension such as shape (squares or circles), there is some difficulty in the re-
description process. Such accounts have been influenced by theories about; children’s 
striking egocentrism, the development of their ability to represent multiple 
perspectives of a given scene and, the idea of mutual exclusivity (Markman, 1991; 
Piaget & Inhelder, 1948; 1956). The authors put forward the hypothesis that general 
developments in understanding different perspectives or representations around this 
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age positively impact upon other specific reasoning abilities. When, at around four 
years, children begin to understand multiple perspectives of a single object or event, 
they begin to be able to base their behavior on this understanding (Perner & Lang, 
2002). 
These accounts differ in their focus and emphases regarding what elements 
ultimately determine EF performance; rule complexity, working memory capacity, 
inhibitory control maturity or re-description/perspective taking ability. As such they 
do not present mutually exclusive theories. Rather, elements of each are qualitatively 
informative with regards the kind of abilities and processes necessary for successful 
EF task performance. 
3.2.2 Measuring EF and its Development in the Pre-School Years 
The aforementioned genres of EF account, although differing in perspective 
and emphasis, assume that executive functioning encompasses the abilities to inhibit 
or suppress some behaviors based on some selected dimensional representation of an 
“if-then rule”. One of the hallmarks of EF failure then is an inflexibility of responding 
when faced with conflicting possibilities (Zelazo et al., 2003). This inflexibility may 
result from an underlying failure to inhibit a response or, a failure to inhibit or 
generate an appropriate representation of the task. These types of inflexibility may be 
a result of restricted WM capacity, immature IC skill, more complex rules than can 
currently be supported or an inability/difficulty in changing perspective. We chose to 
include two widely used measures of executive function. The Flanker task was 
designed to index response control inhibition whilst the Dimensional Card Change 
Sort (DCCS) was designed to tap the flexibility with which participants switch 
between multiple representations of the same stimuli. Specifically we chose to use 
newly developed, computerized versions of these tasks that comprised part of the 
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larger NIH Toolbox Version 1 (Zelazo, Anderson, Richler, Wallner Allen, 
Beaumont, & Weintraub, 2013).  
Inhibitory response control tasks such as the Flanker (IC) challenge 
participants to select a response based on a central stimulus that is incongruent to the 
other stimuli flanking it. The Flanker task for inhibitory control (e.g. Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974; Zelazo et al., 2003) requires selective attention; that is attending to and 
responding based upon a central stimulus regardless of whether the surrounding 
stimuli are congruent or incongruent.  A classic example is being instructed to press 
the left key when a left pointing arrow is presented centrally, flanked by right pointing 
arrows on either side. Flanker tasks typically rely on applying only one rule 
dimension: direction. It allows us to reject a strong internal or external pre-potent 
response (Diamond, 2013). Inhibitory control begins to be seen in the first year of life, 
however, perseveration errors can be seen in tasks measuring IC through the life span. 
Typically perseveration errors, those resulting from a failure of inhibitory processes, 
decline during adolescence (Chelune & Baer, 1986.) Individual differences in both 
speed and accuracy on simple inhibitory control tasks are still developing through late 
childhood and into adolescence (Diamond & Taylor, 1996; Luna, 2009). Deploying 
IC enables an individual to resist the conditioned responses elicited by our 
environments (Diamond, 2013). Without IC we would become enslaved to the 
repetition of the same responses in any given situation without the ability to modify 
our actions in pursuit of different goals and in line with our intentions. Such inhibitory 
control failures would result in continual realist errors during reasoning and the 
absence of any innovation in behavior in the pursuit of possible goals divergent from 
the actual world. Inhibitory control specifically has been related to positive behaviors 
ranging from better concentration during childhood to reduced likelihood for anti-
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social behaviors and ill health in later life (Moffitt, Arseneault, Belsky, Dickson, 
Hancox, et al., 2011). 
Cognitive flexibility (CF) refers to an individual’s ability to rapidly switch 
between response sets based on a change in some explicitly presented abstract rule or 
condition. It supports an individual’s thinking about contrasting semantic, spatial or 
interpersonal perspectives: it allows us to change the way in which we are thinking 
(Diamond, 2013). Crucially cognitive flexibility demands we move between different 
representations of the same stimulus. This can be as straightforward as representing a 
simple object in terms of its shape having previously been interested only in its color. 
A classic task assessing CF involves sorting post-switch cards based on these two 
simple and directly observable dimensions. Participants must sort by color for 
example, having previously been sorting pre-switch cards based on shape (Milner, 
1964). In adult versions of this task the sorting rule will change unannounced and 
subjects must find and adhere to a new rule. In childhood versions the rule is enforced 
by a voice across trials (e.g. Frye & Zelazo, 1998). Young children often persevere 
with sorting according to one rule, despite being competent in identifying the target 
features and having been able to sort them independently in a previous block (e.g. 
Zelazo, Frye & Rapus 1996).  To succeed children must inhibit perseveration 
behaviors and select a new representation that supports correct sorting behavior. This 
contrasts with inhibitory control in that two or potentially more representations are 
competing. With inhibitory control tasks generally the same dimension is being 
attended to, it is the resultant responses that are competing: congruent and 
incongruent.  
Such abilities emerge between 3-4 years of age, but show great improvements 
between ages 7 and 9 (Anderson, Anderson, Northam & Taylor, 2000). CF has been 
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documented as appearing and maturing later than IC (Diamond, 2013). Often tasks 
measuring CF also rely heavily on the inhibitory processes discussed previously in 
addition to working memory. Not only do children have to represent multiple 
contrasting rules, they must also inhibit the recently primed rule in favor of a 
negatively primed alternative (Zelazo et al., 2003). Cognitive control in particular has 
been related to creativity (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). 
Despite their different procedural demands, both types of EF are typically 
assessed through tasks requiring one response to be selected and another rejected. For 
inhibitory control the one to be rejected is highly salient due to some semantic 
relationship. For cognitive flexibility one response adheres to the current or most 
recent abstract sorting rule based on some representation of the target while one does 
not, a contrasting representation of the same stimuli must be attended to. In the most 
basic sense then both IC and CF measure the ability of an individual to not only 
differentiate and comprehend two possible responses, but to correctly select one given 
an explicitly imposed rule. Reasoning tasks then, where children are asked to select a 
response based on their inferences about some content information and the pertinent 
rules implicit there-within, rely heavily on IC and CF. With EF tasks the process itself 
is interesting as the rules are externally generated. Free from the constraints of relying 
on ones own causal knowledge children should be better able to carry out selection 
tasks with a greater deal of proficiency. In addition children should be performing on 
a more level playing field, so to speak, given that no prior knowledge is required and 
the to be applied rules are as a result of the same magnitude for all participants. In 
content based reasoning tasks the type of information being reasoned about is equally 
as interesting and influential as the processes involved due to the requirement that 
rules be extracted from the representations independently. 
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When children engage in a Flanker or DCCS tasks they sit at the interface 
between understanding a rule, intending to act based upon it and executing that action. 
In addition they are in a sense at the same interface between reality and counter-
reality seen in CFR and MSU tasks. If situation A happens in reality they must then 
execute action A. They must infer their future behavior based on the characteristics of 
the current reality. In EF tasks the current reality is free from many of the constraints 
of prior knowledge. Children are being challenged in the target conditions to act 
incongruently with reality: they must change their perspective in order to make the 
correct inference about their future behavior. For the Flanker they must answer in 
terms of stimulus A = response not A. For the DCCS post switch phase they must 
inhibit the positively primed pre-switch sorting dimension in favor of the negatively 
primed post-switch dimension. For both Flanker and DCCS they must inhibit either 
semantically or procedurally pre-potent responses in favor of the response that 
satisfies the if-then rule currently in place. In addition the DCCS, like CFR and MSU 
requires the reasoner to switch their attentional processing to a different 
representation of the same problem. The DCCS requires participants to switch their 
attention from one representation of a card to another. CFR requires participants 
switch their attention from an actual to a once possible representation of a sequence of 
events. MSU requires participants to switch their attention from their own 
representation of the world to another’s potential representation of that same world. 
There are manipulations to EF tasks that have been shown to influence 
performance either negatively or positively. Labelling, demonstrating or otherwise 
scaffolding post switch rules in the DCCS increases performance in even the worst 3-
4 year-old participants (Towse, Redbond, Houstan-Price & Cook, 2000; Kirkham et 
al., 2003). When the salience of a newly presented rule is reinforced attentionally it is 
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more readily adopted in planning and executing behaviors. Leaving pre-switch cards 
upwards, so serving as a reminder of pre-switch rules, works in the contrasting 
manner and lowers post-switch performance in this same demographic (Kirkham et 
al., 2003). However, in children who select the wrong options themselves, there are 
still low levels of error detection when asked to evaluate the selections made by a 
puppet (Jacques, Zelazo, Kirkham & Semcesen, 1999). This contrasts with evidence 
that children have the required rule knowledge, yet it dissociates from actual rule use 
(e.g. Frye, Zelazo & Palfai, 1995). It seems not that young, 3-4 year-old children are 
unable to inhibit some pre-potent response, but more that they are for some reason 
unable to integrate their knowledge with their planned behaviors; they are not 
attending to the correct features when planning and executing their responses. By age 
5 children are becoming much more competent in engineering their future responses 
to align with their knowledge (Frye et al., 1995; Jacques et al., 1999). 
3.2.3. Executive Functions and Other Cognitive Abilities 
Executive function tasks challenge children to infer correct future behaviors 
based upon the application of explicit exogenous rules related to features of current 
reality: If reality A then behavior C (where B represents the pre-potent option). 
Counterfactual reasoning tasks challenge children to infer a counterfactual state of 
affairs based upon the application of causal rules grounded in current reality but 
applied to an alternative world where some alteration has taken place: If not B then 
state of affairs C. Finally mental state understanding tasks challenge children to infer 
mental states based upon the application of mental state knowledge and rules 
grounded in current reality but applied to an alternative world as experienced by some 
other agent: If not my mental state B then their mental state C (see Figure 3.1.). 
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Figure 3.1. Visualization of Common Actual vs. Possible World Demands Made on 
Children During Executive Function Tasks, Counterfactual Reasoning Tasks and 
Mental State Understanding Task.  
 
These three types of tasks share the need to infer, based on current reality, 
some feature of a future, counterfactual or mental state reality (see Figure 3.1.). All 
three are subject to tension between two or more conflicting options, representing 
different representations of the world. What will you do if B? What would the world 
be like if not B? What is their mental state if B? For all three, children must disengage 
from one attentional dimension, be it a sorting rule from the recent past, an actual 
causal chain of events in reality or their own mental state relating to a situation. Once 
disengaged children must switch to a new representational perspective based-upon 
either; an explicit new rule, a counterfactual alteration or, the mental state of another 
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agent. Lack of flexibility in selection and inhibition between these contrasting 
representations will impede successful reasoning. Conflicts between these contrasting 
representations can be weaker or stronger based on factors such as complexity, 
abstractness, salience, recency, egocentricity or prior knowledge.  
Indeed inflexibility, the hallmark of executive function failings, has been 
implicated in poor reasoning about physical causality (Frye, Zelazo, Brooks & 
Samuels, 1996) and mental state, namely false belief, understanding (Wellman, Cross 
& Watson, 2001). It would be expected that functional EF skills are necessary but not 
sufficient for other forms of counter to fact reasoning. Therefore tasks developed to 
measure individual differences in EF processes would be expected to relate positively 
with Mental State Understanding and Counterfactual Reasoning task performances. 
However, it is crucial to be mindful that in Mental State Understanding and 
Counterfactual Reasoning the to-be applied rules that ultimately guide responding are 
not explicit, therefore should be harder to identify and apply than in EF tasks. 
Transformations must be guided by individual differences in knowledge about mental 
states and physical causality. There is less explicit information provided with which to 
generate the necessary representations to be used in supporting subsequent inferences. 
In Chapter 4 we will explore these relations within our own data, looking at how 
executive functions correlate with counterfactual and mental state reasoning. 
3.2.4. Aims 
Our aim for this chapter was to characterize the executive functioning 
performance of our sample through the application of the Flanker and DCCS tasks. 
These tasks on a very basic level challenge the participants to successfully select one 
of two possible world options based on the actual stimuli presented to them. We 
wanted to generate individual executive function scores for our future planned 
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analysis in order to begin answering the question of whether they alone could account 
for the reasoning skill of young children. 
 
3.3. Method 
 
3.3.1. Participants 
Results presented are from the same sample as described in section 2.3.1.  
3.3.2. Measures 
Computerized NIH Toolbox Version 1.0 Flanker and Dimensional Card 
Change Sort (DCCS) measures were used (Zelazo., 2013). This program was run 
using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). As 
described above the Flanker task is a measure of inhibitory control (IC) and the 
DCCS is a measure of cognitive flexibility. 
3.3.3. Procedure 
As described in section 2.3.3 children were invited to the University for two 
visits during which all testing took place. The DCCS task was completed in session 1, 
followed by the Flanker approximately one week later in session 2. Parents were with 
their children throughout the testing period. For both tasks participants were seated on 
a fixed chair facing a computer monitor approximately 60 cm away. This monitor was 
connected to a laptop running E-Prime 2.0 being operated by the tester and whose 
screen was not visible to the children. Speakers were placed either side of the monitor 
and the sound fixed at a suitable level for children to hear clearly. A modified 
keyboard containing only two buttons was placed in front of the monitor. 
Flanker task. The official Toolbox instructions can be found in Appendix C.  
Upon opening the running file training procedures began.  The experimenter read the 
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accompanying text displayed upon the screen during the experiment as the sample 
children were not yet old enough to read these competently unaided. Rather than 
using contrasting arrows as with adult versions of this task children saw static, 
computerized fish on screen that incorporated arrows and were oriented either toward 
the left or right of the screen (see figure 3.2.). Children were told that they were to 
help feed these fish by pressing the keyboard buttons (arrows) that corresponded to 
the direction of the middle fish. They were asked to point to the middle fish to ensure 
they could correctly identify it. Next they were shown instances where all the fish 
were pointing the same way, and instances where the target fish was swimming a 
different way from his friends. They were reminded again that they must always 
choose the button that corresponds to the way the middle fish was facing. Children 
were then able to undertake practice trials. On each trial the program stated the word 
middle to reinforce that there were to respond based on the middle fish. Following 
incorrect responses the computer highlighted the central fish and reminded the 
participant to press the corresponding button. Failure to respond within five seconds 
was also treated as an incorrect response by the program. When ¾ of the practice 
trials were responded to correctly then Phase 1 of the experiment proper began. After 
two sets of practice trials if this cut off had not been met, the testing session was 
terminated with the final thank you screen appearing. In Phase 1 twenty trials were 
presented and for each the word ‘middle’ was repeated once by the program. If 
children exceeded a score of 75% in these 20 test trials in Phase 1 they moved to 
Phase 2. Participants who scored below this threshold finished the experiment at this 
point. In Phase 2 the task was the same except there were arrows only instead of fish 
incorporating arrows to respond to across another 20 trials. Children were reminded 
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of the rules by the experimenter reading the printed instructions, to press the arrow 
button corresponding to the target central arrow on the display. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Photo of the screen presentation used during the Flanker task. Static fish 
incorporating arrows in their body were used in Phase 1. 
 
Dimensional card change sort. Full instructions can be found in Appendix C. 
Upon opening the program children were introduced to the matching game where 
they had to sort cards by color and shape. The computer presented the written 
instructions and the experimenter read them to the participants and highlighted the 
buttons that were to be pressed. The experimenter completed a demonstration and 
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then the participant was instructed to try this. Children either played the SHAPE or 
the COLOR game (determined by the program). In both the practice and test trials 
two pictures were presented that varied along two dimensions, in this case their shape 
and color. At the start of each testing block the computer verbally informed the 
participant which sorting dimension they were to use, shape or color. The central 
stimulus presented was the target and sorting was dependent on its features. For 
example see Figure 3.3. If children were tasked with sorting by shape they would 
determine the central stimulus was a ball and select the other ball. If the sorting 
dimension was color they would select the other yellow object. Children were given 
four practice trials for each of the two dimensions. If the incorrect response was 
chosen, the experimenter would highlight the correct response. Once ¾ of practice 
trials were answered correctly the test trials could commence. If the child failed to 
reach this cut off on the first practice block it was reminded of the rules of the game 
and given another demonstration. If after two sets of practice trials this 75% correct 
cut off had not been met, the testing session was terminated with the final thank you 
screen appearing. 
Participants then completed 5 test trials sorting along one dimension. If 4/5 
were answered correctly they sorted a further five items along the contrasting 
dimension. If children scored less than 4/5 in the first test block the testing was 
terminated and the final thank you screen appeared. Those children who sorted 4/5 
correctly in the second block then moved to Phase 2. In Phase 2 children completed 
30 test trials again sorting along two dimensions, color and shape. Again the 
experimenter read the instructions presented on screen .The computer selects either 
shape or color before each trial and the child must listen for which dimension has 
91 
 
been selected on each trial. In Phase 1 sorting dimensions remained stable across 
trials within a block, in Phase 2 the sorting dimension could change in every trial. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Example of sorting screen presentation for DCCS. Participants were 
tasked to sort based on the central stimulus using either color or shape. 
 
3.3.4. Coding and Analysis 
In line with the NIH Toolbox Scoring and Interpretation Manual two 
Executive Function accuracy scores were generated that reflected the total number of 
correct trials children had completed in the Flanker and DCCS tasks. A correct trial 
was that in which the appropriate response had been executed in response to the 
stimulus. Each correct trial, out of a possible 40, was given a score of 0.125. Final 
accuracy scores for each task were between 0-5, the product of 0.125 * Number of 
correct responses.  
For participants with an accuracy response rate of greater than 80% a reaction 
time vector was further derived in line with the procedure described in the Scoring 
and Interpretation Manual. This score was based on a log10 transformation of reaction 
times for correct incongruent trials in the Flanker task and correct non-dominant trials 
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in the DCCS task only. A score of 0-5 was generated.  Accuracy and reaction time 
scores (if applicable) within each task were then combined for an over all score 
between 0-10. All of this follows exactly the Scoring and Interpretation Manual 
guidelines. 
 
3.4. Results 
Our mean score for the DCCS task was 3.5 (see Table 3.1). The NIH Toolbox 
Technical Manual presents norming data for all the Toolbox measures. For children 
aged four years they reported a mean score of 2.2 and for age five they report a mean 
of 3.5.  Our mean score for the Flanker task was 4.9 (see Table 3.1). This exceeds the 
norms reported for age four (2.8) and age 5 (4.4) but not age 6 (5.8). 
Executive Function computed scores correlated positively with one another, 
r=.45, p<.001. However, when looking at the distribution of scores on these EF 
measures there seemed to be distinct High versus Low groups emerging around a 
mean based on performance, (See Figure 3.4.).  
 
Table 3.1. Table showing mean executive functioning scores for the Flanker and 
DCCS tasks. 
Executive Function Task Mean Standard Dev. 
Flanker 4.9 2.9 
DCCS 3.5 3.4 
 
 
93 
 
  
Figure 3.4. Scatterplots showing our samples distribution of combined accuracy and 
reaction time scores on the Flanker (left) and DCCS (right) tasks. Red lines indicate 
the mean score. 
 
This pattern emerged as a consequence of the format of the NIH Toolbox. 
Children were required to achieve a success rate of >75% on target trials to progress 
from Phase 1 to Phase 2 of the computerized measure. Participants who moved to 
Phase 2 then had increased accuracy scores due to an increased number of congruent 
and incongruent trials. Only those children who scored in total had an accuracy score 
>80% were calculated a reaction time score. This score then boosted their overall 
performance scores resulting in the large standard deviations seen in Table 3.1. For 
the Flanker 18 participants failed Phase 1 while 37 passed. In the DCCS 31 failed 
Phase 1 and 24 passed (see Figure 3.5.). At this age participants are not mostly 
consistently passing or failing the first phase of these tasks. This suggests that both 
inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility are still very much developing abilities at 
this age. 
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Figure 3.5. Number of participants who passed and failed Phase 1 in the two 
computerized EF tasks. 
3.5. Discussion 
  We chose to look at Executive Functioning using these two tasks as it allowed 
us to measure how well children respond when at the interface between the actual and 
the possible. Children needed no prior knowledge, they did not need to engage in 
causal reasoning or chose from a large set of response options. In the target trials for 
both tasks children must reject the semantically or procedurally pre-potent response in 
order to satisfy the imposed conditional rule. These demands align with those placed 
on children during counterfactual reasoning as they must reject the actual world and 
adhere to the nearest possible world. Further in Mental State Understanding children 
must reject the actual world as they experience it in order to reason in line with the 
world as experienced by another. 
Within both the Flanker and DCCS tasks comparable numbers of children 
passed and failed Phase 1. Based on the distribution of the computed scores for these 
tasks children were divided into high and low groups determined by a median split. 
79% of the sample passed phase one of the Flanker while 56% passed phase one of 
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the DCCS. Proportionally then more children performed better when asked to reject 
incongruent stimuli at this age than when required to move flexibly between different 
sorting rules. Although not directly comparable tasks there were many matched 
aspects of the procedure that are informative. Both tasks were presented in the same 
computerized format and in the same testing conditions. Children received the same 
number of trials and needed to meet the same accuracy cut-off thresh holds. The 
general picture then fits with previous research outlining the emergence and 
development of these two different EF measures with inhibitory control maturing 
before cognitive flexibility (Anderson et al., 2000; Diamond, 2013). 
 The DCCS was more demanding in that it requires children to integrate new 
information in an online way in order to plan their subsequent behavior. In both 
counterfactual reasoning and mental state understanding children must also update 
and change their representations of the world and how these changes will effect their 
own behavior and the behavior of others. Children must efficiently use incoming 
information and apply rules to it in order to infer or create a new reality from a set of 
possibilities. 
 For both the DCCS and Flanker tasks our sample outperformed reported 
norms. DCCS performance was more consistent with children aged 5 and Flanker 
performance with children aged 6. The demographics of our sample may have 
contributed to these increased performance levels. The norming sample was chosen to 
be representative of the population of the United States of American and was drawn 
from a number of cities across the country. Families were recruited through the 
databases of market research companies. Further, families were offered a significant 
monetary reward of $90 for completing the single required testing session. A total of 
200 participants per age group (defined as 4 years and 0 days to 4 year and 364 days 
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old) were included in the study. 100 females and 100 males were recruited for each 
age group.  
Our sample all resided in a similar geographical area and were tested within 
two weeks of being 4 years and 4 months old. Our participants were recruited through 
community groups and 28 had been involved in earlier data collections taking place 
monthly for the first 18 months of life. During the four-year testing phase our 
participants took part in two separate university visits as opposed to one. Furthermore 
families were given a much smaller monetary reward in the form of £15 gift vouchers 
and a gift bag. These differences may have altered the diversity of the samples 
recruited. 
 Adult analyses of these tasks take into account both accuracy and reaction 
time scores. Our computed scores were generated in the same way as those computed 
for adults. However, for many of the participants in our sample their accuracy scores 
were below the threshold for computing reaction time scores. As such their scores 
could never exceed 4 on the 0-10 scale. As such the distribution of our scores around 
the mean were polar and the standard deviation high (see Figure 3.3.). It is clear that 
for many of the children in our sample the processing of explicit rules related to 
planned behavior is far from effortless. As such when it comes to the everyday 
planning of the motor or vocal behaviors that make up children’s planned actions their 
processing abilities will also be far from effortless. Integrating concrete, explicitly 
input information dictating the planning and execution of simple selection behaviors 
in EF tasks is challenging for four-year-olds. Even when given all the rules needed to 
make the correct decision children’s moves from the actual to the possible are fraught 
with errors. In both the EF tasks reported in this chapter the need for knowledge is 
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minimized and the number of response options are limited and still many children 
struggled to accurately select the correct possible option based on the actual stimulus. 
When further faced with novel content, and a need for implicitly generated 
rules and the integration of causal knowledge we would expect to see the same 
children experiencing difficulty. Counterfactual reasoning and Mental State 
understanding both require the integration of content knowledge in order to correctly 
infer how some situation will unfold, or to inform the reasoner what the best course of 
action would be. Further more response options are not constrained in the same way 
as the discrete options presented during and EF task.  Inhibitory control and cognitive 
flexibility limitations then may hinder children’s effective reasoning in these domains 
as they are unable to effectively and efficiently manipulate and select the required 
causal information in order to plan and execute the most appropriate goal directed 
action. 
 In the next chapter we will investigate the Mental State Reasoning of our 
sample and relate this to Executive Functioning and Counterfactual Reasoning 
performances. Mental State Understanding requires the integration of knowledge 
about ones own, and others’ mental states in order to reason about some aspect of an 
example situation. Further it tasks children with responding based not on their own 
pre-potent knowledge and experience of a situation, but the mental states of others. 
Much like with EF tasks children must use a causal if-then rule to predict how another 
person will act or what they believe about the world.  
In the final chapter of this thesis we shall be looking explicitly at how 
children’s moves from the actual to the possible, as measured by all the tasks 
presented in this thesis, are related. We shall be examining the relationship between 
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EF and the competence with which children deal with varying facets of the actual 
versus possible. 
3.5.1. Limitations 
 As shown in Figure 3.1 the distribution of scores in our sample was not as we 
had hoped for. Although the tasks were user friendly, reliable and provided 
information rich output we had hoped to capture a more normally distributed data set 
for each EF. As children get older their accuracy scores improve and with that comes 
the ability to generate reaction time scores for all the participants. Perhaps had we 
used a task that did not move through phases based on accuracy performance we may 
have yielded such a score. A future study should consider carefully the likely data 
distribution before selecting EF tasks for this age group to be used in a correlational 
way. 
3.5.2. Conclusions 
 There was great variation in the Executive Functioning performance of the 
children in our sample. 67% of our sample reached the second phase of the Flanker 
task and 56% reached the second phase of the DCCS. It is clear then that at age 4;4 
many children still struggle with immature inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility. 
These tasks allowed us to see how well children could move from the actual world to 
another possible world when knowledge was minimized and options constrained. 
Although our sample’s performance was slightly above reported norms for the two 
tasks, particularly in the case of the Flanker task, performance was still far from 
ceiling in both tasks. Children at this age are still having problems moving from the 
actual to the possible despite clear conditional rules and simple stimuli. 
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Chapter 4. Moving Between Your Actual and Their Possible: Conditional 
Reasoning About the Mind of Another 
4.1. Abstract 
 Young children can be relatively successful when reasoning using simple, 
physically observable, or pre-defined causal rules. When the conditional rules 
necessary for reasoning are internally generated or experienced by another intentional 
agent, however, things become more challenging. Classic theory of mind research 
often utilized false belief tasks to investigate children’s understanding of how other’s 
beliefs impacted upon their behavior (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). More recently a richer story has been presented in which 
typically developing children largely follow the same trajectory when it comes to 
reasoning about many types of mental state, not restricted only to the representation 
of false beliefs (e.g. Peterson & Wellman, 2009; Kristen, Thörmer, Hofer, 
Aschersleben & Sodian, 2006; Wellman & Lui, 2004). There are, however, broad 
individual differences within typically developing groups, as well as group level 
differences when comparing typically and atypically developing young children such 
as those with Autism Spectrum Disorder (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Although mental 
state understanding shares many procedural similarities with other types of 
conditional reasoning the content to be represented and reasoned about can have a 
huge effect on success. In this chapter I will review the development of mental state 
understanding while discussing some of the methods used to assess it. Next I will put 
forward some suggestions about the nature of mental state understandings relationship 
with other nascent abilities. Finally I shall present data again collected from the same 
sample of four year-old children as Chapters 2 and 3 that characterizes the nature of 
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their mental state understanding and provides us with individual differences 
information for subsequent analyses. 
 
4.2. Introduction 
An interest in conditional reasoning and the relationship between the actual 
and the possible for the developing child should take an interest in Mental State 
Understanding for several distinct reasons. Firstly, experimental tests of Mental State 
Understanding frequently (or even typically) involve conflicts between 
representations of the state of the world in order to assess genuine understanding in 
much the same way that Counterfactual Reasoning tasks are important to 
understanding the child’s ability for conditional reasoning. Many Mental State 
Understanding tasks involve a conflict between an independent character’s (inner) 
beliefs about the world and the actual state of the world. This makes direct 
comparisons between conditional reasoning and Mental State Understanding tasks 
theoretically interesting. Second, appreciating the difference between beliefs about the 
world and the way the world actually is seems integral to a full ability to modify the 
world in order to suit one’s needs. One cannot seek out an attractive possible world 
without understanding the actual one. And, finally, one of the main sources of 
information to human beings about how the world could be changed is the overt 
behavior of others. We will be examining this source of information in the subsequent 
chapters on imitation. For the moment, it suffices to say that for others’ behavior to be 
maximally informative, understanding their goals and intentions, that is Mental State 
Understanding itself, is essential.  
In the previous two chapters we focused almost exclusively on the kinds of 
concrete conditional decisions children can make, those based upon physical and 
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observable changes in the world. However, when one begins to speak about those 
causal conditional relationships that are not directly observable in a conventional 
sense a new literature comes to the fore: Mental State Understanding. When children 
see an egg fall to the floor, the resultant causal effect is readily observable, a rather 
messy and slimy area of broken egg. When a person makes a hurtful comment, the 
direct causal effect of this comment may or may not be seen directly and either way 
may not truly be reflecting the resultant psychological outcome. Conditional 
reasoning based on mental states rests upon the same tenets as other forms of 
conditional reasoning. However, the content and causal rules used to generate and 
reason from them rely on inferred representations of someone else’s psychological 
world. It is this representation of the minds of others that marks mental state 
understanding as a “special case”.  
In previous research elements of MSU have been reported under various labels 
such as false belief understanding (FB), mentalizing and theory of mind (ToM). As 
such the research groups investigating the phenomenon of MSU have postulated a 
broad host of theories trying to account for its’ development and cognitive 
underpinnings. This genre of study is broadly interested in the same set of abilities 
when children must reason using information about the mental states of other. No 
longer are children reasoning about their own view of reality, or a counterfactual 
alternative to it; instead children are challenged to reason about the world as 
represented by another intentional agent.  
4.2.1. What is Mental State Understanding? 
Mental states can include but are not limited to intentions, desires, thoughts, 
beliefs, dreams and pretense (Baron-Cohen, Ring, Moriarty, Schmitz, Costa & Ell, 
1994). Researchers have sought to gather evidence of mental state understanding 
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through probing the limits of children’s knowledge about how mental states are 
causally linked to perceptual inputs, behaviors and of course other mental states 
(Flavell, 2000). MSU is one of the socio-cognitive tools that enable us to navigate our 
social worlds efficiently through being able to understand past behaviors, and predict 
future ones (Moore & Frye, 1991). Some researchers have gone as far as to claim that 
mental state understanding is so important that adults implicitly track the knowledge 
and belief states of others, regardless of whether there is any explicit pressure to do so 
(van der Wel, Sebanz & Knoblich, 2014).  
Mental state understanding (MSU) as we shall measure it refers to an 
individual’s ability to understand and reason about the thoughts, feelings, intentions, 
desires and beliefs of others (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Flobbe, Verbrugge, Hendriks 
and Kramer (2008) do not see MSU as just one mental ability, but a collection of 
lesser processes being deployed as and when required. To classify as MSU these 
processes are necessarily related to reasoning about others’ mental states. In a thread 
not dissimilar to the re-description account of EF explored in the previous chapter 
(Perner et al., 2002), mental state understanding requires children move away from a 
Piagetian egocentric world view and towards an appreciation of multiple perspectives 
(Flavell, 2000). Children must remove or pause their own mental states from the 
reasoning equation. 
 Many of the investigations into MSU have used the popular marker of false 
belief understanding as a proxy for MSU more generally (Shahaeian, Peterson, 
Slaughter & Wellman, 2011; Wellman & Liu, 2004). However, MSU can be indexed 
using any task that requires the participant to infer a person’s behavior based on their 
internal mental states (Shahaeian et al., 2011). Although commonly tested using 
paradigms where participants must explicitly indicate their answers, mental state 
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understanding has also been inferred from participant’s implicit looking behaviors 
(e.g. Call & Tomasello, 1999; Clements & Perner, 1994; He, Bolz & Baillargeon, 
2012; Low, 2010; Scott, He, Baillargeon & Cummins, 2012.). Both types of task are 
interested in identifying whether participants will correctly predict the mental state, or 
mental state driven behaviors, of another individual. 
4.2.2. Developmental Investigations into MSU 
The large volume of research carried out into mental state understanding in the 
past two decades has resulted in a corresponding variety of paradigms designed to 
assess this ability. Classic theory-of-mind research most often used false-belief 
paradigms such as the Maxi task or the Sally-Anne tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & 
Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In the Maxi task for example Maxi stores 
some chocolate before leaving the room, his mother then moves the chocolate in view 
of the participant. When Maxi returns the participants are asked a belief question, 
“Where will Maxi look for the chocolate?” To pass this task, children must answer in 
accordance with Maxi’s false belief, not reality. From the information they have about 
the actual world, they must make an inference about an alternative world, based on 
the relevant causal information they possess about how knowledge is accrued and 
how this knowledge informs subsequent behavior. Children are required to reason not 
about how the world actually is but the representation of the world that the questioner 
is interested in, Maxi’s world. In one dimension this contrasts with the type of 
counterfactual reasoning tasks presented in chapter 2, where an element of the actual 
world has been hypothetically changed, mental state understanding tasks ask about a 
world different by virtue of the mental state of another person. However, both tasks in 
a broad sense can be understood as counterfactual in that the representation of the 
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possible world that must be reasoned about to answer successfully is in tension with 
the actual subjective reality experienced by the reasoner. 
By the age of four or five typically developing children begin to consistently 
answer false belief questions correctly (e.g. Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, mental state reasoning more broadly extends 
beyond understanding another’s false belief. When children reason about others’ 
minds they need not only represent their beliefs but also other psychological states. 
The desires, intentions, thoughts, emotions, dreams, pretense and knowledge of other 
individuals for example can also be represented and reasoned about (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1994). Though these psychological states are conceptually different from one 
another they all fall under the umbrella of mental state reasoning. Given our interest 
in how children navigate from the actual to the possible it was important for us to 
examine reasoning ability with a range of psychological states, not simply false 
beliefs. Further we wanted to find a measure of mental state reasoning that gave us a 
scale of performance rather than a pass/fail dichotomy. 
Wellman and Liu (2004) developed such a battery of scaled tasks in order to 
provide some way of indexing mental state reasoning performance across childhood. 
They wished to provide a set of tasks that measured the aforementioned conceptually 
different elements of mental state understanding, that is not only false belief 
understanding, while controlling for, as far as possible, the influence of task demands 
on performance. The tasks were chosen and ordered based on literature about the 
kinds of mental states that children seemed able to reason about more easily than 
others at different stages in development. The final, highly replicable scale has been 
administered cross culturally and to different age ranges. It includes: 
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(i) Diverse Desires: This tasks challenges children to indicate which snack a 
protagonist a will choose to eat, a carrot or a cookie. Children are shown 
pictures of the two snacks and asked which they would prefer to eat. Once 
they have indicated a preference the protagonist (a puppet) is introduced to 
the scene. The children are told that he does not like their choice, what he 
likes most is the other option. To answer correctly children must indicate 
the snack that the protagonist prefers. This task assesses the ability to infer 
a character’s behaviour based on their diverse desire. 
(ii) Diverse Belief: Structured in the same way as the previous item. Children 
are shown two pictures, a garage/shed and a bush. They are told that Linda 
is looking for her cat and asked where they think Linda’s cat might be 
hiding. Once they indicate their belief they are told that Linda thinks her 
cat is in the contrasting location. The belief question is then given “Where 
will Linda look for her cat, in the garage or in the bushes?” To answer 
correctly participants must answer in accordance with Linda’s belief. 
(iii) Knowledge Access: An opaque box is presented to the participant and they 
are asked to guess what is inside. The contents are then revealed, a plastic 
ball. The box is closed again and Polly the puppet is introduced to the 
scene. Polly has never ever seen inside this box. The participants are 
asked, “Does Polly know what is in the box?” and “Has Polly ever seen 
inside the box?” To be correct children must answer both elements 
correctly, that is in line with Polly’s available knowledge. This task 
requires children to infer that Polly will not know what is inside the box, 
given the fact she has not seen inside. 
106 
 
(iv) Contents False Belief: A familiar iconic container is shown to participants 
(e.g. Smarties Tube, Maltesers Box). Children are asked what they think is 
inside and are then shown the true unexpected contents, a pen. The 
container is closed and Peter, another puppet is introduced who has never 
seen inside the container. Participants are asked what Peter thinks is in the 
container, e.g. Smarties or a pen, and whether he has ever seen inside. Like 
the knowledge access task children must answer both correctly to pass. 
This task requires children to infer that seeing the iconic container will 
cause the protagonist to expect the iconic contents, not a pen. 
(v) Real-apparent Emotion: Children are told a story about a boy who had a 
mean joke told about him in front of his friends. The boy doesn’t want his 
friends to know how he feels about the joke as they would call him a baby 
so he tries to hide how he felt. Children are asked to indicate how they boy 
feels inside and on his face by pointing to emotion faces. If, when asked 
about how the boy tries to look on his face, they indicate a more positive 
emotion face than when asked about how he feels inside, then they are 
credited as having passed the task. This task challenges children to 
understand that a person may feel one way on the inside but choose to look 
another way on the outside for some reason. 
 
It is reported that around 80% of children pass these tasks in the order they are 
presented above (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Diverse desires tasks are the first to be 
conquered with upwards of 95% of three-five year olds giving the correct response. In 
contrast only 32% of the same sample were successful on the real-apparent emotion 
task. Similar trajectories have been reported in Australian and German children 
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(Peterson & Wellman, 2009; Kristen, Thörmer, Hofer, Aschersleben & Sodian, 2006) 
(although see differing cultural trends in Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter and Wellman 
(2011) and Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu and Liu (2006)). As with other types of 
conditional reasoning, MSU relies on identifying if-then relationships, in this case 
between mental states and behaviors. This content specific information can come 
from the self or from interactions with and observations of other intentional agents. 
Generating causal dependencies such as when I, or person A, want X, we choose X. If 
I, or person A believe X, we act in accordance to X and so on. These kind of causal 
dependencies must come about from experience of attributing actions to mental states. 
As such many social abilities may be linked to superior MS reasoning. 
Generating representations of those causal dependencies driven by others’ minds 
is a more challenging task than generating representations of causal relationships 
physically observable in the world as the antecedents are often not observable. As 
discussed briefly in earlier chapters the relationship between an egg falling and an egg 
smashing is observable: the relationship between a person’s desire for a cookie, and 
them eating a cookie is not. The hierarchical nature of children’s proficiency with 
different types of MSU reflects the commonality and ease of identification of those 
mental states. People more often act in accordance with their own desires than in 
accordance with some false belief. As such children have less experience with 
observing actions undertaken in accordance with false beliefs. The case of real versus 
apparent emotion also highlights this. Children can only see apparent emotions: the 
idea of a true emotion hidden behind an apparent one is a complex attribution only 
possible when children possess very proficient meta-cognitive skills. 
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4.2.3. The Relationship Between Young Children’s MSU and Other Developing 
Abilities 
MSU, as measured through a variety of false belief and other tasks, has been 
related positively to many other linguistic, social and cognitive skills and abilities 
throughout childhood. Milligan, Astington & Dack (2007) assert that without a doubt 
there is a relationship between language and false belief understanding in particular 
based on their meta-analysis of 324 studies. Use of mental state terms in social 
interactions, mastery of tensed complements, syntax, semantic, and general language 
abilities have all shown positive relationships with mental understanding indices 
(Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Brown, Donelan-McCall & Dunn, 1996; Chiarella, 
Kristen, Poulin-Dubois & Sodian, 2013; deVilliers & Pyers, 2002; Milligan et al., 
2007; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005). Due to the correlational nature of some 
studies it has been difficult to identify the cause-effect relationship between language 
and MSU (Brown et al., 1996; Chiarella et al., 2013).  However, in their meta-
analysis Milligan et al. in combination with earlier studies (Astington & Jenkins, 
1999; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002) judge there to be an increased magnitude of 
predictive effect from language to theory of mind understanding than the reverse. 
Earlier measures of language predicted subsequent theory of mind developments 
whilst the opposite was not the case. Milligan et al. surmise that this direction of 
effect is due to language skill affording children the opportunity to represent and 
communicate false beliefs. 
Social behaviors such as a shy temperament, moral judgments, observant, non-
aggressive temperament and sharing behaviors have shown similar positive relations 
(Mink, Henning & Aschersleben, 2014; Smetana, Jambon, Conry-Murray & Sturge-
Apple, 2012; Wellman, Lane, LaBounty & Olson, 2011; Wu & Su, 2014). Mink et al. 
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(2014) reported that children with a shy temperament at 18 months had higher MSU 
scores at age 3 years, as measured by diverse desire and belief tasks, and a knowledge 
access task. Smetana et al. (2012) investigated the development of children’s moral 
judgments alongside their MSU developments. They concluded the two skills 
developed in a symbiotic manner.  
Finally, attentional and socio-cognitive behaviors such as early attention 
decrements during habituation, understanding pointing gestures and intention 
understanding have been reported to predict MSU in young children (Aschersleben, 
Hofer & Jovanovic, 2008; Colonnesi, Rieffe, Koops & Perucchini, 2008; Wellman & 
Brandone, 2009; Wellman, Lopez-Duran, LaBounty, Hamilton, 2008). Even when 
general measures of cognitive development such as language, IQ and EF were 
controlled, Wellman et al. (2011) reported that social attention, assessed through a 
decrement of attention paradigm at 10 and 12-months, positively predicted theory of 
mind at 4-years as measured by the Wellman and Liu (2004) battery. Aschersleben et 
al. (2008) also used the Wellman and Liu (2004) measure, however, they also inserted 
an additional false belief item. The authors reported that decrement of attention to 
goal directed actions specifically at 6-months old related positively to the solving of 
false belief tasks (but not the other task items) three and a half years later. Both 
Wellman et al. (2008) and Aschersleben et al. (2008) failed to find a concurrent 
relationship between language and mental state understanding, this is in contrast to 
the findings of Milligan et al. (2007). Wellman et al. (2008) and Aschersleben et al. 
(2008) support a specific social cognition continuity hypothesis. Developmental 
studies such as these have identified a robust link between indices of social cognition 
in the early years. They claim developing an understanding of the social agents 
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around you, and interpreting the actions they undertake as intentional, supports later 
understanding of their mental states, and how these mental states may affect behavior. 
Charman, Baron-Cohen, Swettenham, Baird, Cox and Drew (2000) extend this 
idea by asserting that a shared social-communicative representational system links 
abilities such as joint attention, language, imitation, play and mental state 
understanding. Their longitudinal data provided evidence that infants’ joint attention 
abilities at 20-months were positively related to their mental state understanding at 
44-months. Joint attention, in their paradigm, was assessed through the proportion of 
gaze-switching instances during two experimental tasks designed to be novel and 
engaging to the infant. In addition, like Wellman et al. (2008) and Aschersleben et al. 
(2008) Charman et al. (2000) failed to identify concurrent language and mental state 
relationships. Charman et al. (2000) focus on joint attention in terms of it being in 
pursuit of some social goal at sharing their representation, or mental state of 
perception. They too suggest these early social abilities develop in to more 
sophisticated mental state understanding over the subsequent years. 
4.2.4. Structural and Conceptual Similarities Between Executive Functioning 
Tasks, Counterfactual Reasoning an Mental State Understanding  
For young children to successfully answer mental state understanding questions 
the first hurdle they must over-come is reasoning on the basis of their own desires, 
beliefs, knowledge and emotions: this requires EF. If they do not succeed in doing so 
they will select realist answers, those based on their own mental state, the struggle to 
overcome a “curse of knowledge” (Birch & Bloom, 2004). It is not only young 
children’s performance that suffers in this way as adults given tasks that require the 
prediction of a naïve reasoner’s beliefs about a situation often fail to provide the most 
objectively logical answers (e.g. Fischhoff, 1975). It has been argued that all 
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cognitive tasks require EF to some extent (Alexander & Stuss, 2000). Selecting one 
response over another requires the kind of effortful and goal directed processing 
characteristic of mature EF. However, as evidenced by the disparity between task 
performance in the battery, children do not suddenly shift from failure to success in 
this aspect. Instead different types of mental states are easier to draw inferences from 
than others and they develop in a relatively uniform pattern (with the aforementioned 
exception of Chinese and Iranian children,  (Shahaeian et al., 2011)). It could be that 
inhibiting one’s own desires and instead selecting an incongruent option is easier than 
doing the same for conflicting beliefs.  
However, it could also be that generating a representation of another person’s 
desires is more straightforward than generating a representation of their false beliefs. 
The causal representations they have constructed regarding other’s desires and beliefs 
may not be robust enough to support valid inferences about their behavior. 
Counterfactual reasoning relies on knowledge about the causal relationships between 
the elements of a given situation. Without this knowledge, or an ability to seek out the 
required information CFR will falter. Even once children have the ability to represent 
such concepts as beliefs and desires, they may not yet be able to reliably infer 
behaviors based upon them (Onishi, Baillargeon & Leslie, 2007). As with CFR and 
EF, MSU relies heavily on the ability of an individual to select one valid response, 
over one pre-potent response. Children must answer in terms of a world not yet 
realized, and/or realized differently, rather than one already assembled, contrasting 
the actual vs. the possible, based on their knowledge of causal structure and mental 
states. 
 Given that EF, CFR and MSU are all forms of conditional reasoning, albeit 
with different content and rule bases being required, it should come as no surprise that 
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there are many coalescing links. Executive functions, (both CF and IC) have indeed 
been shown to have a predictive relationship with MSU  (e.g. Benson, Sabbagh, 
Carlson & Zelazo, 2013; Henning, Spinath & Aschersleben, 2011; Hughes & Ensor, 
2007; Muller, Zelazo & Imrisek, 2005). Benson et al. showed an increase in ToM 
performance following an explicit EF training protocol (Benson et al., 2013). 
Furthermore a direct link between CFR and MSU has been suggested and was 
discussed in Chapter 3 (e.g. Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; Riggs et al., 1998). The 
strength of this link, however, is still contentious with as little as 3% of the variance 
being explained (Guajardo et al., 2009). It does seem that structurally CFR & MSU 
tasks have much in common: (i) they require a selection between one more salient and 
one less salient option, (ii) representations must be generated representing two or 
more possible causal structures (the actual and the possible), (iii) a correct response 
must be based on not only the actual world’s events but inferred extensions or 
alterations of them. Where the tasks diverge is that CFR tasks need not necessarily 
involve mental states of any kind (e.g. Beck et al., 2006). Mental states are more 
difficult to represent and draw inferences from than concrete and observable causal 
events where the physical structure embodies the causal one. Therefore the demands 
of each task will vary based on the content within them, how well that content is 
understood and how easily and soundly its’ causal structure is represented. 
 MSU in essence is the ability to understand and reason about the causal 
structure of mental states as MSU requires individuals to make predictions about 
behavior based on their knowledge of the cause and effect relationships of internal 
mental-states (e.g. Shahaeian et al., 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004.) CFR may or may 
not involve mental states but conceptually the tasks that measure these two abilities 
are strikingly similar. For a young child predicting the emotional outcome of others 
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given a situation or set of circumstances can be a challenge. Through their 
interactions children become increasingly exposed to the causal impacts of their own 
and others’ behaviors on the mental states of both themselves and others. When faced 
with making real time decisions that are grounded in the current mental state of a 
given person their ability to incorporate past experiences and select and appropriate 
future behavior to achieve the desired social outcome is being put to the test. Children 
who are well able to decide that taking off their shoes will prevent the floor from 
becoming dirty (based on prior experience) may not yet appreciate that taking off 
their shoes may also prevent mummy from becoming angry. For both children and 
adults, the conditional relationships between actions and psychological outcomes are 
not as readily accessible as the relationships between action and physical outcomes. 
Adults in some situations still fail to use their mental state understanding to 
successfully guide their behaviors (Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003). Never the less the 
same decision-making processes apply to counterfactual reasoning about physical 
causal relationships and mental state causal relationships: it is the type of content that 
differs.  
In addition psychological if-then relationships may not be as deterministic and 
reliable as physical if-then relationships: how your social partner reacts to being 
teased on one day may differ to their reaction on the next, a lesson I am sure we have 
all learned the hard way; an egg falling from a counter will break regardless. For 
mental state understanding individuals stand at the interface between a past 
psychological reality (for themselves and/or for others) and a new one of their 
choosing. Having a body of knowledge about people’s past and current desires, 
beliefs, intentions and knowledge states gives children the unique ability to make 
decisions about how their own actions and behaviors can alter or improve these 
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mental states to achieve some end. Mental state understanding may not always lead to 
a change in behavior, it is a two way street. Simply understanding the mental state of 
another, may influence our own mental state, this alone is a particularly powerful 
effect. 
4.2.5. Potential Benefits of Mental State Understanding for Children 
Mental state understanding has the potential to dramatically increase the 
amount of causal information children are exposed to, and subsequently retain. Being 
able to represent the causal motivations for others’ behaviors and appraise the causal 
repercussions of these behaviors is an invaluable resource. Children do not need to 
personally experience mental states to successfully reason about them in a conditional 
way. Seeing another child become upset because they dropped their ice cream while 
running around will be understood, despite not necessarily having found ourselves in 
the same, or even a similar situation before. We can infer that the consequence of an 
undesirable event will be an undesirable emotion, perhaps to a level that we have not 
experienced ourselves, but can understand, such as terror. Children need not have 
experienced a certain situation to deploy appropriate, or avoid inappropriate, 
behaviors having seen others do so previously. Conditional reasoning about mental 
states, as with conditional reasoning about any event in the world is invariably 
influenced by experience, both personal experience and the experience of observing 
others.  
As we move through the world we see other intentional agents interacting with 
objects and engaging in social behaviors of many types. Some of these have easily 
recognizable goals by virtue of the physical manipulations taking place; pressing this 
lever will open that door. Others are more opaque and abstract posing more of a 
challenge for young humans to understand such as giving some words of 
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encouragement will improve a person’s mood. However, understanding causal 
relationships and understanding the intentions and goals of others’ affords children a 
very unique opportunity, imitation. When children see others interacting with objects 
or one another they observe many behaviors and many outcomes. Many of these 
outcomes will be desirable to the young human, like getting chocolate out of a tricky 
container, or initiating a positive and rewarding social interaction. Seeing and 
understanding which behaviors bring about desirable outcome for others, gives 
children the opportunity to replicate said behaviors in the quest for bringing about 
similarly positive results for themselves: without understanding the conditional 
relationships between actions and outcomes, and possible actions and their resultant 
possible outcomes this would not be attainable. Furthermore without understanding 
that others’ past actions and their own possible future actions are equally causally 
adept at bringing about the same or at least similar outcomes, children would not be 
motivated to imitate. Imitation gives children the perfect tool to stand on the 
shoulders of giants by using information about the giant’s mental states combined 
with the causal repercussions of the giant’s actions to guide their own behavior. In 
Chapter 5 I shall discuss imitation in more detail. 
4.2.6. Aims  
 Our first aim for this chapter was to assess the mental state understanding of 
our sample. We utilized the mental state understanding battery previously detailed 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004). Children would be given individual scores based on their 
performance over the five items included in the scale. These five items were 
interested in diverse desires, diverse beliefs, knowledge access, false-contents and real 
versus apparent emotions. 
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 Having already collected individual differences data about our sample’s 
counterfactual reasoning and executive functions we inspected the data for evidence 
of a relationship between these three variables. Children’s reasoning, both 
counterfactual conditional and mental state, is subject to great improvements over the 
pre-school years and beyond. Processing ease, as assessed via executive functioning 
too is rapidly developing. Aside from these fortuitous temporal factors there are 
numerous structural and conceptual similarities that these three skills share. 
 All three variables we have so far discussed challenge children to reason 
conditionally: They must apply some ‘if-then’ rule to the information they have in 
order to guide their response. Counterfactual reasoning gives children the ‘if’ 
antecedent element, while asking them to reason about and signal the ‘then’ 
consequent. Executive functioning gives children both the ‘if’ and the ‘then’ elements 
removing the need to formulate a novel response. Mental state understanding, much 
like CFR also gives the ‘if’ element whilst the ‘then’ element must be generated. In 
all three responses must be made that predict or change the state of reality based on 
this if-then rule. In CFR and MSU especially, these possible realities are in contrast to 
the actual one currently being experienced by the reasoner. Counterfactual answers 
must be based on a reality that once could, but no longer could be: mental state 
answers must be based on a reality that is perceived by another, be it congruent with 
the reasoner’s representation of reality or otherwise.   
 Of course, as discussed in the previous chapter, EFs are integrally associated 
with the planning and execution of goal directed behaviors.  Our second aim then was 
to identify whether CFR and MSU performance in our sample was positively related 
to EF. It was expected that individual differences in EF would relate positively to 
individual differences in both CFR and MSU. Although there has been a mixed bag of 
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evidence with regards to CFR and EF (e.g. Beck et al., 2010; Guajardo et al., 2009; 
Riggs et al., 1998) we did expect to find some evidence that executive functioning is 
correlated of reasoning success.  
 Our third and final aim for this chapter was to ascertain whether mental state 
understanding and counterfactual reasoning performance were related in our sample 
as has been reported before (Guajardo et al., 2004; 2009; Riggs et al., 1998). Guajardo 
and colleagues (2009) reported that when age and verbal ability were taken into 
consideration the contribution of CFR to MSU, although significant was very small.  
There were some fundamental differences to the measurement methods 
utilized in these previous studies when compared to our own. Guajardo et al. (2004) 
administered a paradigm that recorded children’s ability to alter the antecedent 
element of a counterfactual situation rather than identify a consequent. They asked 
how an outcome could have been changed rather than asking how an outcome would 
have changed given some event. This contrasting measurement decision may be 
observing a radically different skill in the sample. Riggs et al. (1998) who also 
reported a strong positive relationship between CFR and MSU used experimental 
materials that were almost identical for both types of reasoning. Children heard 
different questions, related to the same scenarios, from which their MSU and CFR 
scores were obtained. The very nature of the stimuli being virtually identical may 
have contributed to the shared variance seen.  
 Additionally both the aforementioned studies that reported a CFR-MSU link 
relied solely on false belief tasks as the measure of MSU, or ToM as they report it. 
False belief tasks measure one specific facet of MSU and as we wished to compile a 
more comprehensive picture of children’s mental state reasoning skills we included a 
wider range of items. Indeed due to the nature of the battery there was no classic false 
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belief task like the original Sally-Ann task (Wimmer & Perner, 1990). Instead a false 
contents task was used to set up a false belief.  The false contents task does not 
involve deception in the same way as the false belief task and as such may rely on 
different cognitive processes.  
In counterfactual tasks there is the actual world reality, and then a contrasting 
counterfactual world reality, however, the counterfactual world must be generated 
based on a hypothesized, rather than observed change. So, despite having the same 
number of representations, the false contents and counterfactual tasks have differing 
levels of demand. The counterfactual reasoning items require the generation of an 
alternative world due to some change having been made, whereas the information 
about the false contents world is more readily observable and stays static it: it is only 
the perception of the world that differs, not the world itself.  
If there is a relationship between CFR and MSU and it is driven by having 
multiple representations of the world alone then we would expect to see a 
relationships between our chosen MSU and CFR items. If, however, the classic false 
belief tasks provide an additional layer of similarity, through the need for a change, or 
updating of the world through the integration of new information, then perhaps we 
would not expect to find the same positive linear trend between these two developing- 
forms of conditional reasoning as measured in this study. Riggs et al. (1998) pointed 
out that ToM and CFR tasks both deal with counter to reality beliefs. This is also true 
of the false contents task, however, there has been no need to integrate additional 
information that would change beliefs in the false contents task. In both the false 
belief and CFR tasks not only are beliefs counter to reality but that have also had to be 
updated in light of new information, either the event of Ann moving an item, or an 
alternative antecedent being introduced. 
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4.3. Method 
To assess MSU we utilized a scaled battery of 5-items (as discussed earlier in 
section 4.5; Wellman & Liu, 2004). This battery has been used in numerous 
experimental paradigms and proved a reliable and functional tool for assessing the 
development of children’s understanding of others minds (e.g. Wellman et al., 2008; 
Aschersleben et al., 2008). The items were designed to be as structurally and 
procedurally similar as possible to reduce additional task demands altering 
performance. Each item differed only in the type of mental state component it was 
designed to probe. The items included have been shown to provide variability in 
children aged 4; with above chance performance on the first item and below chance 
on the final. We expected to replicate the pattern of success previously reported in our 
sample of British children. 
4.3.1. Participants 
 Our sample was the same as that described in Section 2.3.1. 
4.3.2. Materials 
The following MSU measure was adapted from the 5-item scale assembled in 
Wellman & Liu (2004) described initially in section 4.2.2. Item one required a 
laminated A4 page with a cartoon picture of a cookie on one side and a carrot on the 
other (counterbalanced across participants with half seeing the carrot on the right, and 
half the carrot on the left), and a small, male wooden doll. Item two also required a 
laminated A4 page. This depicted a cartoon picture of a shed/garage on one side and 
some bushes on the other (again counterbalanced with half seeing the shed on the left 
and half the shed on the right). A small female wooden doll was also used. For item 3 
we used a small, opaque cardboard box (10cm x 10cm x 10cm). Inside this was 
placed a yellow plastic ball around 7cm in diameter. A third small wooden doll, 
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female, was also used. For item 4 we used a popular style children’s juice bottle, 
inside of which was a pen. Again a small wooden doll was required, this time a male. 
Finally for item 5 two laminated sheets were required, one depicting a cartoon boy as 
viewed from behind, and one presenting three simple, genderless, emotion faces; 
happy, sad and, neutral. The dolls for items one through four were all different 
previously unknown characters, Mr. Jones, Linda, Polly and Ben. Two were male and 
two female. All these stimuli can be found in Appendix D. 
4.3.3. Procedure 
Testing took place as part of the schedule described in Chapter 2.3.1. The 
MSU battery was completed in session 1 at the end of children’s first visit to the 
university. The MSU tasks were administered in a purpose built testing room with 
inbuilt digital audio and visual recording capabilities. The experimenter and child sat 
facing one another, either side of a small square table that was covered in a black 
table-cloth. All the materials were stored under this table and were presented and 
removed one at a time. Each item corresponded to a set script (see Appendix D). 
Items were always administered in the same order, with the easier questions before 
the harder: Diverse desires, diverse beliefs, knowledge access, false belief and real-
apparent emotion.  
(i) Diverse Desires: This tasks challenges children to indicate which snack a 
protagonist a will choose to eat; a carrot or a cookie. Children are shown 
pictures of the two snacks and asked which they would prefer to eat. Once 
they have indicated a preference the protagonist (a doll) is introduced to 
the scene. The children are told that he does not like their choice, what he 
likes most is the other option. To answer correctly children must indicate 
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the snack that the protagonist prefers. This task assesses the ability to infer 
a character’s behaviour based on their diverse desire. 
(ii) Diverse Belief: Structured in the same way as the previous item. Children 
are shown two pictures; a garage/shed and a bush. Linda is introduced (a 
doll). They are told that Linda is looking for her cat and asked why they 
think Linda’s cat might be hiding. Once they indicate their belief they are 
told that Linda thinks her cat is in the contrasting location. The belief 
question is then given “Where will Linda look for her cat, in the garage or 
in the bushes?” To answer correctly participants must answer in 
accordance with Linda’s belief. 
(iii) Knowledge Access: An opaque box is presented to the participant and they 
are asked to guess what is inside. The contents are then revealed: a plastic 
ball. The box is closed again and Polly the doll is introduced to the scene. 
Polly has never ever seen inside this box. The participants are asked, 
“Does Polly know what is in the box?” and “Has Polly ever seen inside the 
box?” (memory check). To be correct children must answer both elements 
correctly, that is in line with Polly’s available knowledge. This task 
requires children to infer that Polly will not know what is inside the box, 
given the fact she has not seen inside. 
(iv) Contents False Belief: A familiar iconic juice bottle is shown to the 
participant. They are asked what they think is inside and are then shown 
the true unexpected contents; a pen. The container is closed and Peter, 
another doll is introduced who has never seen inside the container. 
Participants are asked what Peter thinks is in the container, i.e. juice or a 
pen, and whether he has ever seen inside (memory check). Like the 
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knowledge access task children must answer both correctly to pass. This 
task requires children to infer that seeing the iconic container will cause 
the protagonist to expect the iconic contents, not a pen. 
(v) Real-apparent Emotion: Children are told a story about a boy who had a 
mean joke told about him in front of his friends. The boy doesn’t want his 
friends to know how he feels about the joke as they would call him a baby 
so he tries to hide how he felt. Children are asked two memory check 
questions about the stories content, (i) “what did the other children do 
when the mean joke was told?” and (ii) “what would the other children say 
if they knew how the boy really felt about the joke?” They must answer 
both correctly to be awarded points for passing the test questions. Children 
were then asked to indicate how they boy feels inside and on his face by 
pointing to emotion faces. If, when asked about how the boy tries to look 
on his face, they indicate a more positive emotion face than when asked 
about how he feels inside, then they are credited as having passed the task. 
 
Answers were coded by a primary and secondary coder from the recordings 
after all sample data had been collected. The primary coder was the experimenter. 
The secondary coder was an undergraduate placement student who was blind to 
the hypotheses of the experiment. For both tasks coding began once the 
experimenter had finished asking the memory check and target questions. If 
participants did not respond the question was asked a second time. Participant 
responses were coded when they either pointed to or verbalized their choice. 
Coding reliability was at 100%. 
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4.4. Results 
Each child was administered the five item scale from the original Wellman 
and Lui (2004) paper. For each item they responded to correctly (including memory 
checks) they received one point culminating in a 0-5 scale.  The percentage of 
participants who passed the test question for each item can be seen in Figure 4.1. 
Table 4.1 displays percentage success rates for children in three other studies using 
the same battery. Performance on Item 1 the Diverse Desires question was lower in 
our sample than the others. Performance on questions 2 through 4 were in the mid-
range when compared to the others. Item 5 was lower in our sample when compared 
with the others as no child answered both memory check questions correctly and as 
such were marked as incorrect regardless of their test question responses. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Percentage of participants passing each item on the mental state 
understanding battery.  
 
Performance on items 1 through 3 were significantly above chance set at .5 for 
each: Q1 mean=.84, t(55)=6.9, p<.001; Q2 mean=.75, t(55)=4.1, p<.001 and; Q3 
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mean=.73, t(56)=3.9, p<.001. Performance on Q4 (mean=.48) was not significantly 
different from chance. For question 5 performance was at zero. 
As reported in the original paper (Wellman & Liu, 2004) performance on 
questions 2 and 4 were significantly different, t(1,54)=3.25, p=.002, as were 
performance on questions 3 and 4, t(1,54)=3.23, p=.002, and 4 and 5, t(1,54)=7.2, 
p<.001.  
For item 5, the real-apparent emotion question, 25 children answered the test 
questions correctly, however, only 4 children passed both memory check questions. 
Of the four children who passed the memory checks none answered the test questions 
correctly. Conversely only seven children gave incorrect answers to the memory 
question associated with item 3, and two in the case of question 4. In light of the 
coding instructions given in the original battery, and precedent in the literature, we 
chose to remove question 5 for the remainder of the analyses and resultant MSU score 
(Nathanson, Sharp, Aladé, Rasmussen, & Christy, 2013). 
 
Table 4.1. Table Showing Percentage Pass Rates for the 5-Items on the MSU Battery 
Scale  
Study  
Authors 
Mean Age & 
Location 
5-Item Scaled MSU Battery 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Wellman & Liu, 2004 4;7 Years 
N.America 
95 84 73 59 32 
Peterson, Wellman & 
Liu, 2005 
4;6 Years 
Australia 
95 85 82 32 19 
Shahaeian, Peterson, 4;6 95 77 68 36 16 
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Slaughter & Wellman, 
2008 
Australia 
Our Sample 4;4 
British 
84 75 74 48 0 
 
4.4.1. Mental State Understanding and Executive Functions 
 Due to the distribution of the EF scores described in section 3.4 a linear 
analysis would have been inappropriate. Instead a median split performed on the 
Flanker and DCCS data was used in a one-way ANOVA to assess whether those in 
the high group outperformed those in the low group. 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean MSU scores of participants in the high and low Flanker median 
split groups. Error bars represent standard error. 
  
Those in the high Flanker group performed better on the MSU battery, 
however, this relationship was only approaching significance, F(52)=3.5, p=.066 (see 
Figure 4.2.). No such relationships were seen when DCCS was used as the 
independent variable F(52)=.49, p=.49.  The largest difference between groups (for 
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both Flanker and DCCS) was seen in Q1 of the battery. Given performance being 
highest on Q1 this was not surprising, those who failed may have done so due to EF 
weakness.  
 Given these weak individual relationships we created a composite EF 
variable. We split subjects into 3 groups based on their overall EF scores on both 
items. In this Composite measure those who were in the Low group for both Flanker 
and DCCS scored 0, those who were High in one and Low in the other scored 1 and a 
score of 2 was given to those who were High in both. A pairwise comparison was 
conducted that showed significant difference on question one between the top and 
bottom EF groups (p=.024 adjusted for multiple comparisons), although a one-way 
ANOVA was marginal, F(52)=2.8, p=.07. Every child in EF composite group 2 
answered Q1 correctly whereas only 71% did so in Group 0 (Figure 4.3.). As such we 
did additional against chance analysis of the three groups on each of the MSU items 
to establish if there was some underlying relationship between EF generally and MSU 
(Table 4.2. and Figure 4.3.). 
 
 
0	0.2	
0.4	0.6	
0.8	1	
1.2	
EF:	0	 EF:	1	 EF:	2	
M
SU
	Q
1	
m
ea
n	
sc
or
e	
EF	composite	groups	
127 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean performances on MSU question one in each of the EF composite 
groups. Error bars represent standard error. 
 
Table 4.2.  
Mental State Understanding Performance, Compared to Chance (.5), Based on 
Composite Executive Functioning Scores. 
Composite EF 0 1 2 
MSU Q1 T(18)=2.05 T(21)=3.53*** 100% 
MSU Q2 T(18)=1.81 T(21)=1.58 T(16)=2.24*** 
MSU Q3 T(18)=1.68 T(21)=3.53*** T(16)=1.751* 
MSU Q4 T(18)=0 T(21)=-.65 T(16)=.49 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.0085 (Bonferroni correction lowering p to .0085) 
 
 Participants in the lowest EF composite group did not perform above chance 
levels on any of the MSU items (Table 4.2.). However, children in the highest group 
performed above chance on items 1, 2 and 3. Performance on item 4 was at chance 
levels therefore as expected there were no significant between group differences. 
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Figure 4.4. Mean performances on the mental state understanding battery items for 
each of the composite EF groups. Errors bars represent standard error. 
 
4.4.2. Mental State Understanding and Counterfactual Reasoning 
 There were no significant linear relationships between MSU and composite 
CFR performance, r=.05, p>.05 (see Figure 4.5.) and no between group differences in 
performance based on either variable. No trends were identifiable with performance 
showing only very weak positive correlations. As MSU is a form of conditional 
reasoning we had expected to find that BCR and CFR correlated with it.  
 
Figure 4.5. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing MSU battery scores and CFR 
composite scores. 
 
4.4.3. Counterfactual Reasoning and Executive Functions  
 As mentioned previously due to the distribution of the EF scores a linear 
analysis would have been inappropriate. Instead a median split performed on the 
Flanker and DCCS data was used in a one-way ANOVA. We then created a 
composite score for counterfactuals, aggregating participants’ raw scores on the 
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standard Slide task and Story task. Despite performance being higher for both EF 
groups there was no significant main effect for the Flanker, F(54)=1.7, p=.2, or the 
DCCS, F(54)=1.7, p=.2 (see Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.6. Mean Performances on the Composite Counterfactual Reasoning Measure 
for the High and Low Median Split Groups on the Flanker and DCCS. 
 
Given these weak individual relationships and in order to better understand the 
relationship between EF and CFR, we split subjects into 3 groups based on their 
overall EF performance as in section 4.4.1. This allowed us to rank children in terms 
of their overall EF skill. Group 1 were on the lower end of the scale and group 3 on 
the higher. One-sample T-tests were then performed based on this composite variable 
to ascertain whether performance could be related to it (Table 4.3 and Figure 4.7.). 
This method of testing was also employed in Beck & Guthrie, (2011). We 
hypothesised that those in the high group would perform better on the CF tasks.  
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Counterfactual Reasoning Performance, Compared to Chance, Based on Composite 
Executive Functioning Scores. 
Composite EF 0 1 2 
Stories Total T(13)=-.586 T(20)=-.175 T(19)=2.698** 
Typical T(13)=.694 T(20)=.252 T(19)=2.629* 
Atypical T(13)=-1 T(20)=-.623 T(19)=1.751 
Standard T(13)=-1 T(20)=4.24*** T(19)=3.24*** 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.0085 (Bonferroni correction lowering p to .0085) 
 
Visually the expected pattern emerged with performance being lowest for 
group 0 and highest for group 2 (see Figure 4.8). Those children in group 1 or 2 on 
the Composite EF measure scored statistically above chance in the Standard condition 
of the Slide task, t(20)=4.2, p<.0085 and t(19)=3.2, p<.0085. Those in Group 0 
performed at chance. Additionally participants in group 2 were the only group who 
performed above chance in the Typical condition, t(19)=2.6, p<.05. 
 
Figure 4.7. Mean performances for each EF composite group on the three 
counterfactual conditionals. Error bars represent standard error. 
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4.5. Discussion 
 The first aim for this chapter was to characterize our sample’s mental state 
understanding abilities. As seen in the original and subsequent papers detailing the 
battery, performance declined across the items (Peterson et al., 2005; Shahaeian et al., 
2008; Wellman & Liu, 2004.) We broadly replicated the findings of Wellman and Liu 
(2004) with earlier questions being significantly harder than later ones except in the 
case of items 1 and 2.  The majority of participants answered entirely in the expected 
order (70%). When compared with the other English-speaking samples reported in 
Table 4.1 our participants were slightly lower than expected on items 1 and 5 in 
particular. This being said our sample had the youngest mean age of the four reported 
studies. Furthermore our children were all the same age, the other studies reported 
data from a sample varying between the ages of three and five years. For our 
participants over all performance was good on the first three items, Diverse Desires, 
Diverse Beliefs and Knowledge Access. The False Contents and Real/Apparent 
Emotions questions, however, were, as expected, significantly more difficult.  
 The second aim we had set out was to investigate relationships between 
Executive Functions, Counterfactual Reasoning and Mental State Understanding. 
Although there was no overall significant main effect between EF and CFR or MSU, 
the group performance breakdowns (Table 4.2. and Table 4.3.) clearly show a trend 
for children with higher EF scores to be those performing to a higher standard. 
Children in the highest EF group performed above chance in MSU items 1-3 while 
those in the lowest group failed to perform above chance levels in any of the items. A 
similar story emerged with EF and CFR. Children in the highest performing EF group 
scored above chance in the typical stories and standard slides tasks whereas those in 
the lowest EF group did not outperform chance on any of the CFR measures. This 
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pattern of results suggest that EFs, despite being necessary for the planning and 
execution of goal directed actions, and although also measured through the 
application of if-then rules, were not sufficient or wholly responsible for conditional 
reasoning about the actual versus the possible. This is conditional reasoning measured 
both through counterfactual situations or mental state reasoning tasks. 
 Finally speaking to our third aim, and in contrast to previous research in which 
positive MSU and CFR relationships were reported (e.g., Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 
2004; 2009; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson & Mitchell, 1998), our data did not show any 
positive relationship between performances on the two tasks.  
4.5.1. The Measurement of MSU 
In our study we used a battery to assign a MSU score to each child where as in 
the aforementioned studies only classic location change false belief tasks were used. 
We chose to measure MSU (as opposed to simply false belief) for several reasons. We 
wanted to generate an individual differences score that reflected children’s mental 
state understanding as a whole, and was not restricted only to the understanding of 
false beliefs. We also wished to use a scale or measure that had precedence in the 
literature and that we could be confident was a reliable measure of MSU. Both Riggs 
et al. (1998) and Guajardo et al. (2004; 2009) used false belief items exclusively. The 
Wellman and Liu battery did not contain a false belief item of the same structure as 
utilized by the other authors. Instead a false contents task that led to the protagonist 
having a false belief from the outset, was used in our study. The nature of this false 
contents task is strikingly different to that of the classic false belief due to the lack of 
new information being integrated to generate the correct answer. The false contents 
task does not involve deception in the same way as the false belief task and as such 
may rely on different cognitive processes. It could be that in retaining the extra 
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deception element the Sally-Ann false belief type tasks become more similar to a 
counterfactual task in having gone beyond a simple false belief through the addition 
of another layer or piece of information regarding how the belief came to be false. In 
the Sally-Ann paradigm three perspectives of one world are involved, the 
participant’s reality, Sally’s reality and Ann’s reality which all contrast but have the 
same temporal qualities.  In the false belief paradigm some event has changed the 
situation, namely Ann’s moving of an object. In the false contents task there is only 
the participant’s reality and the protagonists’ perspectives of reality contrasting, no 
change or alteration of the world has occurred, therefore it may be more readily 
solved.  
In counterfactual tasks there is a similar need for a change or updating of 
reality, in this case into a counterfactual alternative. In both CFR and the false belief 
task the actual world reality, and then updated counterfactual/false belief world 
realities are contrasting. The counterfactual world, unlike the false belief world, 
however, must be generated based on a hypothesized, rather than observed change.  
So, despite having the same number of representations, the false contents task 
and counterfactual story task we used have differing levels of demand. The 
counterfactual reasoning items require the generation of an alternative world due to 
some change having been made, whereas the information about the false contents 
world is more readily observable and remains static; it is only the perception of the 
world that differs, not the world itself. Furthermore there are no additional temporal 
demands made during MSU tasks: although there are different representations of the 
world they were all generated at the same time and about the same time. For CFR 
tasks this added level of representational difference, a temporal difference, may be 
contributing to the decreased performance  
134 
 
In addition to both of their tasks requiring updated or changed representations 
Riggs et al. (1998) matched the materials used to test both false belief understanding 
and counterfactual reasoning in their sample. This meant that they shared the same 
content and structure while varying only in the type of question asked of the 
participants. The strong, shared variance reported then may have been aided by these 
purposefully similar task demands. Riggs et al. (1998) highlighted the shared counter 
to reality beliefs required for children to be successful. The classic Sally/Anne task is 
much more similar to a counterfactual task than the MSU questions used in our study 
for one crucial reason. In the Sally/Anne tasks experimenters are essentially asking 
children to reason about Sally’s belief as if Anne had never been present. However, in 
the Wellman and Liu battery there was only one MSU question that really required 
counter to reality beliefs: the false contents task (item 4). Here children had to reason 
about a protagonist that had never seen inside the distinctive bottle. In this case there 
was a direct contrast between what a blind protagonist would expect and reality. Item 
four alone, however, still showed no relationship with CFR performance. 
4.5.2. The Measurement of Counterfactual Reasoning 
Guajardo & Turley-Ames (2004; 2009) utilized a very different method of 
assessing counterfactual thinking ability than the current study. In their tasks children 
were asked to generate alternate antecedents to change an outcome rather than 
generate alternate consequents in light of changed antecedents. Children were given 
scores then based upon how many alternative antecedents they could produce rather 
than being challenged to answer correctly about the causal outcome of some imposed 
change. This is a much more creative measurement variable in that children were not 
being asked to identify one correct causal consequent but instead generate many 
possible alternative antecedents. This type of generative measure has in the past been 
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related to primed differences in creativity (Markman, Lindberg, Kray & Galinsky, 
2007). The processing mind-set required to generate multiple alternatives is relational 
as opposed to causal and may rely on largely divergent cognitive abilities. 
4.5.3. Limitations  
 As previously discussed in section 3.5.1 having EF measures that yield more 
normally distributed data would have been beneficial for us. Being able to look for a 
linear relationship between our variables was what we had hoped for rather than 
reducing the data into high versus low groups for both.  
It would have also been beneficial for us to have included a classic false belief 
item in our investigation into the mental state understanding of our sample (as in 
Aschersleben et al., 2008). In doing so we would perhaps have been able to draw 
more conclusions about the relationship between counterfactual reasoning and mental 
state understanding. The inclusion of a false belief task would have allowed us to 
explore the possibility that the structure of the question alone may account for 
previously reported relationships between CFR and MSU. 
4.5.4. Conclusions 
In conclusion we did not find the expected relationship between CFR and 
MSU. This was surprising due to both tasks requiring conditional reasoning abilities 
and the demands of both being conceptually similar in requiring navigation between 
the actual and the possible. Both MSU and CFR require children to select an answer 
not the most salient or personal to them. They must generate and reason from 
alternative representations of the same, or similar scenarios and they must answer in 
accordance with a perspective that is not currently their own.  
Despite these structural similarities then children must be drawing on some 
other resources rather than those shared by the tasks from a processing point of view. 
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MSU and CFR rely on strikingly different types of content knowledge. MSU requires 
the possession and use of knowledge surrounding the mental states of others and how 
causal situations may alter this mental state. Counterfactual knowledge also requires 
causal reasoning knowledge but not in relation to mental states (in this study at least). 
CFR further challenges children to reason in line with the nearest possible world, that 
is children must answer CFR questions departing from reality only where necessary. 
Children often must integrate multiple pieces of information when reasoning 
counterfactually and answer inline with what could have been. This requires children 
to disengage from temporal reality. Mental state understanding questions may in some 
cases be answered in a basic conditional way in that generally people will behave in 
accordance with their beliefs and desires. MSU questions are asked in a current or 
future-hypothetical way, so do not place the same temporal demands on the reasoner 
but they are required to disengage from an egocentric perception of reality. Both CFR 
and MSU then require disengagement and shift. However, one requires a shift to a 
contrasting subjective, mental perspective of the same situation and contingent on the 
same causal rules whilst the other requires a shift to a different temporal 
representation and therefore potentially also a different set of causal relationships 
related to the same situation. CFR then could be argued to be more difficult by virtue 
of the world to be reasoned about being altered and therefore possibly subject to or 
influenced by different causal rules. During MSU tasks the situation remains the 
same, it is just the perspective that is altered. 
  
137 
 
Chapter 5: Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Development of Imitation 
and its Roots in Social Cognition 
5.1. Abstract 
One of our main sources of information about the world are the other 
intentional agents who inhabit it: we do not make decisions in a vacuum (Zimmer, 
1986). Imitation refers to the replication of another agent’s goal directed actions, and 
is crucial for the dissemination of innovative problem solutions (Mason, Jones & 
Goldstone, 2008). Observing and adopting the strategies that others deploy to actively 
change the world around them can prove a cost effective choice. Successful and 
useful imitation relies on understanding the goals of any behavior, and the intentions 
behind them: imitation inherently requires mental state understanding. Imitation is 
another a form of conditional reasoning that is necessarily grounded in the past, but 
also impacts upon the future. A unique feature of experimental imitation tasks, when 
compared to the tasks reported earlier in this thesis is that children’s responses are 
unconstrained and they are not asked to indicate a logically reasoned choice: they 
imitate (or not!) any actions they wish. As such exploring children’s imitation will 
allow us to compare how they deal with reasoning about the actual versus in the 
possible in such an unconstrained setting with how they did so in earlier tasks where 
there was a right and a wrong selection to be made. This chapter will focus on the 
imitation of actions although the same principles can be applied to the imitation of 
speech as explored in Chapter 6. In this chapter experimental imitation data will be 
reported to address the following empirical questions: (i) Can we find evidence of 
faithful imitation in our sample? (ii) Are the patterns of imitation observed sensitive 
to causal information? (iii) Do imitative strategies vary across objects with different 
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features? And (iv) Is imitative performance associated with conditional reasoning and 
mental state understanding?  
5.2. Introduction 
5.2.1. An Introduction to Imitation  
In natural language the terms imitation and mimicry are often used 
interchangeably. In the psychological literature, however, the distinction between 
imitation and mimicry is a crucial one: imitation refers to the replication of behaviors 
interpreted as goal directed, while mimicry can refer to phenomena such as facial 
expression matching or other automatically replicated behaviors such as gestures. 
Imitation has been described as one of the “most critical components of socio-
cognitive development”, (Zmyj, Daum, Prinz, Nielson & Aschersleben, 2012). As 
such, a vast amount of research has been undertaken to identify when children first 
engage in this behavior labeled a “powerful learning mechanism” (Over & Gattis, 
2009). The beginning of this development is seen in first few days of life when infants 
are reportedly able to mimic the facial expressions of their caregiver (e.g., Meltzoff & 
Moore, 77; 83; 89; Nagy, Pilling, Orvos & Molnar, 2013).  
With age, the type and scale of behaviors that children are able to copy 
increases. Imitation goes beyond simply mimicking those around us. Early facial and 
vowel sound imitation relies on no understanding about why these behaviors are 
being executed. For more complex goal directed imitation a recognition that those 
behaviors being carried out by another person can also be carried out by one’s self is 
needed: an individual requires self-other equivalence to imitate in a causally 
meaningful way (e.g., Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 2013; Matheson, 
Akhtar & Moore, 2013; Meltzoff, 2007). Furthermore mental state understanding is 
crucial to imitation as the goals and intentions of the model are central to the decision 
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of what to imitate (Meltzoff, 1995). Children will go far beyond what is causally 
necessary in some circumstances to align with the both the goal, and crucially the 
intention of a model (Gergely, Bekkering & Kiraly, 2002). 
5.2.2. The Beneficial Effects of Imitation 
We are interested in the development of imitation and its relationships to other 
cognitive abilities because imitation is such a highly adaptive strategy for the 
transmission of knowledge between individuals. Imitation is a smart strategy, in a 
way similar to counterfactual reasoning, as it reduces the requirement for personal, 
explicit trial and error experience of the world. Imitation allows children to stand on 
the shoulders of giants. Children need not be innovative in every endeavor they 
undertake. In some situations they need only observe, represent and redeploy those 
motor schemas used by others in the same or similar future situations. When faced 
with a problem, such as how to break into the chocolate cupboard at nursery, they 
need only spy on their peers. When challenged to write their first few tentative letters, 
they need only copy their teacher (not to devalue their achievement!). As they get 
older and wish to bring about psychological changes they may slam doors as their 
older siblings do, or take themselves off to their room. Of course not all behaviors that 
are imitated are so physically large or obvious. Children imitate the voices from their 
favorite cartoon to garner a laugh, or imitate the annoying intonation or 
colloquialisms of their peers.  Imitation allows children and adults alike to play at 
being someone else, sometimes in an obvious way when parodying a character, but 
often in a subtle but functionally useful way. The experiences children have of seeing 
others “do” make their own attempts more likely to succeed. They get a fast track 
pass to skills that may otherwise elude them for many minutes, days or longer to 
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come. Modeling our behaviors on the successes of others is a highly adaptive and 
freely available resource that more often than not will benefit us more than it costs. 
A critical aspect of imitation, however, is that imitation is a learning tool but it 
also embodies the navigation between the actual and the possible that we are 
interested in. When imitating children are conceptually behaving as if they were 
someone else. Children who imitate are effectively reasoning along the lines of ‘If I 
were you I would do this’ and use this process to bring about a possible world based 
on an actual one. Imitation contains a duality much like the one that shall be 
introduced with respect to language later in this thesis. The strategy of imitating 
actions is a tool for change in the world and requires the navigation between actual 
and possible worlds, the world of the self and the world of others, but it also embodies 
this combination of the actual and the possible as imitative acts ammalgamate 
elements of both imitation and innovation. 
The act of imitation, combining the actual and the possible, has the potential 
for providing huge benefits to young children. Children can use imitation to support 
their own learning about the world and their decisions about who to imitate reflect 
this learning based benefit. In the case of a behavior or action being performed that is 
novel to a participant, the characteristics of a model relating to their reliability or 
perceived knowledgability become important (e.g., Elekes & Kiraly, 2013; Lampinen 
& Smith, 1995; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Zymj, Buttelmann, Carpenter & Daum, 2010). 
Children will imitate different people at different times depending on the type of 
behavior they are engaging in. When novel actions are being performed children will 
more often imitate an adult than a peer (Zmyj et al. 2010), unless said adult has been 
previously portrayed as an unreliable source of evidence (Jaswal & Neely, 2006). The 
objects being explored are also often critical in determining behavior. When young 
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children are interested in learning about toys they ask their peers, however, when they 
require information about food they instead seek information from adults (Van der 
Borght & Jaswal, 2009). Children are flexible and selective in terms of whom they 
approach to gain the best information relating to a given situation: children are smart 
imitators.  
Imitated behaviors have the opportunity to become incorporated into their 
learners’ repertoire and have the potential to be redeployed flexibly from then on 
(Wood, Kendal & Flynn, 2013). Wood et al. (2013) presented evidence that children 
are able to incorporate both novel and imitated strategies for manipulating a novel 
piece of apparatus into their behavioral repertoires. Adults too often converge on one 
type of problem solution even when other equally valid options are available, they 
jump on the bandwagon (Mason et al., 2008). This further solidifies imitation’s 
position as a powerful, flexible and adaptive learning mechanism, but one with a 
decidedly social foundation.  
From an instrumental point of view the act of imitating gives children the 
opportunity to generate representations of new behaviors through seeing them 
performed by someone else. Furthermore through subsequently carrying them out an 
additional opportunity to generate and strengthen such representations arises. 
Imitation aids the retention of new information as the imitator generates not only a 
memory of observing the behavior in question, but also of having carried it out. If 
they did not imitate, and only observed actions, the strength of the representation 
would not be as robust, and perhaps not support future use as competently or flexibly. 
Manually undertaking an imitated action or behavior makes it more likely to be 
retained and used in the future.  
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Imitation is not a transient phenomenon that only impacts upon, or is limited 
to a current state of affairs: imitation is not bound only to the time and place directly 
following a model (Simpson & Riggs, 2011). Imitating an action once allows it to be 
used to alter physical and social worlds in future. Skills learnt through imitation may 
be productively deployed elsewhere if analogies are made between different 
situations. Having a motor schema in place for opening one type of container, may 
allow a slightly different container to be opened through using the same or similar 
pattern of behavior for example. Flexibility of this sort is one of the hallmarks of 
mature cognition (Zelazo et al., 2003). Imitation allows children to build a repertoire 
of functional behaviors that they can use flexibly in a variety of situations in the 
future. Not only this, but children can begin to cognitively simulate or mentally 
rehearse how these imitated behaviors may be used to manipulate other possible 
worlds, not only worlds they are currently experiencing. With a greater store of 
possible behaviors comes a greater number of real world possibilities when it comes 
to imitative contexts. 
5.2.3. The Paradox of Faithful Imitation 
Actions involving objects, particularly those that incorporate distinct goals on 
the part of the demonstrator, allow children to be selective in what they imitate. 
Infants begin their imitative journeys by imitating the goal of a behavior, choosing to 
copy the outcome of a behavioral sequence. Selective imitation refers to situations 
where only those actions that are causally necessary to achieve the end goal are 
undertaken while any additional intentional acts performed by the model are omitted. 
This form of selectivity is akin to CFR in that children appear to have reasoned about 
which aspects of a past sequence were causally necessary (either instrumentally or 
conventionally) to achieve the goal state, and used this inferred information to plan 
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and execute their own subsequent behaviors. This ability to imitate rationally is a 
strikingly intelligent strategy, in terms of providing economy: energy is only 
expended on causally necessary actions. 
Many studies have investigated how sophisticated or selective the imitation 
that young children engage in is (e.g., Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme & Bushnell, 2007; 
Hilbrink, Sakkalou, Ellis-Davies, Fowler & Gattis, 2013).  In a study of 14 to 16-
month-old infants the causal necessity of actions in the context of the desired end 
states influenced how often they were imitated (Brugger et al., 2007). In a similarly 
structured study the imitative patterns of 12 to 15-month-old infants were observed 
(Hilbrink et al., 2013).  Participants were shown goal-directed actions using two novel 
toys (Hilbrink et al., 2013). At both ages the selectivity of the imitation was driven by 
the physical necessity of the actions, that is, children were more likely to imitate 
actions on objects that were causally necessary to the outcome than actions on the 
objects that were not causally instrumental. However, this selectivity decreased with 
age and a corresponding increase of levels of faithful imitation.  
Faithful or over-imitation directly contrasts with selective imitation in that 
intentional actions are replicated that go beyond those instrumentally necessary to 
achieve the modeled goal. Both causally necessary and unnecessary actions are 
imitated. Nielsen (2006) documented children from 18-months onwards becoming 
more faithful in their imitative styles. Furthermore several publications have reported 
that children between 3 and 5 years old, and adults, faithfully copy the actions of 
models even in conditions when causal information is readily available to them 
(McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn & Horner, 2007; McGuigan, Makinson & Whiten, 2011). 
This faithful imitation phenomenon is pervasive and readily observable in young 
children. Hilbrink et al. (2013) found the move from selectivity to faithfulness 
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occurring sooner than other authors who had reported this intriguing, and intuitively 
paradoxical phenomenon previously. Where selective imitation is rational and 
cognitively efficient, faithful imitation seems cognitively wasteful in comparison.  
When children faithfully imitate they go beyond imitating solely the 
instrumental goals of an action sequence. This in some cases appears economically 
wasteful and rather immature as a learning strategy. However, the imitation of non-
causal features of behavior is pervasive in our daily lives and humans have been 
shown to imitate many different forms of behavior in this way. Literature on adults 
reveals that posture, gestures, prosody and syntactic structures are often copied in the 
absence of any concrete causal justification for doing so (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber & Ric, 2005). 
 In experimental settings with a researcher demonstrating a multitude of 
actions children have been shown to imitate; the operation of puzzle boxes; the search 
locations of hidden objects; the movement styles of soft toys; the end location of toys, 
and; hand movements and tool selections amongst others, (McGuigan et al., 2007; 
Carpenter et al., 1998; Bertenthal & Boyer, 2009; Bekkering et al., 2000). Indeed 
children seem to be willing and able to imitate, or at least attempt to imitate almost 
anything, even those things that do not achieve any readily discernable physical, 
psychological or social causal goal.  
The development of faithful imitation in early childhood mirrors the 
progression of MSU. Children begin to move from understanding only desires i.e. 
regarding a goal or outcome, to understanding that intentions and beliefs are also 
involved in the behaviors being undertaken i.e. regarding method or style. Over the 
following years this tendency to over imitate persists and can be observed in many 
cultures. 3 to 5-year-old pre-school children in both Western and rural African 
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communities have been shown to faithfully imitate actions even when there were able 
to identify which elements were causally unnecessary for goal completion (Lyons, 
Young & Keil, 2007; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). Children possess the relevant 
causal knowledge but go beyond it when making decisions about their own behavior.  
McGuigan et al., (2007), used puzzle boxes that were either clear or opaque, 
with both relevant and irrelevant actions being modeled, and models being either live 
or video-taped. 3 and 5 year olds imitated faithfully both relevant and irrelevant 
actions regardless of the causal information observed in the live demo.  Only 5 year-
olds and not 3 year-olds, however, continued with such imitation when a degraded 
video demonstration was observed. Five-year-old participants showed more faithful 
imitation than their three-year-old counterparts.  The hypothesis that this faithful 
imitation increases over time obtained more support when a later study found that 
adults imitated task elements even more faithfully than older children (McGuigan et 
al., 2011). Two groups of children, (aged 3 and 5-years old) and one group of adults 
(mean age= 42-years) were given the same puzzle box and modeling procedures. Both 
causally relevant and clearly irrelevant actions were modeled. The adult group 
engaged in the highest number of irrelevant action replications, with the 3-year old 
group engaging in the least. 
Evidence from multiple sources then identifies that faithful imitation as a 
strategy is becoming more entrenched with age (Hilbrink et al., 2013; McGuigan et 
al., 2007; 2011). The video evidence further suggests that for younger children a 
stronger social input is required to support faithful imitation of this sort, degraded 
videos ellicited less imitation from the younger children when compared to the older 
children (McGuigan et al., 2007). Such evidence points to an arrangement of imitative 
goals emerging along a developmental progression such as the following. 
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Imitation -> 1st physical outcome  
-> 2nd intentional action  
-> 3rd social concerns 
Children first imitate physical outcomes, then intentional actions and finally 
any actions deemed socially relevant. But why does faithful imitation emerge at all? 
The theoretical beneficial effects of imitation were discussed at length in section, 
5.2.2. The reasons for this now extensively documented phenomenon, however, are 
not agreed upon amongst researchers. Some authors have argued that with experience 
faithful imitation emerges as such an adaptive human learning strategy that it may be 
employed even at the expense of task efficiency (McGuigan et al., 2007). McGuigan 
et al. (2007; 2012), suggest that faithful imitation is an example of the over-extension 
of a “highly adaptive conformist bias” alongside a “model-based bias”. Their account 
suggests that humans increasingly rely on an automatic strategy of imitation when 
learning new skills. Evidence that adults robustly over imitate even when the structure 
and goals of an action sequence are fully transparent supports such automaticity 
accounts. 
Lyons et al. (2007) in contrast suggest that faithful imitation is the result of 
poor physical understanding on the part of young children. They claim this poor 
physical understanding results in a proclivity to encode all adults’ actions as causally 
necessary. However, given the evidence that even adults, with assumed high levels of 
causal understanding, engage in copious amounts of irrelevant imitation such a claim 
seems comparatively weak.  
Nielsen (2006) emphasized the abundance of evidence supporting the view 
that social motivation is the key prompt for over-imitation. He views faithful imitation 
as the result of children becoming less interested with the instrumental or logical 
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structure of actions but more interested in the social experience they promote. Such a 
movement from cognitively-efficient selective imitation at 12-months, to an 
increasingly faithful pattern at 15-months in Hilbrink et al. (2013), lends support to 
this instrumental -> social explanation. Indeed Hilbrink et al. (2013) found that this 
emerging social motivation was predicted by the extraversion scores collected from 
their sample. Such studies link well with evidence pointing to a strong motivation to 
share emotional states, goals and perspectives from aged 12-months and onward 
(Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 2005). Infants suddenly become 
motivated to create, and maintain social co-ordination with a peer rather than just 
learn new skills: imitation is one simple way to achieve this (Eckerman, Davis & 
Didow, 1989). Imitation is a highly adaptive tool and can be used in many contrasting 
social situations. It can be used to communicate alikeness, identify with a social 
partner and repair social experiences (e.g., Over & Carpenter, 2012; Spoor & 
Williams, 2007; Zmyj & Seehagen, 2013). Retaining the instrumental features of 
physical actions in a selective way makes sense, as the affordances of an action are 
universal, whilst the social or conventional affordances of the same actions are not so 
reliably pervasive: faithful imitation is not always a smart choice. Just because your 
mother tucks your napkin into your sweater does not mean this is the appropriate way 
to use a napkin whilst in a Michelin* establishment! The correct way to hold your 
knife and fork, however, is more stable and context independent.  
What is clear, however, is that over time the actions instrumental to a physical 
goal’s attainment are retained in a more prominent or accessible position within the 
hierarchy of goals than the intentional, social features of an action. It may be that 
these conventional actions are forgotten overtime having been encoded in a less 
robust manner as suggested by Simpson and Riggs (2011). Conversely it could be that 
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the conventional, irrelevant actions are suppressed: either way these two types of 
affordances are treated differently by children even at a young age. 
Although lower down the hierarchical chain than those actions deemed 
physically necessary, the fidelity of imitation of non-causal features has been shown 
to be readily influenced by a variety of social mediators in 18, 24, 48 & 60-month-old 
participants (Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Simpson & Riggs, 2011). This is 
largely unsurprising given the intrinsically social roots of imitation. The types of 
social manipulations that have been tested experimentally fall broadly into three 
categories: (1) the model’s social behaviors (e.g., Bandura, 1971; Brugger, Lariviere, 
Mumme & Bushnell, 2007; Hartup & Coates, 1970; Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen, Simcock 
& Jenkins, 2008); (2) the model’s characteristics (e.g., Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum & 
Carpenter, 2013; Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 2011; Ryalls, 
Gul & Ryalls, 2000; Seehagen & Herbert, 2011; Zmyj et al., 2012) and finally; 3) 
increasing goal salience through social means (e.g., Brubacher, Roberts & Obhi, 
2013; Chen & Waxman, 2013; Elsner & Pfiefer, 2012; Hermann, Legare, Harris & 
Whitehouse, 2013; Simpson & Riggs, 2011). Globally speaking, increasing social 
engagement, fostering social affiliation and increasing goal salience through these 
channels increases faithful imitation.  Social processes, however, can only work 
alongside cognitive processes to produce imitative behaviors: there are a great many 
cognitive demands placed on young reasoners when engaging in imitation. That being 
said there are also a great many cognitive rewards. 
The distinction between selective and faithful imitation is a crucial one for our 
purposes: selective imitation sees only actions that are causally necessary elements of 
a demonstration being repeated in contrast with faithful imitation which describes 
situations where causally both necessary and unnecessary components are integrated 
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into a reproduced sequence. This thesis is interested in exploring how children move 
backwards and forwards between representations of the world, and in time, when 
reasoning about, and interacting with the world. Imitation then, inclusive of both 
contrasting forms defined above, has two striking features that make it a particularly 
appropriate setting from whence to investigate children’s navigation through their 
physical and social worlds. (i) Imitation is a strategy or tool that can be used to 
manipulate world. Through imitating an action or behavior children can impact upon 
the world in a similar way to the model from whom they extracted the necessary 
information. (ii) Imitation is paradoxical in that, although by its very nature there is a 
replication of the actions and/or behaviors of others, there is also always a greater or 
lesser extent of innovation or deviation from the model. In the case of selective 
imitation this independence from the model is very clear through the elimination of 
some elements. In the case of faithful imitation too, however, individuals will rarely 
exhaustively copy all aspects and features of the modeled behavior. Examples of un-
replicated features could include the speed, motion or precise manner of an action.  
Children have an almost limitless number of physical options when it comes 
to interacting with a new object. However, having the opportunity to extract some 
salient possible options from the actual world in order to influence future possible 
worlds is invaluable. Conversely if children were restricted or constrained in their 
imitative abilities, i.e., unable to innovate and use only previously observed actions, 
they would not be able to successfully generalize and apply their newly acquired 
physical skills to novel or unexpected situations. It is clear then that imitation is a 
multifaceted and highly adaptable behavior whose study affords an intriguing insight 
into socio-cognitive development.  
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5.2.4. The Centrality of Goals and Intentions to Imitation 
Imitation occurs across a diverse range of situations and in response to 
numerous types of model. Mentioned earlier was the distinction between selective and 
faithful imitation and a move from one to the other being reported early in childhood 
(Hilbrink et al., 2013). To understand this move toward becoming more faithful 
imitators we must look how and why we might imitate anything in the first place. 
In order to imitate children must parse action sequences, chose what elements 
to retain or disregard and reconstruct these in order to generate their own attempts 
(Bekkering et al., 2000). Once children’s ability to pick action components from a 
stream of behaviors is in place (Baldwin & Baird, 1999), and children are able to 
interpret actions as goal directed around the age of six months (Bertenthal & von 
Hofsten, 1998) they can begin the process of selecting what to imitate.  
The intended goals of the action or actions are suggested to modulate this 
process: imitation is a fundamentally goal directed pursuit (Bekkering et al., 2000). 
Behavioral re-enactment paradigms like that of Meltzoff (1995) provide striking 
evidence for this goal directed theory of imitation. Imitation is not supported only in 
situations where physical goals are achieved, but also when they are intended. 18-
month-old infants imitate the intended goal of animate models even when that goal is 
not actually achieved by the model (Meltzoff, 1995). 
If multiple goals are involved in an action sequence then these are argued to 
be organized in a hierarchical fashion: the most salient goal is given most importance 
and is as such more likely to be imitated (Bekkering et al., 2000). In a participant set 
of 4-6 year olds Bekkering et al. (2000), showed that in an imitation task involving 
hand movements there were more reproduction errors in situations where the goals 
were less salient (touching a particular ear with specific unimanual contralateral 
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movement) than in situations where the action itself was more salient (both hands 
being used to touch own ears using a contralateral movement). It seems more difficult 
to satisfy multiple goals when one goal is more salient, or there is competition 
between many goals. Children do not struggle to remember multiple modeled actions, 
rather they struggle to identify, represent and replicate multiple goals simultaneously. 
Certain types of goal are consistently more salient than others and this 
supports their preferential imitation over other, less salient options. There are two 
classic paradigms that exemplify this hierarchical organization of goal theory with 
young children, the mouse-house (Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 2005) and, the head-
touch (Gergely, Bekkering & Kiraly, 2002). The mouse –house paradigm sees an 
experimenter hopping a small felt mouse with accompanying sound effects from one 
location to another. In one condition this end location was marked with a house, in the 
contrasting condition there was no house marking the end location. 12 to 14-month-
old infants copied only the trajectory of movement when a house was marking the end 
location (Carpenter et al., 2005). They copied both the manner and sound of the 
movement in addition to the trajectory when no house was present. Children were not 
struggling to remember the manner of movement when a house location marker was 
present, they were just failing to incorporate and replicate all intentional goals due to 
the increased salience of one over the other. 
 In the head-touch paradigm a model switched on a lamp using their head. At 
fourteen months infants copied this head touch method more frequently when the 
model had used their head despite their hands being free to do so (Gergely et al., 
2002). In a condition where the experimenter’s hands were not physically free during 
the model participants were almost 50% less likely to use their head when switching 
on the light. Much like the behavioral re-enactment paradigms mentioned earlier 
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children copied the intended physical goal of the model, and not their manner or 
execution unless there was an intentional choice to do so despite another more 
physically affordant option being present. When combined these paradigms make for 
dramatic evidence that even in their first year of life children represent actions in 
terms of goals and intentions with spatial goals being replicated and 
conventional/non-causal intentional goals being present, but less-salient when in 
competition.  
Additional evidence for this spatial versus conventional goal dependent 
hierarchy of imitation can be found in older children (3 to 6-years) and using different 
research methods (Gleissner, Meltzoff & Bekkering, 2000; Perra & Gattis, 2008; 
Williamson & Markman, 2006). 
When children get older, however, their propensity to faithfully imitate both 
the goal, and the steps demonstrated to achieve it, increases (Hilbrink et al., 2013). 
Children become better able to replicate multiple goals. In an extension of Gergely et 
al. (2002), Nielsen (2006) reported that both 18 and 24-month-old participants (unlike 
the 12-month-olds) faithfully imitated the action sequence of the head touch, 
regardless of whether a logical reason to do so was provided. In this case it was not 
only the goal that precipitated imitation, but also those unnecessary elements that 
preceded its completion: children truly engaged in faithful-imitation. Faithful 
imitation then, although in some ways appearing to be a rather clumsy, one size fits 
all tool becomes increasingly common through the pre-school years. Children imitate 
a whole host of physically unnecessary actions that are undertaken intentionally by a 
model. They replicate actions in pursuit of more ambiguous, abstract intentional goals 
in addition to more concretely observable physical ones. 
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In the case of faithful imitation, unlike selective imitation, both instrumental 
and seemingly incidental goals are represented and replicated. This requires both 
causal knowledge and mental state understanding working alongside one another 
concurrently. The ability of attributing intentions has been firmly established as 
fundamental to modulating imitation (e.g., Bekkering, Wohlslager & Gattis, 2000; 
Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998; Carpenter et al., 2002; Over & Gattis, 2009). 
This ability is very early to appear in development. When infants are able to attribute 
intentionality to a demonstrator then they are able to represent their actions and 
behaviors in terms of goals and intentions as discussed earlier. In this way intentional 
goals start to be incorporated into the hierarchical structure proposed by Bekkering et 
al. (2000) alongside the more readily identifiable physical goals. Intentional goals 
may be social, conventional or even regarded as playful. 
 In the first year of life infants hone these necessary intention reading abilities 
and hence their ability to represent intentional goals more robustly. This drives an 
increase in faithful imitation as an increasing number of goals can be represented 
concurrently. This ability can be bolstered by increasing the salience of the intentional 
actions in numerous ways such as vocal cuing (Carpenter et al., 1998), novel word 
usage (Chen & Waxman, 2013), or intentions being identified prior to actions taking 
place (Carpenter et al., 2002). An understanding of mental states, in this case the 
intentions/desires of a model, is intrinsic to goal directed imitation and highlighting 
these mental states increases their salience and subsequently their likelihood of being 
replicated.  
Such socio-cognitive and attentional skills being involved in imitation as 
discussed above go beyond the low level associative processes proposed by some to 
account for imitation (e.g. Heyes, 2001). If we were simply organisms with pre-potent 
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dispositions to replicate the behaviors we see, then we would be engaged in never 
ending imitation at the expense of any innovation. This is of course not the case as we 
have seen in previous sections, even the youngest children are selective in what they 
imitate. Firstly children replicate only the instrumental, physical goals from a 
sequence, and later they begin to incorporate other intentional actions as they are 
better able to identify and represent actions in terms of social or conventional goals. 
Faithful imitation is much more than an automatic, all encompassing process. 
5.2.5. Imitation’s Relationship to other Cognitive Skills 
Faithful imitation is inherently similar to reasoning, both counterfactual and 
mental state, for numerous reasons none less than the causal structure of a scene, and 
the intention of a model having been strongly and consistently shown to influence 
children’s imitative behaviors. However, another critical component required for 
counterfactual, mental state and imitative reasoning is the ability to represent and co-
ordinate alternative possibilities in the past, the present and the future. Conditional 
reasoning in temporal isolation alone is not as challenging as when required to add 
additional temporal elements. Conditional reasoning about different points in time, 
from different perceptions of an event, and using the resultant inferences generated to 
guide one’s own behavior is a sophisticated and complex ability. 
Domain general executive functions. “All imitative acts are not of the same 
kind,” said Meltzoff and Moore (1997). As such each imitative behavior will be the 
cumulative result of numerous different types or proportions of cognitive processing. 
Indeed some have suggested that there may be distinct mechanisms for imitation 
based upon the content to be imitated (Subiaul, Anderson, Brandt & Elkins, 2012). 
As we have learnt children can be strikingly selective in what they imitate, 
inhibiting the replication of some action elements and incorporating other elements 
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from memory by drawing analogies between current and previously experienced 
behaviors. This selectivity and flexibility of imitation requires those lower-level 
domain-general cognitive process discussed in section 3.2.1. Executive functions such 
as inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility and working memory will be recruited for 
imitative behavior.  
Children must be able to switch between their own and other’s perspectives of 
the world in order to make sense of, and choose to imitate their intentional behaviors: 
this requires cognitive flexibility. Goals cannot be inferred without the application of 
some prior knowledge and causal structures of the same, or similar objects. This 
reasoning feat cannot be undertaken without working memory. If children were 
unable to inhibit the replication of all aspects of an action, regardless of causal 
relevance, intentions and goals, then there would be no possibility for selective 
imitation. Such inhibition of mimicry requires inhibitory control. If children were not 
engaging EFs then they would replicate failed and successful behaviors equally rather 
than imitating the inferred goals of an action sequence (Behne, Carpenter, Call & 
Tomasello, 2005; Meltzoff, 1995; 2005; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2009). Even in the 
case of faithful imitation, where irrelevant actions are imitated, children will still not 
imitate every aspect of the behavior they see in an exhaustive manner. Exact 
movement forms or non-related incidental or accidental aspects of the movements are 
often omitted as they do not constitute a particular physical, conventional or social 
goal to be represented in the hierarchy.  
Children build representations of a model action based around the perceived 
goal or goals of the action, and the model undertaking it. Additional information 
about the modeler’s behavior and their characteristics are also incorporated into this 
cognitive model. Children require inhibitory control, cognitive flexibility and working 
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memory to successfully imitate based on these representations in a way that fulfills 
both their instrumental and social goals. 
It could be then that faithful imitation comes about due to the executive 
functioning developments known to be taking place in the pre-school years 
(Anderson, 2002). For imitation, children’s working memory and cognitive flexibility 
may aid them in committing to memory, generating a representation of, and re-
enacting not only those causally necessary elements, but those other, less 
instrumentally salient features of the scene. They are able to represent more 
information about the world, beyond that causally necessary for physical goal directed 
success.  
EF tasks themselves, such as those used in this thesis require the same forward 
and backward mental movement as MSU, CFR and Imitation. EF tasks rely on the 
application of some rule presented earlier in time to some stimulus presented in the 
present. The application of this rule constitutes a move forward into a future possible 
world. In EF the causal relationship that drives the inference is man-made, unlike 
mental state or true counterfactual reasoning. However, the rule application process is 
the same. Just like with imitation, children first reason based on physical, causal rules, 
then intentional rules and finally they can simultaneously reason about a broad range 
of intentional social features of an action. Still, however, they use the application of 
causal rules and information about other people and situations to guide their own 
future behaviors. 
Counterfactual reasoning. In our imitation paradigm the most salient goal is 
a physical one. In the counterfactual reasoning paradigm the most salient goal is 
making a correct inference. We would expect children to behave in a goal directed 
way in both tasks. As we have seen imitation develops in the pre-school years. 
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Conditional reasoning, including counterfactual reasoning, also emerges in the pre-
school years and continues to develop well into late childhood (Rafetseder & Perner, 
2010; Robinson & Beck, 2000; Harris et al., 1996). As seen with MSU, between the 
ages of three and four children’s responses to counterfactual reasoning questions 
move from being bound to their own perspectives of reality, towards supporting more 
causally driven inferences based on other possible, counterfactual worlds (Riggs et 
al., 1998; Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004). Children get better at navigation the 
actual and the possible in these different formats. 
Counterfactual reasoning, like imitation requires looking back in time in order 
to look forward. For CFR this is realized through mentally looking back to a point 
where some change could have, but didn’t take place and then reasoning forward, 
counterfactually, about the causal repercussions of this change. For imitation this is 
realized by the child looking to their representation of the actually undertaken 
elements of an action or behavior and reasoning about the causal relationships and 
intentional actions held within that representation before selecting which elements to 
implement in their own impending action or behavior. Around age four children 
become much better able to use their knowledge in an objective way to guide their 
inferences and behaviors. 
In both MSU and CFR children begin to stop thinking instrumentally and 
uniformly about their environment and start appreciating the differing perspectives 
and beliefs of others, as well as the possibilities if a situation was fundamentally 
different, not just perceived as so. They become less constrained by the actual and 
more reflective about the possible (e.g., Riggs et al., 1998; Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 
2004; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Children begin to 
more consistently represent the world as others experience it, or how it could have 
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been and could be. In doing so they are then able to use these representations to guide 
their own behavior. It follows then that when imitating, children can expand upon the 
instrumental goals of a model and begin imitating other possible goals. As they begin 
to experience the world as more than a physical reality, but a social one too, those 
things they may imitate have the opportunity to expand concurrently.  
As we have seen in Chapter 2 children become better at reasoning about the 
causal structure of abstract properties in addition to concrete properties (Birch & 
Bloom, 2004). Causal structures exist across both domains, however, it is the type of 
content that differs: physical causality versus conventional or social causality. If there 
is some shared underlying ability here, however, supporting causal judgments across 
these two psychologically distinct domains we could expect to see a positive 
relationship between counterfactual conditional reasoning and faithful imitation. 
Correct inferences based on the causal structures laid out in the counterfactual 
reasoning tasks may correlate with inferences about the conventional structure of an 
object laid out in the imitation task. 
Mental state understanding. Being able to imitate any behavior, simple or 
complex, requires basic perceptual abilities. More specifically, however, imitation 
requires attention to the actions and behaviors of other intentional agents in the world. 
Without attending to such agents their goals, intentions and social affordances cannot 
be represented and replicated. In early childhood, social attention (Olineck & Poulin-
Dubois, 2009), point following (Carpenter et al., 1998) and, pointing, reaching, 
showing and checking back (Bretherton, McNew & Beeghly-Smith, 1987), are all 
suggested to facilitate imitative behavior.  More broadly higher levels social interest, 
desirability, empathy and surgency also have been related to increased imitation 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; DiYanni, Nini & Rheel, 2011; Hilbrink et al., 2013; 
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Uzgiris, 1981). Such evidence suggests that interest in and knowledge about others 
may have a role to play in subsequent imitation. 
The ability to represent behavior, and do so in terms of mental states is vital 
for imitation (Sakkalou et al., 2012). Being able to interpret the intentions of a model 
for example, especially in a situation where there has been some form of goal failure 
requires understanding of space and causality, (Brugger et al., 2007). Children cannot 
imitate the goal of an incomplete action if they do not have the necessary causal 
and/or structural knowledge about the world. However, in addition to this causal 
knowledge they must also have an understanding about mental states that allows them 
to identify that this instrumental failure was not intentional, and infer that 
instrumental success was the intended outcome. As we have seen already in this 
chapter imitation, from an early age, relies on the identification of goals and 
intentions. Identifying these requires at least a rudimentary insight into the mental 
states of others. Completing the goal of a failed action for example requires an 
appreciation that failure was not the intended result of a person’s pursuits. As the 
development of imitation unfolds during the pre-school years great strides are taken in 
children’s mental state understanding. Mental state understanding, as measured 
through false belief type tasks for example, undergoes radical changes in the pre-
school years (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 
2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Before the age of four the majority of explicit 
responses given by children to MSU questions do not take into account the 
perspectives of others. Very young children’s appreciation of a scene seems 
inextricably grounded in the realism of their own perceptions. However, with age the 
mental states of others, and how they impact upon behavior, become more apparent in 
children’s reasoning. Around age four children’s MSU suddenly begins to expand and 
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judgments about others holding false or differing beliefs emerge. During this time the 
pattern of children’s imitation also evolves with not only goal states being emulated 
but intentional actions being replicated faithfully. Children are still inferring the goals 
of a model, but instead of emulating only the causally necessary elements of a 
behavior, they begin to incorporate smaller irrelevant actions undertaken by the 
model: they faithfully imitate based on their understanding of the model’s goals and 
intentions. It could be that children who are now able to represent the minds of others 
and the possibilities of a scenario choose to retain and imitate some elements of 
behavior they can identify as causally unnecessary for some other, social reason. They 
reason that a model who is perceived to have a high level of causal prowess may have 
undertaken a behavior that appeared unnecessary, so there must be some unknown 
conventional or social reason or goal for them having done so. 
5.2.6. Aims 
 Our first aim was to assess the faithful imitation of our sample. We expected 
to find high levels of this often-reported phenomenon in our sample (e.g., Lyons et al., 
2007; McGuigan et al., 2007; 2011; Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). We 
used two novel apparatus, each of which had two distinct moving parts. These moving 
parts interacted with a ball placed inside the apparatus. Every model the child saw 
demonstrated both these moving parts being manipulated by the experimenter. In the 
necessary condition both moving parts had to be manipulated in order for the modeled 
goal state to be achieved. In the crucial unnecessary condition only one moving part 
needed to be manipulated for the very same goal state to be achieved: it was only 
causally necessary to manipulate one of the two available moving parts in the 
unnecessary condition. Critically the experimenter modeled the same two-action 
sequence in both conditions, regardless of causal necessity. We wanted to see if, like 
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other researchers, our sample would readily incorporate both necessary and 
unnecessary intentional actions into their imitative behaviors. This would provide 
evidence that those children were willing and able to choose a possible world based 
on the goals and intentions of a model in the actual world: the model intentionally 
achieved a goal but also intentionally undertook unnecessary actions. To achieve the 
goal in the unnecessary condition, however, what happened in the actual world need 
not also happen in the possible world: children need not replicate all the actions that 
actually took place in the unnecessary condition to move into a possible world where 
the instrumental goal state is still met, some intentional actions may be ignored.  
Our second aim for this chapter then was to assess the contrasting form of 
imitation. We expected to find that some children chose a more physically efficient 
sequence of behaviors to achieve the instrumental goal in the unnecessary condition 
(e.g., Brugger et al., 2007; Gergely et al., 2002; Gleissner et al., 2000; Hilbrink et al., 
2013; Perra & Gattis, 2008). We expected that due to the impact of causal necessity, 
and the hierarchical structure of goal directed imitation that there would be 
significantly less faithful imitation in the unnecessary condition. We expected this 
because a more physically efficient selective imitation response would also result in 
the modeled goal state. If children were representing the possible world goal state 
based around the most salient goal identified in the actual world only then we would 
expect selective imitation. 
With our first two aims we were interested in characterizing the imitative 
behaviors of our sample. We wanted to see how our sample would use what happened 
in the actual world to reach an unconstrained possible world of their own creation. 
Faithful imitation sees the actual world be replicated whilst selective imitation creates 
the same instrumental outcome via innovative means. To speak about our third aim 
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we must look more specifically at the imitation apparatus to be used. Although on the 
surface our two experimental apparatus were similar there were several crucial 
differences that meant we shall be presenting the data both separated by, and 
collapsed across apparatus (see Table 5.1.). These two apparatus will henceforth be 
referred to as the Tower and the Rake (see Appendix D).  
In both the Tower and the Rake a ball contained within the apparatus could be 
manipulated and moved along a discrete trajectory. Also in both two actions were 
consistently modeled by the experimenter. In both the necessary and unnecessary 
conditions of the Tower there was one possible plane of motion with the ball only 
able to fall down the tube and trigger the springing sound. In the Rake there was also 
only one possible plane of motion in the necessary condition with the ball only able to 
move horizontally toward the end of the box. In the unnecessary condition for the 
Rake, however, there were two possible planes of motion for the ball: it could move 
in the same horizontal manner if both actions were imitated or the ball could drop 
down the small trap door if the first action was not replicated at the right point. This 
meant that there were more possibilities for motion competing with one another in the 
unnecessary Rake condition when compared with the same condition using the 
Tower. As such we expected there to be less faithful imitation using the Rake as 
children explored these additional affordances. 
Furthermore in the necessary condition failure to complete the first modeled 
action had very different consequences on the potential journey of the ball held 
within. For the Rake apparatus the omission of the first action (pushing the trapdoor 
shut) meant that with the completion of the second action the ball would fall down the 
hole rather than come out of the end of the box as modeled. With the Tower, however, 
the failure to remove the first and/or second rod meant that the ball could not fall 
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down the tube fully and no noise would be generated: there was no alternative path 
for the ball to take. We expected that children would be more likely to faithfully 
imitate using the Tower during the unnecessary condition as failure to do so would 
result in a lack of movement and therefore be a boring outcome. 
The second distinction between the two apparatus was that upon completion of 
the modeled goal the Tower apparatus made a comical noise while the Rake did not. 
This noise being associated with the goal for one and not the other could have altered 
the salience of the goal, making the Tower’s more salient when compared to the 
Rake’s. This salience would make the modeled outcome more attractive to the 
children and hence they would be more likely to replicate it. 
A third difference between the two apparatus was that in the Tower both 
actions that could be carried out were identical: Pulling a rod horizontally out of the 
Perspex tower. For the Rake there were two different actions being modeled: the trap 
door being pushed closed and the rake being pulled horizontally. Having two identical 
actions may reduce cognitive load and be more easily replicable than having two 
distinct actions. 
A fourth and final distinction between the two was that the set-up of the 
Tower allowed for both actions to be completed simultaneously: both rods could be 
pulled from the Tower at the same time. For the Rake apparatus, however, the two 
modeled actions, closing the trapdoor and pulling the rake, moved on different planes 
and hence could not be carried out simultaneously. 
We expected that these differences would generate different patterns of 
response most evidently in the necessary condition where there was the most salient 
divergence in possible outcomes. The actual world and the possible worlds afforded 
by the Rake could show divergence from the actual instrumental goal. Conversely the 
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possible sequential worlds of the Tower afforded divergence from the intended 
sequence in the possible world. 
In the critical unnecessary condition for both apparatus the modeled goal was 
the only possible outcome aside from failure to engage with the toy at all. Given these 
four crucial distinctions between the Tower and the Rake we were interested in 
examining the consequent differences in imitative performance they supported. Our 
aim was to provide evidence that goal salience and object complexity would alter 
response types and over all levels of faithful imitation (e.g., Brubacher et al., 2012; 
Chen & Waxman, 2103; Elsner & Pfiefer, 2012; Hermann et al., 2012). Manipulating 
the Tower led to a more salient, auditory goal, the actions to be carried out were 
simpler and more swiftly executionable and, there were limited possible movement 
outcomes. As such we expected there to be higher levels of faithful imitation carried 
out on the Tower when compared to the Rake, however, we expected the temporal 
order of this faithful imitation to be more variable.  
 
Table 5.1. Showing the characteristics of the Tower versus Rake apparatus 
            Feature of the Apparatus Tower Rake 
Contains a ball which can be manipulated ✔ ✔ 
Has two identical actions that may be carried out ✔  
Has two different actions that may be carried out  ✔ 
Modeled actions can be carried out simultaneously ✔  
There is one single modeled movement and outcome to be 
achieved across conditions 
✔  
In one condition there are two possible movements and 
outcomes, one that has been modeled and one that has not 
 ✔ 
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The modeled outcome generated a sound ✔  
The temporal order of actions in the necessary condition is 
important for the goal 
 ✔ 
Two actions are necessary for the goal outcome in the necessary 
condition 
✔ ✔ 
In the unnecessary condition only one action is causally 
necessary for goal completion 
✔ ✔ 
 
 
Our fourth and final aim for this chapter then, after characterizing the faithful 
and selective imitation of our sample, was to relate their imitative behaviors to their 
reasoning skills reported in chapters two through four. We will do this by relating 
children’s imitation performance on both their first trial, and across trials to their 
performance on the slide, story, executive functioning and mental state understanding 
tasks. Firstly a solid causal processing base, as investigated by our counterfactual 
reasoning tasks, could predict one of two things for imitation. In the necessary 
condition both modeled actions must be carried out in order for the goal state to be 
reached. As such we would anticipate that robust instrumental causal knowledge 
would be required for both conditional reasoning and imitation in this condition. In 
contrast, in the unnecessary condition only one of the modeled actions must be carried 
out in order for the modeled instrumental goal to be achieved. We might expect then 
that good conditional reasoning skills would relate to more single action responses in 
this condition as children reject the undertaking of superfluous actions. However, if 
children attribute the two action sequence modeled in the unnecessary condition to 
some unseen, instrumental causal relationship intentionally adhered to by the 
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experimenter, or identified some additional social or conventional causal structure, 
then we may in fact expect more faithful imitation to be related to conditional 
reasoning skill in this condition. The motivations behind how and why children move 
from the actual to the possible in these tasks are very different. 
Secondly we wanted to look for any possible relationship between EF and 
imitation. As mentioned earlier imitation relies on domain general processing and as 
such children showing more proficiency in inhibition and cognitive flexibility may 
display a distinctive pattern of imitation. Much like the concern with conditional 
reasoning, however, this EF proficiency could be argued to effect imitation in 
contrasting ways. In both conditions there is an instrumental goal. In the unnecessary 
condition there is an additional goal, a social one determined by the intentional 
manipulation of an instrumentally unnecessary fixture. Good inhibitory control may 
limit the replication of superfluous actions not instrumentally necessary to the 
intended goal. Conversely good inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility may 
prevent the abandonment of superfluous action in order to retain features deemed 
socially necessary despite being instrumentally unnecessary. There being two goals in 
the unnecessary condition, one social and one instrumental, may add additional work 
for domain general processes and as such correlate positively with EF. Previous 
research suggests that we should expect to find a positive relationship between 
executive functioning and rates of imitation (e.g., Behne et al., 2005; Meltzoff, 1995; 
2005; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2009). 
From a conceptual standpoint we would expect solid EF to correlate with 
faithful imitation as developmentally faithful imitation comes later so may in that 
sense be thought of as a more mature skill. Faithful imitation encompasses multiple 
goals in a way selective imitation does not. Furthermore how well children navigate 
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the most simplistic actual/possible tasks (like EF tasks) should impact upon one of the 
more challenging tasks, converting the intentional goal directed action of another in 
the actual world to your own decisions in bringing about the possible. 
Finally, as has been discussed earlier in this chapter, the attribution of 
intentions and goals are a key-factor in imitation (Sakkalou et al., 2012). Therefore 
we expected to find that mental state understanding would relate positively to faithful 
imitation, most particularly in the unnecessary condition as children attribute 
intentionality to the model and therefore replicate their modeled two-action sequence. 
The intended instrumental goal of the model for the Tower is to generate the comical 
noise: rhe intended instrumental goal of the Rake is to extricate the ball from the 
puzzle box. Crucially, however, in addition to the instrumental goal, the unnecessary 
condition further encapsulates a social goal in that there is a concerted, repeated 
intentional act of manipulating an instrumentally inconsequential piece of the 
apparatus. As such those with good MSU may be expected to show higher rates of 
faithful imitation in the unnecessary condition particularly. Our final aim was to test 
this mental state understanding hypothesis and identify whether the performances in 
these two tasks that both require the actual world of someone else influencing the 
generation of a possible world are related. 
 
5.3. Method 
5.3.1. Participants 
Results presented are from the same sample as described in section 2.3.1.  
5.3.2. Materials  
Two separate apparatus were constructed for this task. The first was an 
adaptation of Apparatus G used in Tennie, Greve, Getscher and Call (2010) and 
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comprised of a transparent vertical tower with two solid rods slotted through the 
tower horizontally.  The second was a rake like contraption based upon one used in 
Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme and Bushnell (2007).  
The tube tower was made from a piece of transparent tubing sitting vertically 
on a square wooden base (15cm x 15cm x 4cm) and with a wooden lid (Appendix E). 
The tube was 40 cm in height and had a diameter of 9cm. Three, evenly spaced holes 
were drilled perpendicular to the tube through which solid, grey plastic rods 30cm 
long could be slotted to act as stilts. A tennis ball was placed in the tube resting atop 
one of the rods. When the rod(s) below the tennis ball were removed it could fall to 
the base where a pressure mechanism was activated and a small sound box affixed to 
the base would emit a ‘boing’ sound akin to a cartoon rabbit or similar. In the 
necessary condition two rods were placed below the ball therefore both needed to be 
removed for the sound to be produced. In the unnecessary condition one rod was 
above and one below the ball, therefore only removal of the lower rod was causally 
necessary to generated the modeled goal sound. 
The rake-box was constructed from wood and topped with transparent plastic 
so the simple mechanism inside could be seen (Appendix E). The box was 40cm long, 
25cm wide and 10cm deep. A T-shaped rake divided the box in two and protruded out 
one end of the box where there was a small handle. The rake was used to pull a small 
wooden ball (approximately 3cm in diameter) from one end of the box to the other. 
Small plastic railings on either side of the rake shaft acted as runners, to provide a 
path for the ball. At the end of these two railings were small semi-circular openings in 
the wood, just large enough for the ball to pass through when the rake reached the 
end. On the right hand side of the box a small sliding portion could be pulled out 
transecting the runners and creating a hole in the base of the box (4cm x 4cm) down 
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which the ball could fall. Therefore if the ball was placed on the right hand side of the 
rake it could only be retrieved via the semi circular holes once the trapdoor had been 
closed fully. For the necessary action condition the ball was placed on the side of the 
rake with the trap door, therefore it was necessary for both the door to be closed and 
the rake to be pulled to retrieve the ball. The unnecessary condition then saw the ball 
on the left side of the rake with no trap door and hence no causal reason to close the 
trap door when retrieving the ball. 
5.3.3. Procedure 
Testing took place during the first visit children made to the University as 
described in section 2.3.1. In this within subject design children saw both the 
apparatus and both conditions during testing. Children were given one of these four 
possible apparatus-condition combinations, 1) Necessary Tower 1st: Unnecessary 
Rake 2nd 2) Necessary Rake 1st: Unnecessary Tower 2nd 3) Unnecessary Tower 1st: 
Necessary Rake 2nd 4) Unnecessary Rake 1st: Necessary Tower 2nd. Which one of 
these four apparatus-condition combination participants undertook was 
counterbalanced. The experimenter and child sat opposite one another, either side a 
square testing-table placed in the center of the room and covered in a black table-
cloth. The first object was presented from out of the child’s sight (retrieved from 
behind a curtain surrounding the testing area). The object was placed on the center of 
the table in clear view of the participant. The experimenter then spoke, ‘Childs Name: 
Watch this!’ It was repeated if necessary to make sure the child is watching was 
fixating the apparatus. The experimenter then demonstrated the two actions in a slow 
and deliberate manner. For the rake apparatus the actions were the same for both 
conditions, first the trap door was slid closed and then the rake pulled. For the tower 
apparatus again the actions were the same for both conditions, pull one rod out, then 
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pull the next rod out. However, in the necessary condition both rods were inserted in 
slots below the ball, whilst in the unnecessary condition one was above and the other 
below. The apparatus was then reset in the same manner out of sight (beneath the 
testing table). The reset apparatus was then returned to the table and placed in exactly 
the same position as it had been during the modeling phase. The child then was 
offered a turn, ‘Now it’s your turn.’ The response was coded from the point the child 
first touched the object. This was repeated six times (experimenter model – 
participant offered a turn) while maintaining a natural social interaction through 
shifting eye contact with the participant and watching the apparatus. Once six turns 
had been completed the experimenter replaced the first object with the second (also 
hidden behind the curtain) and repeated the process in the opposite condition. 
5.3.4. Data Analysis 
Responses were coded after the testing visit using the audio-visual recordings 
of the session. Responses were coded using the Mangold Interact software for coding 
behavioral data. Responses were coded exhaustively across the response period that 
was calculated as 60 seconds from either the moment the toy was replaced on the 
testing table or the child’s first contact with the apparatus. This first contact 
contingency was implemented as many children reached forward to grab the object 
before it had been placed fully on the table.  
We coded any action carried out on the apparatus. An action was defined as 
the completion of one of the mechanism in questions affordances such as a trap door 
being closed or a rod being removed. Actions were not coded in instances where the 
participant completed then replaced or reversed the mechanism unless the 
instrumental goal was achieved. Action A referred to the first modeled action, Action 
B referred to the second modeled. In addition to coding the occurrence of actions their 
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temporal characteristics were also coded as reported in Brugger et al. (2007). In cases 
where action A and B were carried out simultaneously a third code to reflect this 
temporal relationship was employed. In all then for each apparatus there were six 
possible temporal outcome responses that any given participant could produce; 
completing neither action, completing action A then B, completing action B then A, 
completing actions A and B simultaneously, completing action A only or, completing 
action B only. 20% of the primary coders files were secondary coded and agreement 
was 100%.  
We were interested in children’s imitation of both the causally necessary and 
unnecessary actions they saw modeled. In the necessary condition action A and B 
were both causally necessary for goal completion. In the unnecessary condition only 
action B was causally necessary: Action A could be deemed redundant for goal 
completion in the unnecessary condition. Faithful imitation then in the unnecessary 
condition was defined as the copying of this first modeled action (Action A) 
regardless of instrumental necessity. This meant that of the six possible temporal 
outcomes three were considered faithful imitation; completing action A then B; 
completing action B then A and; completing actions A and B simultaneously. Within 
faithful imitation then were three distinct temporal patterns that could be further 
explored. Selective imitation in this condition referred to carrying out only the 
causally necessary action, just B. 
Further, given the differences in our two experimental apparatus we wanted to 
inspect the patterns of performance on both separately, as well as having them 
combined. As such all trials were also coded for apparatus in addition to condition. 
For each condition/apparatus combination children saw six models and were 
given six opportunities to interact with the apparatus themselves. We were interested 
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in both first trial responses for each condition as well as across trial patterns of 
performance. Our first trial responses allowed us to inspect children’s initial response 
to the novel apparatus and the modeled actions they observed being carried out using 
it. This would allow us to identify children as faithful or selective imitators.  
Finally, by aggregating performance across trials in each condition we 
generated an imitativity score to be correlated with the other cognitive indices 
collected throughout the course of the thesis. Each trial showing faithful imitation was 
given 1 point creating a possible score of 0-6 for each condition.  
5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Faithful Imitation and Sensitivity to Causality 
Our first aim for this chapter was to replicate the finding of faithful imitation 
in this age group. Our second was to find evidence that causal necessity influenced 
imitative performance between conditions. In this section of the results the apparatus 
will be treated separately given their complimentary, but distinct structural features. 
Furthermore only data from the first trial completed will be presented.  
Tower apparatus. In the first experimental trial faithful imitation was highly 
prevalent with children completing both Action A and B across condition in 95% of 
cases. Single action, Just B responses constitute selective imitation when carried out 
in the unnecessary condition. Therefore we compared faithful and selective responses 
to identify if one was significantly more prevalent than the other in the critical 
unnecessary condition. Faithful imitation was significantly more prevalent than 
selective imitation in the unnecessary condition χ2=25, p<.001 (see Figure 5.1.). 
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Figure 5.1. Mean number of faithful and selective imitative responses in the 
unnecessary condition for the Tower apparatus. Error bars represent standard error. * 
Represents a significant difference between bars, p<.05. 
 
When comparing faithful imitation levels in the necessary and unnecessary 
condition there was a significant difference χ2=4.05, p<.05. There was significantly 
more faithful imitation in the necessary condition, 88% versus 100% (see Figure 5.2.) 
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Figure 5.2. Mean number of two-action faithful responses between-condition for the 
Tower apparatus. Error bars represent standard error. * Represents a significant 
difference between bars, p<.05. 
 
Finally we investigated whether condition order affected children’s faithful 
imitation rates (see Figure 5.3.). Faithful imitation was more common when the 
unnecessary condition was presented first but the difference between conditions did 
not reach significance χ2=.47, p=.49. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Mean number of two action responses, split by condition order, for the 
Tower Apparatus. Error bars represent standard error.  
 
Rake apparatus. As with the Tower more often than not children completed 
both modeled actions on the Rake. In the first experimental trial children chose to 
complete both possible actions on the Rake across condition with a 72% completion 
rate. Again we wished to identify whether faithful imitation was more prevalent than 
selective imitation in our critical unnecessary condition. Indeed rates of faithful 
imitation were significantly higher than selective imitation responses in the 
unnecessary condition using the Rake apparatus, χ2=32, p<.001 (see Figure 5.4.). 
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Figure 5.4. Total mean number of faithful and selective imitative responses in the 
unnecessary condition for the Rake apparatus. Error bars represent standard error. * 
Represents a significant difference between bars, p<.05. 
 
 Unlike in the Tower, when comparing conditions there was no significant 
difference in the amount of faithful imitation χ2=3.65, p=.55 (see Figure 5.5).  
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Figure 5.5. Mean number of faithful responses between condition for the Rake 
apparatus. Error bars represent standard error.  
 
Again we investigated whether condition order affected children’s faithful 
imitation rates (see Figure 5.6.). There was no significant difference in the number of 
two action responses dependent on condition order although, in contrast to the Tower, 
imitation was slightly higher after having seen the necessary condition first χ2=.12, 
p=.72. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Total mean number of two action responses, split by condition order, for 
the Rake Apparatus. Error bars represent standard error. 
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type, one physical outcome and a more attentionally salient goal we would find more 
faithful imitation than when compared to the Rake. Overall there was significantly 
more faithful imitation on the first trial following a Tower model than when following 
a Rake model, χ2=10.6, p<.01 (see Figure 5.7.).  
 
Figure 5.7. Contrasting the mean number of two action responses in the Tower and 
Rake apparatus on the first trial. Error bars represent standard error. * Represents a 
significant difference between bars, p<.05. 
 
In the unnecessary condition there was no significant difference between the 
number of two action responses carried out on the Tower and Rake, χ2=2.95, p=.08. 
In the necessary condition, however, there were significantly more two action 
responses performed on the Tower, χ2=8.54, p<.01. See Figure 5.8.  
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Figure 5.8. Contrasting the mean number of two action responses in the first trial for 
the Tower and Rake apparatus in the necessary and unnecessary conditions. Error bars 
represent standard error. * Represents a significant difference between bars, p<.05. 
 
Each child carried out 12 experimental trials, 6 of these in the unnecessary 
condition and 6 in the necessary. Different apparatus were used for each. When 
comparing the 6 trials in each condition, split by apparatus, there were significantly 
more two action responses using the Tower than the Rake in the necessary condition, 
F(1,55)=4.3, p<.05, but not the unnecessary condition, F(1,54)=.92, p=.34 (see Figure 
5.9). 
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Figure 5.9. Contrasting the total mean number of two action responses across trial for 
the Tower and Rake apparatus in the necessary and unnecessary conditions. Error bars 
represent standard error. * Represents a significant difference between bars, p<.05. 
 
Temporal response types. We decided to compare children’s response types 
in more detail by examining the temporal order of their actions. To examine the full 
range of actions more closely we choose to include responses from all six trials.  
In the necessary condition there were significantly more B then A, 
F(1,55)=12.42, p<.001 and simultaneous responses, F(1,55)=10.24, p<.01, performed 
on the Tower than the Rake. The number of A then B responses were not significantly 
different, F(1,55)=2.5, p=.12. There were significantly more Just B responses, 
F(1,55)=36.43, p<.001,  using the Tower than the Rake. 
In the Unnecessary condition there were again significantly more B then A, 
F(1,55)=4.4, p<.05 and simultaneous responses, F(1,55)=6.23, p<.02 for the Tower 
than the Rake. However, A then B, F(1,55)=.51, p=.48, and Just B, F(1,55)=.51, 
p=.48,  responses were comparable across apparatus (see Figure 5.10.)  
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Figure 5.10. Contrasting the number of A then B, B then A and Just B, response 
types, across trial for the Tower and Rake apparatus in the necessary and unnecessary 
conditions (simultaneous responses not plotted as in both conditions using the Rake 
there were no instances of this response). Error bars represent standard error. * 
Represents a significant difference between bars, p<.05. 
 
The necessary condition generated the most variation in terms of one and two 
action responses, both between apparatus and within apparatus in the case of the rake. 
As such moving forward, when relating our sample’s faithful imitativeness to the 
other measures of cognitive development that we have generated we used only data 
from the unnecessary condition where between apparatus faithful imitation 
differences are not significant. In the unnecessary condition there is no significant 
difference between the levels of faithful imitation for the Tower and Rake either on 
the first trial or across trials. Only the temporal order of action completion differs 
significantly, not action completion itself. 
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5.4.5. Cross-task Relationships 
 Our final aim for Chapter 5 was to relate the imitative behaviors of our 
sample to those reasoning skills reported in chapters two through four. We did this by 
relating children’s imitative performance on both their first trial, and across trials, to 
their performance on the slide, story, executive functioning and mental state 
understanding tasks. Reasoning scores will be related to performance on each 
apparatus separately and combined. Firstly we will report the relationship between 
conditional reasoning and imitation. We had predicted that the reliance on causal 
knowledge for the completion of goal directed actions would result in a strong 
positive relationship between reasoning and imitation in the necessary condition. We 
had then suggested that causal conditional knowledge could predict diverse 
performance in the unnecessary condition. Selective imitation represents an 
instrumentally efficient route to goal completion therefore robust causal conditional 
knowledge may predict selective imitation. In contrast causal conditional knowledge 
may instead predict more faithful imitation as children are more sensitive to 
additional implied instrumental or conventional causal relations in the experimenter’s 
intentionally modeled actions. 
Secondly we had wished to test the prediction that imitative performance is 
affected by the domain-general processes of inhibitory control and cognitive 
flexibility. We will compare the imitative responses of participants high and low on 
these EFs. 
Finally we predicted that those children better at reasoning about the mental 
states of others’ would be more faithful imitators in the unnecessary condition where 
instrumental causal structure alone is not predictive of the experimenter’s goal 
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directed actions. We tested whether participant’s MSU battery score, or single item 
responses were predictive of imitative behavior. 
Conditional reasoning. Tower. For these cross task relationships we used 
both first trial data and the combined scores collected across all six experimental 
trials. Children who completed a two action response in their first trial had 
significantly higher typical story scores than their peers who completed only one 
action, F(1,53)=4.15, p<.05 (See Figure 5.11.). Across trial correlations between 
typical story and standard slide conditions, and two action responses across trials were 
marginally significant; r=.23, p=.088 (see Figure 5.12) and, r=.25, p=.071 (see Figure 
5.13). The number of Just B responses correlated negatively with the typical story 
measure but not the standard slide, r=-.47, p<.001 (see Figure 5.14.).  
 
Figure 5.11. Mean scores on the Typical Stories task for those completing single and 
two action responses in their first Tower trial. Error bars represent standard error. * 
Represents a significant difference between bars, p<.05. 
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Figure 5.12. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing the correlation between two action 
responses across trials using the Tower and typical story performance.  
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Figure 5.13. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing the correlation between two action 
responses across trials using the Tower and standard slide performance.  
 
 
Figure 5.14. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing the correlation between single 
action, Just B responses across trials using the Tower and Typical Story performance.  
 
When separated by condition the same pattern was evidenced in the necessary 
condition. Two action responses correlated marginally with standard slide, r=.36, 
p=.053 (see Figure 5.15). Again in the necessary condition there were negative 
correlations between the number of Just B responses total stories, r=-.41, p=.025 (see 
Figure, 5.16.). However it was clear that this particular relationship was driven by the 
presence of an outlier. In the unnecessary condition only Just B responses and typical 
stories retained their negative correlation, r=-.46, p=.021 (see Figure 5.17). 
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Figure 5.15. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing the correlation between two action 
responses across trial using the Tower in the necessary condition and standard slide 
performance.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.16. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing the correlation between single 
action responses across trial using the Tower in the necessary condition and total story 
performance.  
0	0.5	
1	1.5	
2	2.5	
3	3.5	
0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	Stan
da
rd
 S
lid
e 
C
or
re
ct
 
Two Action Response 
Apparatus: Tower 
Condition: Necessary 
0	1	
2	3	
4	5	
6	
0	 0.5	 1	 1.5	 2	 2.5	 3	 3.5	 4	 4.5	To
ta
l S
to
ri
es
 C
or
re
ct
 
Just B Responses 
Apparatus: Tower 
Condition: Necessary 
186 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.17. Scatterplot showing the correlation between single action responses 
across trial using the Tower in the unnecessary condition and typical story 
performance.  
 
Rake. Children who completed a two-action response had comparable 
counterfactual reasoning scores to their single action peers. There were no linear 
associations seen between two action or Just B responses and counterfactual 
reasoning. This lack of pattern extended to both the necessary and unnecessary 
conditions. 
Tower & Rake. In addition to looking at trends within apparatus we were also 
interested in imitativeness across apparatus. Only unnecessary trial data was used to 
this end. There was no linear relationship evident between unnecessary two action 
responses and either of our conditional reasoning measures. However, there were 
some cases where the temporal sequence of response was related to conditional 
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reasoning. B then A responses in the unnecessary condition, that is copying the 
modeled actions in the reverse order, showed a significant negative correlation with 
typical story (r=-.31, p=.02) and atypical story (r=-.27, p=.043) performance. Indeed 
B then A responses in this condition were also negatively correlated with total story 
performance, r=-.34, p=.01 (Figure 5.18).  
 
 
Figure 5.18. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing total story performance and B then 
A responses for both the Tower and the Rake in the unnecessary condition. 
 
Executive functions. Tower. Given the distribution of the EF tasks as 
discussed in section 3.4 we inspected the between group differences in imitative 
performance based on a median split of the participants. There were no significant 
differences in performance on the first trial as a function of DCCS or Flanker 
performance in the necessary condition as all participants generated a two action 
response (see Figure 5.19). In the unnecessary condition also there were no significant 
differences between high and low EF groups.  
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Figure 5.19. Mean number of two action responses performed on the Tower first trials 
separated by condition and EF task performance. Error bars represent standard error.  
 
Rake. In the necessary condition children in the high Flanker group produced 
significantly more two action responses than their peers in the low flanker group 
χ2=4.96, p<.03 (see Figure 5.20). The same pattern is visually discernable for the 
DCCS task, however, this difference did not approach significance χ2=1.79 p=.18. 
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Figure 5.20. Mean number of two action responses performed on the Rake first trials 
separated by condition and EF task performance. Error bars represent standard error. 
* Represents a significant difference between bars, p<.05. 
 
Tower & Rake. Although in both EF measures the two action imitation scores 
in the unnecessary condition for the low groups were lower than their high group 
peers this difference was small and did not reach significance. DCCS: F(1,54)=.18, 
p=.74. Flanker: F(1,54)=.24, p=.63 (see Figure 5.21). Furthermore none of the 
possible temporal response patterns were related to either Flanker or DCCS 
performance. 
 
Figure 5.21. Column chart showing the mean number of two action responses in both 
Flanker and DCCS high and low median split groups. Error bars represent standard 
error.  
 
Mental state understanding. Tower & Rake. There were no statistically 
significant relationships found when looking at each apparatus’ first trial responses 
individually so only the combined data will be presented here. No linear relationship 
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was evident between imitative responses in the unnecessary condition and mental 
state understanding battery scores (see Figure 5.22). However, there was one 
interesting positive relationship between two-action imitation and Question 5, the real 
apparent emotion item in which none of the children answered the memory check 
question correctly. Scores for the target questions only on this item correlated 
positively with the number of two action responses in the unnecessary condition 
r=.29, p=.03.  
 
Figure 5.22. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing MSU battery performance and two 
action responses during the object imitation unnecessary condition. 
 
 
Table 5.2. Non-parametric correlation table between mental state understanding and 
two-action responses in the unnecessary condition. 
 Unnecessary Condition 
Mental state understanding battery -.08,   p=.57 
Question 5 .29,   p=.03* 
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5.5. Discussion 
Imitation is a central tool in children’s developmental toolbox. It is both a 
corner stone of socio-cognitive development and a powerful learning mechanism 
(Over & Gattis, 2009; Zmyj et al., 2012). Children imitate a variety of modeled 
actions and behaviors in daily life (e.g., Bertenthal & Boyer, 2009; Carpenter et al., 
1998; McGuigan et al., 2007; Wolschlager & Gattis, 2000). Young children can be 
sophisticated and discerning imitators (e.g., Brugger et al., 2007; Hilbrink et al., 2013; 
McGuigan et al., 2013; Nielsen, 2006). Children become increasingly faithful 
imitators in the pre-school years (e.g., Lyons et al., 2007; Matheson et al., 2013; 
McGuigan et al., 2007; 2011; Nielsen, 2006). Intentional actions, even those that are 
physically redundant, are often replicated (e,g., Bekkering et al., 2000; Carpenter et 
al., 1998; Carpenter et al., 2002; Over & Gattis, 2009). Intentional goals are identified 
and replicated in addition to those more concretely observable instrumental goals. Our 
first aim for Chapter 5 was to replicate this established finding of the pervasive 
faithful imitation of novel actions in this age group (e.g., Lyons et al., 2007; Matheson 
et al., 2013; McGuigan et al., 2007; 2011; Nielsen, 2006). On the first trial, across 
condition and apparatus, 83% of responses included both modeled actions. In the 
critical unnecessary condition this faithful two-action response was the 
overwhelmingly most popular, with it making up 85% of the total action sequences 
executed. The critical condition for the purpose of identifying faithful imitation in 
both apparatus was the unnecessary condition. For both Tower and Rake the 
unnecessary action was completed by the majority of participants in our sample. In 
addition, these two action responses, containing one instrumentally unnecessary 
action, were significantly more common than single action, Just B responses: faithful 
imitation far outstripped selective imitation regardless of apparatus.  
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 These findings then support the large body of work reporting that children of 
this age tend to faithfully copy the actions of models even when contradictory causal 
information is readily available to them (e.g., Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 
2007; 2011; Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). This strong preference was 
apparent across both of our experimental apparatus: children are very proficient at 
incorporating novel actions from their recent past into their future behaviors. 
Our second aim for this chapter was to seek out residual evidence supporting 
the hierarchical goal directed theory of imitation described by previous researchers 
(Bekkering et al., 2000). Causal necessity has been shown to significantly impact 
faithful imitation rates in young children with spatial goals being replicated before 
conventional ones (Bekkering et al., 2000; Brugger et al., 2007; Gergely et al., 2002; 
Gleissner et al., 2000; Hilbrink et al., 2013; Perra & Gattis, 2008; Williamson & 
Markman, 2006.) When looking at our apparatus individually there were significantly 
more Just B responses in the critical unnecessary condition when compared to the 
necessary condition using the Tower. This pattern remained for the Rake but did not 
reach statistical significance. Imitation then, although predominantly faithful, was 
significantly impacted by the causal necessity of the actions involved in one of our 
apparatus. At the group level children were sensitive to causality to some degree. We 
can confidently say therefore that faithful imitation is prevalent at age four, and 
unnecessary actions occur significantly more frequently in our imitative paradigm 
than required by causal necessity. Moreover, despite this propensity for faithful 
imitation there is evidence that causal information significantly influences 
responding. 
The patterns of imitation in our sample strongly support the centrality of goals 
and intentions to imitative behavior. Imitation as we are investigating it is the 
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replication of goal directed actions (Bekkering et al., 2000). Imitation’s goal directed 
nature has been elucidated through many paradigms (Carpenter et al., 2005; Gergely 
et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 1995). Children in our sample overwhelmingly chose to 
complete the modeled instrumental goal in both apparatus. Even in the Rake where 
there were other possible innovative goals that could be sought children preferentially 
chose the modeled outcome. 
 Although our two apparatus generated complimentary data confirming the 
existence of faithful imitation in our sample there were distinct differences between 
the Tower and Rake that help us understand further what features impact upon 
imitative readiness. The Tower apparatus data, as expected, generated significantly 
more faithful imitation. This pattern was significant only in the necessary condition 
but the trend also appeared in the unnecessary. We hypothesized three reasons why 
this pattern would occur. Firstly the two Tower actions were always identical where 
the Rake actions were of two distinct forms. As such the Rake task could be 
considered more taxing as two distinct actions must be observed, represented and then 
selected from replication. This would take more processing capacity than having two 
identical actions represented in the same way. Additionally the repeated nature of the 
actions on the Tower would increase their salience to the observer, and hence their 
likelihood of replication. 
 Secondly the goal state of the Tower was to allow the ball to fall to the base of 
the apparatus, triggering a comical sound via a pressure sensor. This addition of sound 
to the goal was not present in the Rake. Previous studies have presented evidence that 
vocal cueing and novel labels increase goal salience, and as such increase imitation 
(e.g., Carpenter et al., 1998; Chen & Waxman, 2013; Elsner & Pfiefer, 2012). This 
addition of sound to the goal could strengthen its representation and as such its 
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likelihood of being manually replicated by the subject. In the necessary condition 
using the Rake apparatus the absence of such a salience cue may have resulted in 
weaker representations of the instrumental goal leading to children producing an 
increased number of innovative responses. Children are sensitive to goal salience 
when interacting with a novel object. 
 Finally there could be another contributor to this decrease in two action 
responses in the Rake when compared to the Tower. The Tower’s structure meant that 
the ball could only do one of two things dependent on the participants’ actions in the 
necessary condition: remain static or fall down the tube. For the Rake, however, the 
ball could do one of three things: remain static, fall down through the trapdoor or 
come out the end of the apparatus as modeled. There being multiple options or 
possibilities increases the amount of goal competition present for the children. Where 
upon manipulating the apparatus the children seeing the Tower can only make the ball 
move in one direction, the children manipulating the Rake can either have the ball 
follow the modeled trajectory or have it fall down the trap door: children seeing the 
Rake in the necessary condition have an opportunity to be innovative and exploratory 
in a way simply not available with the Tower. Children using this apparatus had the 
opportunity to reason that an interesting alternative could have occurred had the 
trapdoor not been closed. As such it is unsurprising then that responses from the Rake 
in this condition are significantly different from those on the Tower, with faithful 
imitation being more infrequent in the former, despite remaining at a reasonably high 
level. Children at age four are sensitive to multiple possibilities when interacting with 
an apparatus that affords them. 
Authors such as McGuigan et al. (2007) suggest that the imitative proclivity 
seen in young children is a mostly automatic behavior derived from a “highly 
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adaptive conformist bias”. Lyons et al. (2007), however, claimed that such imitation 
arises from a poor grasp of physical causality requiring some other strategy to support 
children’s action. Nielsen (2006) instead identified a strong social motivation for 
over-imitation in children. Nielsen and colleagues suggest that children become less 
interested in instrumental goals and more in intentional, social goals. Evidence such 
as faithful imitation only perseverating when a model remains in close proximity and 
offers the child the modeled apparatus strengthens this claim (Nielson & Blank, 
2011), as too does evidence from even younger participants showing that a move 
from selective to faithful imitation styles is predicted by extraversion scores (Hilbrink 
et al., 2013). Following on from such studies others have investigated the role of early 
social competence on imitation. A number of researchers have presented evidence for 
a specific link between nascent socio-cognitive skills such as social attention and cue 
recognition, and imitation (e.g., Brubacher et al., 2013; Chen & Waxman, 2013; 
Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2009).  
Our evidence so far points to children being sensitive to the causal affordances 
of the apparatus as imitation is reduced in the critical unnecessary condition. This 
contrasts with Lyons et al. (2007) claiming that imitation is the result of poor causal 
understanding. Additionally we also agree with there being a strong social motivation 
to imitate as the majority of our sample imitated above and beyond that which was 
required by physical necessity alone. In a further attempt to speak to these differing 
accounts of imitation we then turned to look at how other forms of reasoning were 
related to children’s imitation. We used indices of both physical and social reasoning 
to inspect alongside our imitative performance scores. 
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5.5.1. Object Imitation, Inhibitory Control and Cognitive Flexibility 
 As we have seen imitation can be both selective and faithful, and influenced 
by numerous experimental and social factors. As such domain general cognitive 
abilities such as inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility will be required during 
performance. Selectivity in imitation would be impossible if children were unable to 
inhibit the replication of all observed actions (e.g., Behne et al., 2005; Meltzoff, 2005; 
Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2009). Flexibility in imitation is necessary to navigate 
multiple goals, and types of goals simultaneously. In our sample, although temporally 
faithful responses were more frequent in the high performance groups of both our EF 
measures, and Just B responses more frequent in the low performance groups for both 
measures these differences did not reach statistical significance across the data set as a 
whole.  
When looking only at the Rake apparatus necessary condition, however, there 
was a significant positive relationship between Flanker performance and faithful 
imitation. Those children in the high Flanker group carried out significantly more 
two-action responses during the first trial of the necessary condition than their low 
group peers. Recall that this apparatus condition combination allowed children to 
select one of three possible outcomes; the ball remains still, the ball falls down the 
trapdoor or the ball comes out the end of the runners as modeled in the actual world. 
Children who opted to achieve the modeled outcome inhibited the desire to explore 
the object’s possible, non-modeled affordances and instead chose to take the road 
more travelled. This evidence could be used to refute McGuigan et als.’ (2012) claim 
that imitation is a largely automatic behavior. Children with better inhibitory control 
were MORE likely to imitate faithfully. If this behavior were highly automatized then 
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we would expect the opposite pattern with little or no influence of processing 
limitations. 
Another possible reason for this relationship being significant in the Rake and 
not the Tower is that the Rake model incorporated two different actions on the object 
in contrast to the same action being repeated during Tower models. Perhaps then this 
inclusion of two distinct actions was more taxing to domain general cognitive 
functions. A third and final possible reason is that the physical goal in the Rake 
condition was less salient due to the absence of an auditory cue. Goal salience has 
reportedly been increased by such auditory means in the past (e.g., Carpenter et al., 
1998; Carpenter et al., 2002; Chen & Waxman, 2013). As such identifying, retaining 
and replicating the modeled goal may have been more cognitively challenging for 
those seeing the Rake when compared to the Tower in the necessary condition. 
Executive functions here seem necessary but not sufficient for object 
imitation. There were generally non-significant results except in a small subsection of 
our sample. This was not entirely surprising in light of the type of actions we had 
chosen to use and the complexity of the objects. Only two actions were demonstrated 
on each object and when combined with the causal transparency of the objects this 
meant a very simple action sequence. They did not need to inhibit or switch between 
representations in the same way as demanded by CFR and MSU. The model and the 
participant shared the exact same set of circumstances, the causal structure remained 
the same (unlike in CFR) and the viewpoint for each was the same as the objects were 
symmetrical and entirely visible to both. Only the person acting on the object changed 
across trials. Although novel objects were used in a novel way the actions themselves 
were familiar, either a pull or a push. There were no hidden mechanisms or 
ambiguous parts. Had the children been given the opportunity to manipulate the 
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objects prior to modeling it may have been expected that the majority would have 
rapidly solved the mechanisms to achieve the goal state: the object itself was not 
enigmatic. As such we would not have expected to a high EF demand when all that 
children needed to do in order to solve the apparatus was to copy some or all of the 
actions they were being shown. Had a more complex task been used with an opaque 
or counterintuitive causal structure then perhaps EF would have begun to show a 
predictive effect.  
5.5.2. Object Imitation and Counterfactual Conditional Reasoning 
We had hypothesized that due to the similar conceptual demands of imitation 
and counterfactual reasoning that there would be a positive relationship between these 
two skills. Both imitation and counterfactual reasoning require a person to use 
information about a recently passed reality to inform their decisions or behaviors in 
the near future: they require looking back in time to the actual in order to look 
forward to the possible. Counterfactual reasoning involves thinking about possible 
alternate outcomes while imitation involves actually choosing a modeled possibility 
over some innovative alternative. Furthermore both counterfactual reasoning and 
faithful imitation require the identification of, inferences about, and adherence to 
some recently presented causal structure. 
When investigated in our sample, however, there was no linear relationship 
found across apparatus between faithful imitation responses and counterfactual 
reasoning performance. However, this was somewhat unsurprising given the 
prevalence of faithful responses across participants and conditions: there was much 
greater variation in response type during counterfactual reasoning than during 
imitation trials. 
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When looking at each apparatus separately, however, it was clear that 
responses from the Tower apparatus were related to CFR in a way that responses on 
the Rake were not in the necessary condition. The amount of selective imitation, 
particularly in the necessary condition correlated negatively with CFR story and slide 
performance. Children who exhibited a causally inappropriate response in the 
necessary condition were poorer at reasoning causally about the location of a 
protagonist or the path of motion of a ball. This pattern was not seen in the necessary 
condition of the Rake, perhaps because here the failure to carry out the first action 
still led to an interesting and innovative spatial outcome, i.e., the ball disappearing 
through a trap door.  
Looking back to the cross apparatus data then, when the specific temporal 
order response types were investigated there were some interesting results. B then A 
responses in the unnecessary condition correlated negatively with counterfactual story 
performance. Remember in the story task: those who performed poorly on the story 
task were those who failed to reason exactly in line with the causal structure as set out 
in the story. In the imitation task then: those who chose the B then A response also 
more often failed to reason in line with the implied temporal causal structure of the 
imitation apparatus. Although they carried out both modeled actions they did not do 
so in the same modeled temporal sequence. There was some contiguity based on 
reasoning about and acting upon some newly presented causal structure. 
There could be multiple reasons as to why children reasoned in this way 
across the two tasks; (i) Children may have been unable to remember the specifics of 
a given causal structure, verbally presented in the story or visually implied with the 
apparatus, i.e., there may have been a bottleneck in working memory; (ii) Children 
may have chosen to disregard, or been unable to retain specifically the temporal 
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information presented to them; (iii) Children may have struggled to integrate the 
information being presented and their subsequent actions, i.e., there may have been a 
bottleneck in cognitive flexibility although this seems unlikely given the absence of a 
CF relationship reported earlier; (iv) Children may have had a more general problem 
with recognizing and utilizing causal structures; (v) Children may have understood 
the presented causal structures but been unable to use this knowledge to guide their 
goal directed actions. The unnecessary condition may have been particularly 
ambiguous as the modeled actions were not both necessary, and as such the order of 
the actions were not as critical. The subsequent representation generated then may not 
have put enough weight on the temporal sequence, only the occurrence of the actions. 
The contrast between causal necessity and intentional action may have caused those 
children with a more tenuous ability to reason about causal structure to be less 
confident with their own subsequent actions. 
 It is key to remember that the counterfactual story task relied almost 
completely on a linguistic presentation of a set of causal events embellished by props: 
the object imitation task was a purely observational task with no details about causal 
structure being verbalized. Despite these very different presentations of a causal 
sequence participants’ response patterns across the tasks were still correlated to some 
degree. Four-year-olds who perform poorly on counterfactual conditional reasoning 
tasks that require the integration of their own causal knowledge and newly presented 
causal knowledge are less likely to copy the exact action sequence of a model during 
an simple object imitation task using a novel, but causally transparent apparatus. Such 
evidence points to some participants having a prevailing difficulty with executing 
behaviors and/or selecting responses based on their representations of causal structure 
at this age. This is regardless of the medium through which causal structure was 
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generated or the method and type of responding required. From a functional 
perspective imitation and counterfactual reasoning are similar as their deployment 
reduces the requirement for personal, explicit trial and error experience of the world 
for learning. They both offer a learning proxy that reduces the risk of acting out the 
entirely unknown. 
5.5.3. Object Imitation and Mental State Understanding 
 Understanding behaviors in terms of the mental states supporting them is 
crucial for imitation (Sakkalou et al., 2012). Given evidence in the literature that early 
socio-cognitive skills are related to early imitation we had hypothesized that the older 
children in our sample who had better MSU would show increased levels of faithful 
imitation (e.g., Bretherton et al., 1987; Brubacher et al., 2013; Chen & Waxman, 
2013; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2009). Furthermore general levels of social interest 
and other social indices have been related positively to imitation in children (e.g., 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; DiYanni et al., 2011, Hilbrink et al., 2013; Uzgiris, 1981). 
Faithful imitation, however, was the most dominant response form by a significant 
margin in our sample as a whole. It was not entirely surprising then, as seen initially 
with our CFR results, no significant linear relationship was evident when looking at 
the MSU battery scores and the different imitative responses, although some small 
positive trends were visually evident. However, in this case even looking at each 
apparatus separately did not reveal any of the expected underlying relations. 
Only the last of our five individual items in the MSU battery showed a 
statistically significant positive relationship with our target imitation condition. This 
was despite all of the children answering the memory check portion of this question 
incorrectly. Item five, the real-apparent emotion question, required children to answer 
two test questions: how the protagonist felt inside and how they looked on their face. 
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This was the only item on the battery that challenged children to not only represent 
the mind of another but also represent an additional layer of conflict by contrasting 
how they really felt, and how they wished to appear. All the earlier MSU questions 
comprised of only one dimension of a protagonist’s mental state, what they desired, 
what they believed, what they knew and what they expected. Here the psychological 
contrast came between the participant and the protagonist. Item five, however, asked 
children not only how the protagonist felt (their mental state) but also how the 
protagonist acted (which contrasted with their mental state). The contrast occurred 
within the same person, not between two different individuals. Children heard 
information about a past event, teasing, and a present event and then had to identify 
how the protagonist would be feeling and acting: the integration of multiple pieces of 
causally inferred information here is crucial. The processes involved in faithful 
imitation are then more akin to this item 5. Participants watch a model then must 
choose how to act themselves moving forward. Children watch a model behave in a 
way that contrasts with the most salient goal, the instrumental goal. As such children 
must attribute some additional layer of intention to the model: there must be some 
additional social goal to be achieved. Here then is the same discord or tension as the 
model or protagonist does not externally behave in a manner entirely congruent with 
their initially perceived mental state. Item 5 challenges children to reason about the 
agent’s same psychological reality in two contrasting ways in much the same way as 
imitation does. 
That the battery score did not relate to faithful imitation was initially 
surprising, however, it could be that at this age the majority of children are able to 
represent others’ minds to a sufficient extent ensuring no real challenge is imposed 
during these relatively simple, two action sequences. Conversely it could be that the 
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MSU questions used with the exception of Item 5 were not sufficiently complex to 
highlight any significant individual differences.  
Other earlier emerging socio-cognitive indices pertaining to mental state 
understanding have been related to imitation rates therefore our lack of global battery 
predictive effects by no means precludes the importance of MSU in imitation in this 
age group. Rather the types of imitation and MSU tasks themselves perhaps could be 
modified in order to find more variability in the sample and perhaps allow any 
predictive effect of mental state understanding at this age to be observed. 
 Several options to this end present themselves. Regarding the imitation 
paradigm it would be possible to make the critical first action, deemed causally 
unnecessary in the critical condition, more distinct. Children are much less likely to 
copy an action that is “off object”, that is it does not physically manipulate the target 
object during imitation tasks (Brugger et al., 2007). Other options for increasing 
imitation task difficulty include increasing the number of modeled actions, making 
the causal structure more ambiguous or adding additional goals. Additionally MSU 
questions that probe the multiple possibilities inherent within a single protagonist 
could be created, rather than only the contrast between self and other. By increasing 
the complexity of the MSU task, to include past, present and future information more 
analogous results may be obtained. 
5.5.4. Limitations 
 There were two main limitations associated with the imitation tasks chosen for 
this chapter. Firstly, as with the counterfactual stories task it would have been better 
for us to choose two tasks that were identical in structure so as to simplify the results 
for our later analyses with other variables. Being able to treat the Rake and the Tower 
data as a single body of evidence in both conditions would have been beneficial for us 
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rather than having between apparatus differences. Another consideration was that 
perhaps these apparatus were too simple to find meaningful variation between 
children. Having a more complicated apparatus structure, through having a more 
opaque structure or through an increased number of actions may have strengthened 
our results and the conclusions we can draw from them. 
 5.5.5. Conclusions 
 Faithful imitation is highly prevalent at fifty-two months of age: four-year-
olds are very good at incorporating actions performed by others in the recent past into 
their own repertoire. Children are good at incorporating the actual into the possible. 
Regardless of the causal necessity of the actions involved faithful imitation is always 
the preferred option at the group level in this age group. In addition to this, however, 
there is evidence to suggest that the causal affordances of actions are not ignored 
completely. Action sequences that diverge from faithful imitation are more frequent 
in the condition where all modeled actions are not in fact causally necessary in order 
for some physical goal state to be reached. Children imitate in line with a hierarchical 
organization of goals with conventional goals being slightly less replicable than their 
physical counterparts. 
 The salience of a goal as altered through action repetitiveness, auditory cues 
and the number of possible outcomes significantly effects faithful imitation. The more 
salient a goal, the more likely it is to be imitated. The more salient an action or 
outcome is in the actual world influences the likelihood of its transmission into a 
possible one. 
Faithful imitation is pervasive and robust, and does not appear to be globally 
reliant on executive functioning skill in this age group. EF relations are restricted to 
one distinct condition and apparatus combination suggesting that domain general 
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processing skills are necessary but not sufficient for imitation as measured here. There 
are some significant relationships between counterfactual conditional reasoning and 
imitative success. Those who reason more successfully also act in a more imitative 
manner across the domains. In both CFR and imitation moving forward requires 
looking back, looking to the actual as you form the possible.   
Finally MSU does appear to be related to faithful imitation, albeit in a more 
subtle way than predicted. MSU, like CFR an imitation requires the selection of one 
among a set of possibilities. In all of these still developing socio-cognitive skills 
children must look back at the actions, thoughts, or causal landscapes of others in the 
actual world in order to generate and their own representations of the world from 
which to derive their own possible paths.  
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Chapter 6. Imitation of Language and Linguistic Competence: Grammaticality, 
Novel Lexical Items and Complex Syntax 
6.1. Abstract 
In the previous chapters we have discussed children’s reasoning skills and 
patterns of imitation, highlighting how these skills function to move children from 
actual to possible realities. Children’s actions on objects can have highly constrained 
causal consequences as seen in their imitation of actions in the previous chapter. 
Language, however, is an arguably even more potent force for change in a child’s life. 
Comprehending and producing language catapults a child from experiencing reality 
based on observation alone to being able to represent situations based on the words of 
others. Not only can children better understand the world through comprehending 
language, they are more able to change it. In the context of this thesis being interested 
in children’s navigation of actual versus possible words, language is an invaluable 
resource for our investigations based on two unique features: language sits astride the 
concepts of imitation and innovation and language is the tool for entertaining 
differences between the actual and the possible, and it is no surprise that the majority 
of tasks examined in this thesis so far are unthinkable without language.  
In Experiments 1 and 2 we shall focus on this first feature of language, its 
paradoxical nature as being both highly imitative and highly innovative. We shall 
look at children’s willingness to imitate different features of language (sentences, 
novel verbs and syntactic structure) and some influences on this willingness 
(grammaticality, novelty and familiarity). Experiment 3 shall further investigate 
whether imitation of these linguistic features is positively correlated with the action 
imitation behaviors described in the previous chapter: is imitation as a strategy 
deployed similarly across both action and language tasks? 
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 In the Chapter 7 then we will turn to look at language’s role as a tool for the 
manipulation of the world, and whether competence in this is predicts any of the 
cognitive and behavioral indices collected in Chapters 2 through 5. 
6.2. General Introduction 
 
“As far as acquisition of language is concerned, it seems clear that the reinforcement, 
casual observation, and natural inquisitiveness (coupled with a strong tendency to 
imitate) are important factors, as is the remarkable capacity of the child to 
generalize, hypothesize, and ‘process information’ in a variety of complex ways. 
These may be largely innate or may develop through some sort of learning or through 
maturation of the nervous system” Noam Chomsky (2002, pp 137). 
 
When children learn to speak they are learning to use the lexical tokens of 
their native tongue. They do this within the grammatical and syntactic environment of 
this native language. However, to become truly competent language users children 
must go above simply regurgitating the language they have already heard, they must 
be generative and productive in new and flexible ways. Tomasello (2000) called this 
interplay between imitation and innovation, the actual and the possible, a “paradox of 
language”. Children must be conventional in order to successfully convey information 
using the correct lexical items, arranged in a coherent syntactic structure. However, 
children must also be innovative in rejecting previously heard utterance constructions 
in favor of the one that is most appropriate for the task in hand. Within language 
production, then, is a distinct tension between the actual and the possible. The 
linguistic input we hear constitutes linguistic reality, how language has actually been 
used. Conversely, generative utterances we produce, or could produce on a daily basis 
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embody a possible range beyond that what has been heard before. One of the 
hallmarks of human language is this limitless number of possible coherent re-
combinations that, although novel, can be easily comprehended by other language 
users.  
How we navigate these actual and possible linguistic worlds has indeed 
proven a fruitful ground for research into, and theorization about, language 
acquisition. Children’s productivity with language has been held as evidence against 
language acquisition being the result of exclusively imitative processes. Linguistic 
output that features over-regularization errors i.e., “she hitted me” or “there were 
three sheeps,” have similarly been used to generate hypotheses about the mechanisms 
by which children acquire productive language (Tomasello, 1992). Some researchers 
have attributed such errors to children possessing innate, or rapidly formed syntactic 
categories and linguistic rules that they can flexibly apply to newly learnt lexical 
items. Chomsky (e.g. 1968) put forward the thesis that children’s rapid acquisition of 
language, in the face of “the poverty of the stimulus” must be resultant of them 
having some innate “universal grammar” embodying key abstract principles about 
language. Chomsky’s work began a popular movement of research based around the 
principle of language acquisition being grounded in underlying linguistic 
representations (Tomasello, 2009, p.3). 
More recently, however, such accounts have attracted criticism from scholars 
characterizing young language learners as more conservative and imitative than 
previously suggested. Tomasello’s (1998) usage based account, for example, 
highlights the imitative nature of young children’s language.  Here ‘imitative’ is taken 
to mean exactly what it means in the context of the imitation work of the previous 
chapter, namely a ‘copying’ that is not mere mimicry, but rather sensitive to the 
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functions, goals, and intended meaning of the utterances that children are copying. 
These more recent theories benefit from advances in other branches of developmental 
psychology that highlight the breadth and variety of learning mechanisms that young 
children have available to them when learning language. Socio-cognitive skills such 
as mental state understanding, joint attention and imitation, and domain general 
categorization skills, all support language above beyond the simple inductive or 
associative processes favoured in the mid-20th century (Tomasello, 2009, p3-4). 
Tomasello argues that alongside learning specific lexical items children are 
accumulating syntactic knowledge through specific, concrete items that then, only 
gradually, facilitate the acquisition of more abstract rules. Tomasello (2009) proposed 
that familiar early word combinations could contain “slots” into which different 
words could be inserted. These so called “pivot schemas” allow children to be 
generative in their communications whilst retaining the same structural qualities they 
are familiar with. Tomasello et al. (1997) showed that children can incorporate 
entirely novel lexical items into such slots e.g. “Wug gone” or “more Wug.”  
In the context of verb learning Tomasello (e.g. 1992; 2000) proposed that 
item-based constructions are generated before children can become flexible in their 
use of verbs. The “verb island hypothesis” puts forward an account where children 
under the age of four exclusively use verbs in the construction that they have been 
exposed to, and, in that sense, are limited to ‘imitation’ (Tomasello, 1992). Evidence 
from a corpus of speech collected from one infant showed that almost all of her 
utterances were organized around single verbs (1992). Further evidence from a corpus 
for 12 pre-school children (Lieven, Pine & Baldwin, 1997) emphasized the restricted 
nature of children’s productions, with the majority of verbs only being used in one 
construction. According to this account, then, young children’s language is wholly 
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fixed upon verbs in set constructions around which various nouns/pronouns can be 
inserted. Children may be able to generalize a particular verb in a particular 
construction, but not yet have mapped that verb as belonging to a particular class of 
verbs. This results in young children being resistant to using verbs in a flexible way. 
With increased exposure to language children can gradually build upon these verb 
islands through a process of structure mapping and by drawing analogies between 
single items over time, hence beginning to generate verb general schemas. Marchman 
and Bates (1994) suggest that a critical mass is reached after which children are able 
to utilize their lexical knowledge of specific verbs to form semantic subclasses such 
as transitive versus intransitive verbs. Once these subclasses are formed children can 
use them to support not only comprehension of new words but also to produce novel 
utterances incorporating the rules governing the subclass. Children move from context 
level representations of verbs to broader sentence level constructions that can be 
viewed as invariant across numerous verb items of a certain class (Brooks & 
Tomasello, 1999b). 
As children become more competent users of language they become better 
able to understand the world, past, present, and future. In addition, they become better 
able to reason about, and make changes to the world, past, present and future due to 
this newly acquired ability to learn about things temporally and physically removed 
from them. Furthermore children become able to represent new possibilities based 
upon their linguistic abilities due to being privy to worlds only accessible through 
language. Language supplies children the systems of thought necessary to reason, 
interpret, organize action and engage in other mental acts they could not have 
achieved before (Chomsky, 2007).  
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6.2.1. Research Questions and Aims 
We then have set up two reasons as to why language is an important setting in 
which to explore children’s developing navigation of actual versus possible worlds. 
(i) Language is a tool that can be manipulated and used to change their future world 
and, (ii) language is a paradoxical skill that relies on the integration of imitation and 
innovation. Specifically in this chapter we will use data from two experimental tasks 
that allow us to explore this second feature in greater detail. 
The first experimental task we shall report simply investigated whether 
children would imitate or alter different types of repetition in a simple sentence 
constructed with familiar words. This task was adapted from Over and Gattis (2010). 
In earlier work relating to the imitation of repetitions by young children Dan Slobin 
and colleague (e.g., Slobin, 1968; Slobin & Welsh, 1973) suggested that language 
imitation was reliant on memory and grammatical knowledge rather than intention 
understanding. Their conclusion was based upon children being more likely to 
replicate the semantic content of a sentence rather than its’ specific surface features. 
This in many cases led to repetitions being omitted in favor of adding stress to the 
singular form (Slobin & Welsh, 1973). This pattern of imitation mirrors the selective 
imitation of actions discussed in the previous chapter: children replicate the modeled 
communicative goal but not the exact means used to achieve it. Furthermore children 
were more likely to correct ungrammatical utterances with age, again, arguably a 
selective imitation strategy. The authors argued that this was an adaptive strategy as 
otherwise children would struggle to navigate the accidental “stutterings and false 
starts” inevitably observed in adult speech from time to time (Slobin & Welsh, 1973). 
In contrast to Slobin, who ruled-out intention understanding as a critical component of 
verbal imitation, Over and Gattis (2010) reported that the perceived intentionality of a 
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model did indeed impact upon imitation patterns in young children, aged three-years. 
Over and Gattis concluded that children were interpreting ungrammatical repetitions 
as a failed attempt of sorts much like those documented in behavioral re-enactment 
paradigms (Meltzoff, 1995). Children then repair the ungrammatical breakdown 
during the course of their own utterance. Language imitation appears to rely not only 
on memory processes and linguistic competence, but also intention understanding. 
Over and Gattis’ work was based upon numerous observations in the imitation 
literature focusing on the role of intentions on action imitation discussed at length in 
Chapter 5 (e.g., Bekkering et al., 2000; Sakkalou et al., 2013).   
The same task as used by Over and Gattis was chosen for this thesis to chime 
with the kind of object and tool use imitation paradigms discussed in the previous 
chapter, where intentional actions could be both necessary and unnecessary, but for 
the most part are faithfully imitated regardless. As language, like any other behavior, 
can be represented as intentional and goal directed, we wished to document how our 
sample chose to imitate a modeled sentence in addition to a modeled action. Some of 
these sentences contained repetitions. The repetitions were either grammatical or 
ungrammatical. Over and Gattis (2010) showed that three year-old children who 
completed this task often removed ungrammatical repetitions but retained 
grammatical ones. In addition children removed ungrammatical repetitions more often 
when the model was an animate agent, when compared with an inanimate one: this 
shows a marked social component and influence of intentionality on imitation. We 
wished to compare older children’s imitative behavior in this linguistic context with 
their imitative behavior in the action imitation contexts described in Chapter 5. This 
task would help draw comparisons between how children chose to manipulate the 
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world with their actions in the action imitation tasks, and how they chose to 
manipulate the world with their utterances in the verbal imitation task. 
 For the second task we chose to implement a verb-learning paradigm 
designed to assess comprehension and production of a form of syntax that remains 
relatively rare in the spontaneous speech of four year-old children. The passive verb 
construction that we chose to use will be discussed later in more detail. We wished to 
use an experimental design, as with the reasoning and object imitation tasks, to most 
closely mirror the setting in which the imitation data was collected. Through using a 
novel verb we could determine whether children would again faithfully imitate, 
through replication of this verb or selectively imitate by reverting to a semantically 
appropriate but familiar alternative. The same could be said for the novel verb form, 
would children faithfully imitate and retain the same verb construction or would they, 
where possible selectively revert to a more familiar form. We aimed to generate data 
that could help elucidate the question of how imitative and how innovative children at 
age four are with their language, and how their imitation of language relates to their 
navigation of these actual and possible worlds in other contexts. 
 In addition we hoped to speak to the question of how language was used as a 
tool. We specifically were interested in collecting data about how readily children 
could flexibly alter their utterances in response to communicative demands. 
In the final analysis we wished to compare our experimental measures of 
imitation in both the action and linguistic domains. During experiments one and two 
we collected measures of repetition imitation (grammatical versus ungrammatical), 
measures of novel verb imitation and information about transitive structure 
replication. All these would be related to action imitation performance to try and 
identify whether imitative proclivity in one was seen also in the others. We expected 
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that imitation in all three areas would be influenced by the goal-directed intentional 
behaviors of the model and the causal necessity of these behaviors to the perceived 
goal. As such we expected there to be strong cross-domain relationships with 
children’s imitative proclivity being consistent in both action and verbal domains. 
Imitation, of both actions and language, embodies a duality of function. Imitation 
embodies the process of moving from the actual to the possible. Imitation is also a 
tool for navigating between the actual and the possible. Imitation is the navigation 
between the actual and possible but is also an invaluable tool for learning about such 
navigation. 
Experiment 1 focuses on the first task, the imitation of grammatical versus 
ungrammatical repetitions. Experiment 2 reports the result of our novel verb and 
varied transitive structure task. Here participants’ language comprehension, as well as 
their imitation of novel lexical items and transitive structure will be reported. In the 
third section, titled Analysis 3 the relationship between the imitative behaviors 
recorded in these two tasks will be explored. In addition the imitation data reported in 
Chapter 5 will also be included as we look for contiguity between imitation behaviors 
in the linguistic and action domains. 
6.3.1. Experiment 1: Introduction 
As outlined, acquiring language is a fundamentally imitative endeavor. 
Although small nuances and generational differences exist within speakers of the 
same regional accent, the vast majority of a language’s conventional features are 
retained. If this were not the case language would lose its prime cause for existence: 
the ease and specificity of communication. This is the paradox of language, its’ tokens 
and grammar are imitated, but the way in which they are specifically delivered or 
combined need not be. It is both highly imitative and highly innovative. However, 
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imitation is also an integral facet of language development (Bannard, Klinger & 
Tomasello, 2013). Simple sound effects demonstrated alongside actions are imitated 
by infants as young as 12-months old (Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 2005). The 
prosody of language can be imitated by 3-5 year-olds (Loeb & Allen, 1993). Children 
can imitate novel nonce verbs (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999). In an experimental 
setting Over and Gattis (2010), showed that 3.5-year-olds would imitate the 
grammatical and ungrammatical speech of both an intentional (stuffed animal) and 
unintentional (coloured cardboard box) model, albeit in distinctly different ways. The 
authors likened this behavior to the kind of imitation seen in object based behavioral 
re-enactment paradigms where children imitate the models goals, rather than their 
actions (e.g. Meltzoff, 1995). Moreover, Kuczaj and Maratsos (1975) reported that 
children often imitate the grammatical structures used by adults before they appear in 
spontaneous speech. Indeed children readily adopt the syntax heard from a modeler in 
structural priming studies (e.g. Vasilyeva, Huttenlocher & Waterfall, 2006). It seems 
clear then that children’s imitative abilities are pervasive and wide ranging from 
simple actions to complex, abstract features of language. In Study 1 we decided to 
implement an experimental imitation paradigm to gauge how children would choose 
to imitate sentences composed of familiar lexical items. We gave them the 
opportunity to imitate grammatical and ungrammatical repetitions of familiar words, 
as well as control sentences containing no repetitions.  
We replicated the methods used in the aforementioned study by Over and 
Gattis (2010). In their initial study children aged three and a half imitated the 
ungrammatical speech of both intentional and unintentional agents (Over & Gattis, 
2010). Ungrammatical sentences such as “the cat was too big big for the chair” were 
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less often repeated verbatim than grammatical sentences such as “Sam was a big big 
cat.” Children tended to correct the ungrammatical sentences.  
Furthermore Over and Gattis (2010) identified that when the “speaker” could 
have had intentions attributed to it (i.e. a stuffed toy) children were more likely to 
correct these ungrammatical utterances when compared to the sentences being 
produced by an inanimate box like apparatus. In this case children were more likely to 
omit a repetition to retain the intended message whilst removing the excess, 
“incorrect” element. This provides striking evidence that much like in paradigms 
involving goal directed action imitation in toddlers, some young language learners 
were selectively emulating the intended goal sentence in an efficient way, i.e. were 
producing a semantically identical grammatical sentence when the speaker was an 
intentional agent: children were engaging in selective imitation. Of course in this case 
the ungrammatical sentence is conventionally incorrect rather than just causally 
unnecessary as with the action imitation paradigms. It highlights an important idea, 
however: children treat both physical and verbal behaviors in a goal directed manner. 
As we have reported in our object imitation study in the previous chapter, however, 
children move from an emulative to an imitative strategy in the action domain. 
Children as early as eighteen months begin to selectively copy not only instrumentally 
necessary actions but also those intentionally undertaken. Data collected from our 
four year-old sample would help us determine if a similar shift takes place in 
language imitation. If the imitation of language were to follow the same trajectory as 
the imitation of actions then we would expect to see several key features emerge: 
(i) Children would more readily selectively imitate causally relevant 
features of the language i.e. those that achieve an intended communicative goal. 
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(ii) Children would more readily imitate intentionally produced features of 
the language. 
(iii) Children would faithfully imitate more incidental or non-critical 
features of language with age. 
(iv) Children would imitate a live social model more faithfully than an 
inanimate or distant model. 
(v) Familiarity and or affiliation with a model would influence rates of 
faithful imitation. 
(vi) Attentionally cueing or framing some feature of the language would 
increases its’ imitation. 
(vii) Instrumental features of the language that are imitated would be more 
readily retained than features not intrinsically related to the functionality of the item 
(e.g. a new word is retained but not necessarily in the construction it was initially 
encountered in). 
Some of these features of language imitation have been observed before. For 
example recall in Over and Gattis (2010) that: three year olds were more likely to 
alter grammatically incorrect sentences than matched grammatically correct sentences 
and; children were more likely to correct such ungrammatical sentences when they 
were produced by an intentional agent compared to an inanimate box. In another 
study with three year olds, context determined whether a novel word was beneficial or 
not to the communicative intention of an utterance (Bannard, Klinger & Tomasello, 
2013). Participants imitated novel adjectives significantly more often when the 
context made them communicatively useful. Children were more likely to use novel 
adjectives when in doing so they provided a social partner with useful information. 
These results both support point (i). Bannard et al. (Exp. 3: 2013) also found that 
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children were less likely to imitate novel adjectives produced “accidentally” by an 
experimenter. This provides evidence for point (ii) and the imitation of intentional 
features of language. It is important to remember, however, that despite between 
condition differences in imitation rates, faithful imitation at high levels was evidenced 
across condition. This mirrors our, and others’ results, from the action domain in 
Chapter 5: children at this age most often chose to faithfully imitate actions (e.g. 
Brugger et al., 2007; Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan et al., 2011). 
Other studies, from quite a different theoretical background have looked at 
other features of utterances that children may imitate, in addition to familiar lexical 
items. These include novel verbs, syntactic structure and prosody. In Shimpi et al’s. 
2007 study an experimenter described pictures of a dynamic scene to 3 and 4 year-old 
children. The experimenter used a particular transitive syntactic structure, either 
active or passive. In some trials children were asked to repeat the model’s sentence 
before being presented with a new picture that they could describe freely. The type of 
syntax modeled was more likely to be imitated as children got older. This supports 
point (iii). Shimpi et al. also reported that asking children to repeat the model exactly, 
before being given a target describe increased levels of imitation, when compared to 
trials where no such repetition was prompted. This support point (vi) as repeating the 
modeled syntactic structure serves to highlight its salience, thereby increasing its 
imitation.  
6.3.1.1. Aims 
 For the purpose of Study 1 we chose to focus on the imitation of sentences, 
some of which contained grammatical and ungrammatical repetitions. We adapted the 
paradigm from Experiment 2 in Over and Gattis (2010).  Each child heard thirteen 
sentences: eight contained grammatical and ungrammatical repetitions; five contained 
219 
 
no repetitions. Sentences were verbally produced by an experimenter in the context of 
a game called “Can you say what I say?”   
Our first aim was to assess the difference in imitative behavior between the 
experimental conditions. We expected to find significantly less verbatim imitation and 
significantly more repetitions removed in the ungrammatical condition than the 
grammatical condition due to the increased likelihood of selective imitation omitting 
the non-functional ungrammatical repetition. This would be a similar pattern of 
performance to the unnecessary condition in Chapter 5 where there were significantly 
more Just B responses in the necessary condition: the unnecessary element was 
omitted. 
Using this data, and the data collected in Experiment 2 of this chapter we 
aimed to identify any commonalities between imitative performance in the object and 
linguistic domains. In Chapter 5, regardless of the causal necessity of actions, 
children’s most frequent imitative response was faithful to the model. Similarly we 
expected that at the group level children in both the grammatical and ungrammatical 
repetition conditions would imitate faithfully, that is repeated the sentence verbatim.  
Of course the linguistic and object tasks cannot be directly compared as causal 
necessity is a different concept than grammaticality: however, there are enough 
similarities to warrant comparison being drawn in a more general sense. Of course in 
our verbal imitation task the communicative goal can be achieved with or without the 
repetitions, particularly in the grammatical condition. In the object imitation task the 
omission of one of the actions in the necessary condition would result in a goal 
failure. This would presumably reduce the likelihood of omission when compared to 
the verbal task where communication could proceed successfully regardless. 
6.3.1.2. Methods 
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6.3.1.2.1. Participants 
The same participants as presented in section 2.3.1 took part. 
6.3.1.2.2. Materials 
To overcome shyness and introduce children to the task six practice sentences 
were included. The first two sentences contained one word, the second pair contained 
two words and the final pair contained three words. For the experiment proper 
thirteen sentences were taken from Over and Gattis (2010), Experiment 2. Eight of 
these were test sentences that contained repeated words; four sentences containing 
grammatical repetitions, e.g. ‘Sam was a big big cat’, and four containing 
ungrammatical repetitions, e.g. ‘The cat was too big big for the chair’. Also included 
were five grammatically correct filler sentences each containing five words but no 
repetitions, e.g. ‘I like to eat cake’. Examples of the practice, filler and test sentences 
can be found in Appendix F. 
6.3.1.2.3. Procedure 
 Parents and children were invited to our on-campus lab for their second visit. 
These visits began with a short warm up time before the experimental tasks were 
introduced in a separate room. Tasks were administered in a purpose built testing 
room with inbuilt digital audio and visual recording capabilities. The complete verbal 
imitation procedure was the first task of the session. The participant and experimenter 
sat opposite each other, either side of a square testing table covered in a black table 
cloth. 
Children were introduced to the game ‘Can you say what I say?’ The single 
word practice utterances were produced one at a time by the experimenter for the 
participant to repeat, followed by the two and three word utterances. Following the 
practice children were reminded of the game ‘Can you say what I say?’ and the 
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thirteen experimental sentences were introduced one at a time. If after three 
repetitions children did not respond the experimenter moved on. Children were 
praised for each response they gave, regardless of what the response was. The 
sentences were presented in a pseudo-random order: filler, grammatical and then 
ungrammatical so that similarly structured sentences were not produced in too close 
proximity to one another. There were five different scripts with differing 
combinations of sentences but retaining the same type order. 
6.3.1.2.4. Data Analysis 
Verbal responses were transcribed from the audio recordings and then coded. 
20% of videos were secondary coded and inter-rater reliability was at 100%. 
Participant’s were then given three scores to reflect how imitative they were overall, 
in response to grammatical repetitions and, in response to ungrammatical repetitions. 
Non-verbatim responses were then further coded to reflect the type of alterations 
made; repetitions removed (removal of the target repetition only), repetition additions 
(addition of repeated words over and above those in the original utterances), block 
omissions (removal of one or more words other than the repeated item alone), or other 
alterations (changes to the content).  
6.3.1.3. Results 
 To begin with we examined the levels of verbatim imitation in our sample (see 
Figure 6.1.). Verbatim responses for the test conditions containing repetitions were 
scored between 0-4. There was a significant main effect of condition on imitation 
rates using a one-way ANOVA, F(2,159)=47.75, p<.001. Mann-Whitney U 
comparisons were carried out between the target conditions and grammatical 
sentences were significantly more often recounted verbatim than ungrammatical 
sentences (U=929.5, p<.001). The four sentences containing grammatical repetitions 
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were recounted verbatim at a mean of 3.3 whilst the mean for sentences containing 
ungrammatical repetitions was the lowest at 2.7. Grammatical sentences and 
ungrammatical sentences were indeed treated differently with higher levels of 
imitative fidelity in the former when compared to the latter.  In addition to a 
difference in verbatim imitation between the experimental conditions, repetitions 
were significantly more often removed if utterances were ungrammatical when 
compared to grammatical (U=1020, p<.001) (see Table 6.1. And Figure. 6.2.). 
 
Table 6.1.  
Table Showing Mean Imitation Scores and Alteration Types in the Grammatical (G) 
and Ungrammatical (U) Conditions. 
 Condition Mean Standard Dev. 
Total Imitation G 3.3 1 
 U 2.7 .98 
Reps Removed G .20 .66 
 U .56 .74 
Reps Added G .06 .236 
 U .39 .566 
Block Omission G .59 .926 
 U .52 .846 
Other Alterations G .24 .586 
 U .26 .48 
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Figure 6.1. Mean number of sentences recounted verbatim on the vertical axis for 
each of the target model types on the horizontal axis: grammatical and; 
ungrammatical. Error bars represent standard errors.  * Represents a statistically 
significant difference between the bars p<.05. 
 
Next we wanted to briefly explore the other types of sentence alterations that 
the children produced during the experimental procedure (see Table 6.1). Interestingly 
in addition to there being an increased number of repetitions removed in the 
ungrammatical condition there were also significantly more repetitions added than in 
the grammatical items (U=1188, p<.01) (see Figure 6.2.).   
In the grammatical condition there were more repetitions removed than added 
with the difference being marginally significant, t(53)=1.74, p=.09 In the 
ungrammatical condition there were comparable numbers of added and removed 
repetitions, t(53)=1.2, p>.05. This points to the grammaticality of the repetitions, 
rather than simply the presence of repetitions being meaningful and influences how 
participants respond. 
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Block omissions and other alterations were at a comparable level for 
grammatical and ungrammatical sentences (U=1289, p=.21). This supports the theory 
that it is not the length or complexity or these sentences that are different, it is 
something unique about the grammaticality of the repetitions and how those 
repetitions are dealt with that is altered.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Mean number of each alteration type made during grammatical and 
ungrammatical condition repetition. Error bars represent standard errors. * Represents 
a significant difference between bars p<.05. 
 
6.3.1.4. Experiment 1: Discussion 
Our first aim for this experiment was to characterize the patterns of imitation 
in our sample and to test the impact of grammatical versus ungrammatical repetitions 
on children’s imitative responses. As we had predicted at the group level verbatim 
imitation was the preferred strategy for the target grammatical and ungrammatical 
sentences. This result mirrors children’s preferred imitative strategies in the object 
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imitation task where again faithful imitation (A then B responses) were the most 
common across condition.  
We had further expected to record fewer verbatim repetitions in the 
ungrammatical condition when compared to the grammatical condition. This group 
level pattern highlights the importance of communicative goals in imitation: omitting 
an ungrammatical repetition would retain the communicative goal of the utterance 
while selectively removing communicatively redundant material. As predicted, a 
between condition difference in verbatim repetition was found, with there being 
significantly more faithful imitation of the sentences containing grammatical 
repetitions when compared to their ungrammatical counterparts (See Figure. 7.1.). 
Over and Gattis (2010) also reported this difference, though of a greater magnitude. 
This relates to the first feature of imitation we remarked on in the introduction: 
children more readily selectively imitated causally relevant features of the (behavior) 
language. They more often altered sentences that were ungrammatical than they 
altered perfectly grammatical sentences, by doing this they retained the semantic, 
communicative goal whilst omitting intentional ungrammatical element. 
In addition we showed that repetitions were more often removed in the 
ungrammatical condition than the grammatical condition by our sample. This result 
replicates the findings of Over and Gattis (2010) who also reported increased levels of 
repetition removal in the ungrammatical condition. However, the additional types of 
alterations made contrast with the results reported in Over and Gattis (2010). In the 
coding scheme applied to their sample of three year-old children if an ungrammatical 
sentence was altered it was in order to be corrected to a grammatical form. In our 
sample of four year-olds the children made a variety of alterations including 
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additional repetitions that were significantly more common in the ungrammatical 
condition. 
We expected that the most common type of alteration in the ungrammatical 
condition (as in the necessary condition of the object task) would be to omit the 
redundant/causally unnecessary element in the pursuit of communicative 
(instrumental) clarity. We expected children to behave in a way consistent with only 
omitting the repetition while retaining all the other functional and semantic elements 
of the utterance. This would be a similar pattern of performance to the unnecessary 
condition of the action imitation task where there were significantly more Just B 
responses than in the necessary condition: the unnecessary element was omitted 
whilst those functional elements were retained.  
However, we did not find the expected significant difference between the 
incidences of repetitions being removed from the utterance and the incidences other 
types of repetition. The expected removal of repetitions was at a comparable level to 
the unexpected addition of repetitions. When the number of repetitions removed and 
added were compared between the grammatical and ungrammatical condition, 
however, the results were striking (see Figure. 6.2.). As expected there were 
significantly more repetitions removed in the ungrammatical condition. In addition 
there were significantly more repetitions added in the ungrammatical condition when 
compared to the grammatical. These two poles of behavior were both more frequent 
in the ungrammatical condition. Block omissions and other alterations, however, were 
at a comparable level across conditions. 
As mentioned earlier the increased number of repetitions being removed in the 
ungrammatical condition was expected and replicated earlier results (Over & Gattis, 
2010). The additional repetitions in this same condition were at first surprising. 
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However, when reflecting on the importance of goals and intentions for imitation a 
potential explanation became apparent. 
The usual function of language is as a communicative tool. Grice’s Maxims 
set out a useful set of assumptions that language learners expect and adhere to when 
communicating with one another (Grice, 1975).  When speaking about the manner of 
utterances in particular Grice stated that they be brief, being only as informative as is 
needed in the situation: repetitions and certainly ungrammatical ones would 
intuitively seem to go against this maxim. However, language can also be a tool for 
play and humor within a larger communicative context. In the context of our games 
children may have become more sensitive to the potential elements of playfulness in 
our language and embellish their linguistic choices accordingly. Recall that children’s 
imitation relates to the hierarchical organization of goals (Bekkering et al., 2000). 
Further the intention of a social partner is crucial for imitation as highlighted most 
elegantly in behavioral re-enactment paradigms (e.g., Meltzoff, 2005). If these two 
ideas are combined it may be that children: (a) understanding the adult model to be a 
competent, or even expert, language user, infer that they meant to produce the 
ungrammatical repetition and; (b) having inferred that the repetition was intentionally 
produced, further infer that the goal of the utterance was to produce a repetition in the 
pursuit of play. As a result children may have organized their representation of the 
utterance around the production of a repetition, rather than the conveyance of some 
semantic information. Having reached this point then children may engage with this 
goal and extend the model repetition further, then perpetuating or engaging with the 
inferred game. Children made inferences about the actual words the experimenter 
chose and based upon those inferences selected from a number of possible utterances 
they themselves could make in response. Children are using information about the a 
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speakers passed intentions and goals to inform their own behavior, and their own 
goals in the future. Such an opportunity would not have been available in the context 
of the object imitation task described in Chapter 5, as there were only two possible 
actions for participants to carry out.  
6.3.2.1 Experiment 2: Introduction 
In Experiment 2 we chose a more challenging linguistic paradigm in order to 
probe the limits of our sample’s imitative abilities. Based on Experiment 1 we can 
conclude that children can indeed imitate simple sentences of a certain length made 
up of familiar lexical items and containing repetitions, grammatical or otherwise. 
However, for the purpose of our investigation into language imitation we chose to 
focus not only on the imitation of simple sentences, but also on the imitation of novel 
words and syntactic structure. By using a paradigm that combined an unfamiliar 
structure and novel words we had two main aims to use an experimental method of 
assessing linguistic competence, both receptively and productively and to have 
additional measures of language imitation. In addition, using novel verbs would allow 
us to observe how children dealt with a new lexical item, would they use it flexibly 
through the application of general abstract rules (e.g., Chomsky, 1968) or be 
conservative in its usage, preserving the original syntactic frame as per the verb island 
hypothesis (Tomasello, 1992)? The syntactic structure we chose was the transitive 
passive voice and an introduction to it follows.  
6.3.2.1.1. Introduction to the Passive Verb Construction  
Transitive verb constructions broadly involve an action being carried out by 
one object on another. The active transitive construction focuses the listener’s 
attention on the agent carrying out an action (see example. 1a). Conversely the 
passive construction directs attention toward the patient of an action (see example. 
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1b). Tomasello (1998) has highlighted the appreciation of how the order of an 
utterance’s constituents can manipulate attention in such ways as the essence of truly 
understanding communicative intentions. 
1a. Mark designed that building 
1b. That building was designed by Mark 
In the context of syntactic transformations, the passive has been described as 
the “grand-daddy of them all,” (Ross, 1974). Passives are structurally more complex 
than their active counterparts. They constitute the marked form of an expression, with 
word order being reversed. The most common passive form in everyday speech is the 
truncated passive, (Horgan, 1976; Jesperson, 1924, p.168; Slobin, 1963; Svartvik, 
1996). These truncated, or short-passives, have no active subject, containing only one 
noun or pronoun explicitly (see example. 2a). Full passives then have both subject and 
object present in the utterance (see example. 2b). Not only are truncated passives 
more common, they are also easier to comprehend (Harris, 1976) and are recalled 
more successfully (Slobin, 1963). 
2a. The window was broken 
2b. The window was broken by the tree 
Full passives, those with both subject and object included, can be semantically 
reversible or non-reversible (Horgan, 1976). Reversible passives often include two 
animate actors (see example. 3a) where either could logically be in the agent or 
patient position. Non-reversible passives involve scenarios where it would be 
semantically implausible to reverse the noun positions (see example. 3b). 
3a. The boy was hugged by the girl 
3b. The tree was hugged by the girl 
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In addition to the inclusion and arrangement of nouns and/or pronouns the 
characteristics of the verbs themselves can differ. The most studied dichotomy is that 
between actional and non-actional (or experiential) verbs. Actional verbs result in an 
altered end state such as kicked, pushed or broken. Non-actional verbs are not 
similarly perceptible to an observer, they are experienced by the patient, or describe a 
state of affairs, for example seen, heard or ruined. Children have been reported to be 
more productive with actional verb passives than non-actional (Pinker, LeBeux & 
Frost, 1987). Non-actional or experiential verbs can be further categorized into; 
perceptual (e.g., noticed, ignored), cognitive (e.g., believed, understood), or affective 
(e.g., trusted, admired) (Sudhalter & Braine, 1985). Another type of distinction within 
non-actional verbal passives recently investigated was the contrast between theme-
experiencer and experiencer-theme passives (Messenger, Branigan, McLean & 
Sorace, 2012). Experiencer-theme passives have the experiencer in the object position 
(4a), where as theme-experiencer have the opposite construction (4b.) They pose 
differing levels of difficulty for comprehension. 
 4a. The fairy was seen by the girl 
 4b. The fairy was frightened by the girl 
6.3.2.1.2. Developmental Patterns with the English Passive Verb Construction  
English speakers are not typically seen to produce spontaneous full passive 
utterances until aged 4 or 5 years (Harris & Flora, 1982; de Villiers & de Villiers, 
1978). This poverty is mirrored in child directed speech with only .36% of utterances 
being classified as passive in one natural language study (Gordon & Chafetz, 1990). 
The occurrence of full reversible passives is particularly restricted with none reported 
in a corpus of 12’000 utterances from five year-old participants (Harwood, 1959). 
Lovell and Dixon (1967) reported low levels of comprehension and production of full 
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English passive verb constructions in 4.5-year-old subjects. Similarly Turner and 
Rommetveit (1967a), found that the full passive was comprehended only 25% of the 
time in nursery aged children, and produced in only 20% of these same children using 
an imitation paradigm. Bever (1970) has suggested that pre-school children tend to 
interpret all noun-verb-noun statements as agent-action-patient relationships.  
Truncated passives, however, with one explicit noun or pronoun, and non-
reversible passives seem to appear earlier in speech, and have been elicited from the 
majority of 3-year-olds (Slobin, 1963). Furthermore truncated passives are also easier 
for children under 6-years of age to understand (Slobin, 1963). Of those passives 
recorded in child directed speech the vast majority were indeed truncated forms 
(Gordon & Chafetz, 1990) 
Some verb types are also more difficult to comprehend in the passive 
construction. Non-actional verbs have been shown to result in considerably more 
difficulty for children and even teens (Maratsos, Kuczaj, Fox & Chalkey, 1979; 
Sudhalter & Braine, 1985; Becker & Maratsos, in Maratsos & Chalkey, 1980). This 
effect of non-actional verbs appears not to be due to the verbs regularity or frequency 
in speech, it is the nature of the transitive action itself that interferes with performance 
(Sudhalter & Braine, 1985). 
It is clear from the many studies investigating the passive that although 
evidence of productivity and comprehension can be found in the pre-school years, 
there are many factors influencing performance at the group level. In addition there is 
a large range of individual differences within tasks and age groups. As such there 
have been extensive studies on passive voice comprehension and production at the 
group level that have served to highlight some of the ways task contents and demands 
can mediate performance. This shall be discussed further in section 8.1.4. Language 
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production tasks are generally harder than comprehension tasks (Hirsh-Pasek  & 
Golinkoff, 1996). This seems to indeed be the case for the passive construction 
(Flavell, Beach & Chinksy, 1966; Turner & Rommetveit, 1967; however, see 
Messenger et al., 2012 for a counterexample). In the following section I will detail 
further experimental studies elucidating how task demands and differing paradigms 
change young children’s performance in comprehension and production of the passive 
construction.  
6.3.2.1.3. Abstract Schemas vs. Verb Islands: Assessing Productivity with the 
Passive Experimentally  
Baseline measures of how children choose to freely describe verb-action 
sequences consistently identify the preference they hold for utilizing active verb 
forms over passive forms (e.g., Kidd, 2012; Savage, Lieven, Theakston & Tomasello, 
2006; Shimpi, Gamez, Huttenlocher & Vasilyeva, 2007, and Whitehurst et al., 1975). 
These unconstrained opportunities for children to describe pictures have been used as 
comparisons for studies in which the use of novel, less frequent or unfamiliar verb 
forms is elevated. Structural priming is described as the tendency for individuals to 
generate new utterances while retaining the structural features of other recently heard 
speech (Bock & Griffin, 2000). Priming studies are one of the linguistic world’s 
equivalents of imitation paradigms. Priming studies use models of a particular 
syntactic structure to investigate whether individuals or groups of participants hearing 
them will subsequently incorporate some, or all of the structural features into their 
own utterances. This feature of conversational language, incorporating and imitating 
structural elements heard in the speech of others, is both abundant and inadvertent in 
normal speech (Bock & Griffin, 2000). Indeed Bock and Griffin argued that the act of 
structural repetition following another speaker is implicit, independent from intention, 
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effortless and without need of explicit attention to form in adults (Bock & Griffin, 
2000). In essence then priming is considered by some as an automatic feature of 
natural, social language. Further investigation of the features and hypotheses of 
structural priming more generally will occur later in this chapter. 
Developmental productivity with the passive has previously been assessed 
through the lens of such paradigms. One hypothesis derived from their use is that if 
children hear a passive model they will only readily adopt it in a different semantic 
context if an abstract representation of the construction is already in place. For 
example if a child hears a passive sentence like “The lemon is being cut by the knife,” 
then sees a picture of a knife and a loaf of bread, they will only describe the picture 
as, “The loaf of bread is being cut by the knife,” if they have already developed an 
abstract representation of the passive construction. Resultant evidence that young 
children do indeed represent syntactic structure abstractly has been put forward by 
numerous authors (e.g. Bencini & Valian, 2008; Gentner, Fisher & Eisengart, 2000; 
Shimpi et al., 2007; Thothathiri & Snedeker, 2008).  
In contrast to these early abstraction accounts, item-based accounts suppose 
that young children are not able to make the abstract connection between verbs and 
instead are incredibly conservative with their verb construction use. The verb island 
hypothesis introduced earlier is an example of such item-based accounts (Tomasello, 
2000). In the subsequent paragraphs I will outline a sample of the experimental 
works, many using priming paradigms, which can speak to these accounts of early 
grammatical development.  
In one of the first experimental studies of passive verb acquisition Whitehurst 
et al. (1974) modeled English passives over five sessions. Four to five year old 
children listened to these models that described drawings of actors and actions. The 
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participants were prevented from overtly imitating the modelled speech. Following 
these models the children were shown probe drawings of different actions, some they 
were asked to describe and others simply identify. This procedure generated both 
production and comprehension scores for the children. In comparison to performance 
baselines prior to the modeling sessions both production and comprehension of 
passive verb constructions improved. All participants in the experimental condition 
produced at least once passive utterance to describe the probes. No children in the 
control group that had received no passive models produced any passives, although 
their comprehension was still above chance. Whitehurst et al. attributed this increase 
in production to selective imitation (also characterized as a form of abstraction in their 
paper) that is imitating the grammatical structure whilst excluding the content 
(Whitehurst et al., 1974). They claimed that exposure to the structure also increased 
comprehension. In a study of younger, three-year-old children, Shimpi et al. (2007) 
used an altered paradigm to produce similar priming results. Shimpi et al. used fewer 
passive verb models, had participants repeat the modeled sentences and inserted target 
pictures after each model rather than after blocks of models. The participants showed 
increased passive productivity following models. They concluded that three-year-olds 
also had an abstract representation of the passive construction, however, it was less 
easily accessible than for slightly older children (Shimpi et al., 2007).  
Thatcher et al. (2007) extended these findings with evidence of cross verb 
priming in younger children (aged 3), and with varying semantic classes of verb. Both 
actional and non-actional verbs modeled in the passive construction increased 
participants’ use of the passive structure in subsequent utterances. Thatcher et al. also 
attribute these results to children possessing an abstract representation of the passive 
that was not tied to specific verbs, or even semantic classes (Thatcher et al., 2007). 
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Different forms of the passive, for example Be passives vs., Get passives, also show 
cross item priming, although stronger from Be to Get than vice versa in six-year-olds 
(Messenger, 2009). Additionally truncated passives can prime full passives and vice 
versa (Messenger, 2009). 
There are several key aspects of such paradigms which could bolster the 
effects seen – namely the increased production of passive verb forms. Firstly the 
experimental setting itself dictates that children and experimenters are interacting in a 
dyadic manner. Priming has previously been conceptualized as a communicative, 
imitative and social process (Pickering & Garrod, 2006). Children will be particularly 
sensitive to, and therefore more likely to imitate, the features of speech that are 
directed to them (Branigan, Pickering, McLean & Cleland, 2007). Being the member 
of a group that is addressed during storytelling also increases productivity of the 
passive verb form (Vasilyeva, Huttenlocher & Waterfall, 2006). The number of 
models heard can influence the likelihood of adoption also (Bencini & Valian, 2008; 
Pickering & Branigan, 1998). If, as Brooks and Braine (1995) argue, children build 
models of syntax through extracting commonalities across numerous exemplars of a 
construction, the more exemplars present, the more opportunities for syntactic 
learning (see also structure mapping processes hypothesized by Tomasello, 2000). 
Children begin to categorize verbs and as such draw analogies between newly 
encountered verbs and more familiar entrenched forms, potentially supporting future 
generalizations. With the use of familiar items then there may be individual 
differences in the number of exemplars of its’ use already in long-term memory. 
Additionally with familiar lexical items participants are not being as taxed in terms of 
their understanding of the actions itself, therefore have more working memory to 
assign toward processing features of syntax. If children are familiar with the verb, in 
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any form, they will be more able to attend to the structural rather than semantic 
features involved. 
Studies such as those described above were interested in the circumstances 
under which young children would adopt an unfamiliar syntactic structure they had 
heard in the speech of an experimenter. However, many of these studies used familiar 
verbs in these structures. Indeed the majority of passive production studies with 
children utilize familiar English verbs (e.g., Bencini & Valian, 2008; Bock & Griffin, 
2000; Branigan, Pickering, McClean & Cleland, 2007; Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva & 
Shimpi, 2004; Kashack & Glenberg, 2004; McClure, Pine & Lieven, 2006; Kidd, 
2012; Messenger, Branigan & McClean, 2012; Pinker, LeBeaux & Frost, 1967; 
Savage, Lieven, Theakston & Tomasello, 2003; 2006; Thatcher, Branigan, McClean 
& Sorace, 2007; Vasilyeva, Huttenlocher & Waterfall, 2006; Whitehurst & Novak, 
1973.)  
Several attempts have been made to further investigate the abstract nature of 
children’s grammar and their proclivity with unfamiliar items, by upping the task 
demands (e.g., Brooks & Tomasello, 1999; Childers & Tomasello, 2001). One option 
for doing this is to use an unfamiliar construction in conjunction with a completely 
novel nonce verb. Nonce verbs give the researcher a glimpse into how participants 
interact with an entirely new lexical item. To be used flexibly the nonce item must be 
recognized as coming from the transitive verb class, and applied as such in a different 
context. The first productive use then could be to retain the verb construction but 
describe different nominals. For example the verb meek being modeled in an active 
transitive to describe the motion of a trolley being pulled across a ramp by a lever: 
“The hammer is meeking the boy.” This could be used productively in another 
situation where “the elephant is meeking an aeroplane.” In addition the verb itself 
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could be modified according to grammatical rules already in place for such verbs. 
Going even further then by altering the construction used to describe the event could 
see a passive sentence like “the aeroplane is being meeked by the elephant,” being 
produced. 
Children can incorporate novel verbs learnt in experimental settings into their 
own novel grammatical utterances (Childers & Tomasello, 2001). Between two and 
four-years-old this ability develops to a point where children can begin to flexibly use 
novel verbs in a transitive way at the group level (Abbot-Smith, Lieven & Tomasello, 
2004). Brooks and Tomasello (1999) gave two and three-year-old children a large 
volume of passive or active construction models with a novel verb and action. 
Participants most often attempted to retain the structure of the verb that had been 
initially presented, 75% of those who had been trained with a verb in the passive 
construction subsequently used it in that construction. However, around 1/3 could be 
productive, that is move independently between constructions under certain task 
demands.  The authors concluded that these productive participants had general 
construction knowledge about the active and passive robust enough to support 
flexibility. However, in their set of experiments children were exposed to huge 
numbers of active and passive utterances. Despite this Brooks and Tomasello argued 
that young children are still extremely conservative and vary their use of verbs in line 
with the adult models they encounter.  They imitate the speech they hear in a clever 
way in that they often rely on the linguistic context to facilitate their productivity 
(Tomasello, 2003, p75-76). 
The move children make, from extreme conservativeness towards productive 
flexibility is suggested to take place between three and five years of age (Brooks & 
Tomasello, 1999). Children in their earliest stages of multiword utterances retain new 
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verbs in the structures that they were initially presented. After this stage then children 
begin to represent the form-meaning similarities held within the many utterances they 
have been exposed to through the aforementioned process of structure-mapping 
(Tomasello, 2003). The relational structure between different verbs and the 
constructions in which they appear can be extended to novel verbs discerned to be in a 
similar semantic category (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999b). Children suddenly are able 
to imitate a novel item in an appropriate and innovative manner when in an altered 
context as opposed to mimicking the verb and its structure in an inappropriate way 
given the new discourse demands. 
6.3.2.1.4. Imitation versus Innovation: How Language Sits Astride the Actual 
and the Possible 
An interesting contradiction can be evidenced here in situations where the 
goals of language are manipulated. Suppose children do have a robust and easily 
accessible abstract structural representation of the passive transitive form. Suppose 
they can readily imitate both passive and active utterances, be they containing English 
or nonce verbs: how far might this desire/automatic propagation to retain the structure 
previously heard extend into maintaining it in the presence of incongruent discourse 
pressure? In a second study in which both active and passive constructions were 
modeled some children showed evidence of being able to alter the structure of their 
descriptions in response to the experimenter’s phrasing of questions: they responded 
to discourse pressure (Tomasello & Brooks, 1999a).  
In the active construction speakers and listeners are attending to the agent of 
the action, therefore in unconstrained questioning will have no reason to alter this 
emphasis. With agent-focused questions too then, the question type is congruent with 
the initial construction and the representation of the action. If an interlocutor, 
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however, asks, what is happening to the patient of the action, the focus of attention 
switches: so too can the language used to describe it switch. Patient focused 
questions, with their emphasis on the patient lend themselves to a response using the 
passive construction. Here the goal of language has clearly been mapped for the 
listener, therefore potentially changing the hierarchically organized representation of 
the task. For clarity let us look at an example below (Figure 6.3.).  
 
Figure 6.3. Illustration to show the effect of question focus on syntactic constructions. 
 
A neutral unconstrained question would ask, “What is going to happen now?” 
The most likely response would be an active transitive utterance such as “Minnie is 
going to hit the ball.” An agent-focused question asking what Minnie is going to do 
would for increase the likelihood of this form of answer. Asking a patient focused 
question, however, “What is going to happen to the ball now?” would be expected to 
elicit an increased number of passive utterances like “the ball will be hit/get hit by 
Minnie.” Language being modified in this way eases fluency between speakers by 
retaining the focus of attention. It allows the intentionally salient feature often the 
agent in an action sequence to be identified and information about it exchanged in a 
parsimonious way. This is the goal of language in the current situation. This prevents 
inferences having to be made about what happened to the ball based upon an 
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utterance focused on Minnie, who for whatever reason, may not be the questioner’s 
priority.  
Not only verbal discourse pressure can produce such results. The presentation 
of prompts in pictorial form of the patient of an action has been shown to trigger 
passive voice recall (Turner & Rometveit, 1968). Additionally pre-action direction of 
attention through language can also increase the likelihood of passive utterances being 
produced in an experimental setting (Turner & Rometveit, 1968). In this way 
linguistic behavior emulates object imitation. Behavior is based upon the salience of 
different goals of the interaction and these goals can be made more or less salient for 
participants as explored in Chapter 5. 
Altering their language in response to modulation of attention in this way, 
although possible, can be difficult for majority of children under 5-years-old using 
English verbs and novel verbs alike (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999; Brooks, Tomasello, 
Dodson & Lewis, 1999; Vasilyeva, Huttenlocher & Waterfall, 2006). However, 
Brooks and Tomasello (1999) showed that some children younger than three are 
capable of being productive and flexible with novel verbs. 35-40% of children could 
produce the verb learnt in one construction, in the opposite construction under 
discourse pressure with 90% of those passives in response to neutral and patient 
focused questions (see also Pinker et al. 1987, who used a teaching paradigm).  
Responding to discourse pressure, however, comes at the cost of imitation: Or 
does it? If a person has been speaking about agents, listeners will form an expectation 
of action agents being focused upon, based on the statistical evidence from these 
previous utterances. This expectation would in-turn encourage the listener to attend to 
agents and subsequently form speech focusing on agents. Such expectations, based on 
the subject-verb-order of prior utterances, have been identified in young children 
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through preferential looking paradigms (Thothathiri & Snedeker, 2008). In addition 
imitation is often used as means to initiate, maintain and repair social interaction. If, 
however, a social partner signals that some other behavior is desirable then injecting 
some innovation is a positive response. 
Responding to discourse pressure displays linguistic, conversational and even 
social sophistication: it indicates that you can quickly and effortlessly track and 
respond to attentional-focus changes or any other subtle cues generated by a 
conversational partner. Tomasello (1998) describes understanding communicative 
attention as being that very ability, understanding how a social partner means to 
manipulate your attention. Such a skill, being able to over-ride your initial automatic 
willingness to retain structural parity, may in itself be an indicator of great things. 
Remember that priming of this sort is often considered an automatic process (Bock & 
Griffin, 2000). Rejecting the modeled construction in favor of allying with discourse 
pressure requires inhibition of the pre-potent form and subsequent flexibility in 
generating a productive utterance based on the application of abstract rules about 
grammatical verb transformations. Indeed, some researchers have suggested priming 
itself is a result of a lack of executive control (Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). Tomasello 
(2000) called this interplay between imitation and innovation a paradox of language, 
as mentioned earlier. Children must be conventional in order to successfully convey 
the information being requested of them, using the correct lexical items, arranged in a 
coherent syntactic structure. However, children must also be innovative in rejecting 
previously heard utterance constructions in favor of the one that is most appropriate 
for the task in hand. 
Perhaps responding to such instances of switching focus, has benefits not only 
for language but other cognitive processes too such as cognitive flexibility. 
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Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva, Cymerman & Levine (2002) reported that the complexity of 
caregiver speech, using multi-clause sentences for example, relates positively to their 
infant’s syntax. It stands to reason then that there will be individual differences in the 
strategy children take, in terms of what, when and the extent to which they imitate. It 
may be individual differences in basic cognitive functions such as inhibition or 
cognitive flexibility that determine how able a child, who possesses the necessary 
abstract grammatical rules, can apply them in situations of discourse pressure. 
A speaker has made numerous intentional decisions that a listener may or may 
not chose to imitate; single words, word order, syntax, what to talk about and even to 
commence speaking at all. Again, however, children cannot be flexible with rules that 
they do not possess. Free from linguistic constraints children may have greater or 
lesser implicit social desire to imitate that extends not only to the use of a new verb 
but also the construction it was used in. They are socially motivated to use a novel 
verb in a passive form regardless of the question focus. Children may do this 
regardless of their ability to change the structure, relying only on the pattern 
previously exhibited by the modeler. They may, however, correctly identify that the 
focus of attention has shifted for whatever reason and instead of retaining the passive 
construction apply their abstract grammatical knowledge to this newly learned verb 
and produce the contrasting form. Children who are perhaps less able to do this may 
still respond to discourse pressure but being unable to apply rules (either they are not 
there to begin with or are difficult to access and deploy) may answer in a 
linguistically congruent form but using a familiar English verb. Childers & Tomasello 
(2001), suggest that a verb schema may be in place in children that is strong enough 
to support comprehension processes but not production. Such hypotheses are 
supported by the work of Thothathiri and Snedeker (2008) who provided evidence of 
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comprehension competence ahead of productive abilities. Regardless of social 
motivation then some children may struggle to imitate certain features of speech, 
preferring instead familiar lexical and syntactic options. 
Children may not copy the novel verb at all, but retain the construction. The 
key here would be seeing English verbs used in passive constructions. Perhaps 
retaining properties of syntax, is for some kids, more salient than a new verb? This 
option seems unlikely given children’s rapid uptake of new words in natural language. 
Aside from all these possible patterns of response there may also be increased 
numbers of incomplete or intransitive utterances, as children struggle to manage the 
many working memory demands being placed upon them. 
The combination then of priming studies and the application of discourse 
pressure allows for multiple facets of language production to be assessed 
concurrently. Additionally the use of a novel verb allows for researchers to 
investigate, in real time, how children incorporate a new lexical item into their 
subsequent utterances, across contexts and under differing discourse demands. 
6.3.2.1.5. What Facilitates the Imitation of Syntactic Structure? 
It is clear that children struggle with the spontaneous production of passives 
until late childhood and performance can be facilitated by a number of factors. At this 
point it would be useful to remind ourselves of the factors that influence the imitation 
of actions. Object imitation has been shown to respond to experimental manipulations 
of: (i) social behavior: aloof or socially unresponsive models reduce imitation 
whereas warm experimenters facilitate it, social cues such as eye-gaze also increase 
imitation (Bandura, 1971; Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme & Bushnell, 2007; Hartup & 
Coates, 1970; Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen, Simcock & Jenkins, 2008); (ii) model 
characteristics: the model’s age, social background and even language spoken can 
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influence imitation rates (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum & Carpenter, 2013; Jaswal & 
Neely, 2006; Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 2011; Ryalls, Gul & Ryalls, 2000; 
Seehagen and Herbert, 2011; Zmyj et al., 2012); (iii) increasing goal salience: looking 
behaviors, novel language, repetition, verbal framing, synchronicity and timing can 
all alter imitation rates (Brubacher et al., 2013; Chen & Waxman, 2013; Elsner & 
Pfeifer, 2012; Hermann et al., 2013; Simpson & Riggs, 2011). Such factors would 
presumably also impact upon the imitation of syntactic structure. 
 Indeed experimental paradigms that manipulate the volume of passives 
present in the input, have been shown to impact upon the rate at which they appear in 
the participants’ subsequent utterances (Messenger, 2009; Vasilyeva et al., 2006). 
Such repetition of the structure would serve to increase its salience, and consequently 
the likelihood of imitation in much the same way as happens in the object domain. 
Furthermore being instructed to imitate a modeled passive increases subsequent 
production for three year-olds. Having the children use the structure increases its 
salience and availability (Shimpi et al., 2007). 
Features of the agents and patients used by experimenters modeling the 
construction have also been reported to influence performance. In experimental 
settings utilizing pronouns consistently aids four year olds to produce passive 
utterances when compared with nouns and pro-nouns (Savage et al., 2003). Pronouns 
seem to scaffold performance from model to production. A mix of both pronouns and 
nouns in a series of examples has also been shown to benefit production (Childers & 
Tomasello, 2001). This facilitatory effect of pronouns has been used as evidence to 
support the verb island hypothesis and by having one stable element of the utterance 
children can more readily substitute other elements. 
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Model utterances with animate patients produce poorer comprehension and 
production outcomes for children (Lempert, 1990). Animacy of the agent is a more 
common feature of passive utterances for children therefore more readily learnt (when 
compared to an inanimate object acting on something). Moreover common or familiar 
agents and patients act to scaffold performance through a suggested form of lexical 
scaffolding for children in much the same way as seen with the use of pronouns 
(McClure, Pine & Lieven, 2006). 
It is not only features of the agent and patient that can influence production 
performance. The type of verbs themselves being described can also boost or hinder 
production in children, with actional being more readily produced than non-actional 
passives (Sudhalter & Braine, 1985).  Having a variety of individual verbs modeled 
for participants further provides a performance boost through highlighting the 
common structural features rather than semantic features (Savage et al., 2006).  
6.3.2.1.6. Why Might the Imitation of Language Structures Itself be Useful for 
Young Language Learners? 
In Chapter 5 we introduced the idea that through imitation children are able to 
stand on the shoulders of giants. Children need not be innovative in every situation 
they find themselves in because they can model their behaviors on the behaviors of 
those who have gone before: an efficient strategy. Of course for language production 
each token is imitated due to its inclusion in said language’s lexicon. However, there 
are many features of language that children can imitate: speaking at all; which of a 
selection of lexical items to choose; prosody; pronunciation or; syntax -- to name a 
selection. Hearing others use language in a certain way in a sense invites us to use it 
in a similar way. Observing language, how it is used and the subsequent physical or 
social effects that it has, is an invaluable tool for young language learners. Children 
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can learn about language in a vicarious way that they can then emulate or imitate 
immediately or on a later occasion. 
There are several papers investigating why structural imitation in particular is 
so prevalent in human speech. Suggestions include it being the result of a basic 
phenomenon such as short-term cortical activation, where hearing a certain syntactic 
structure activates the associated production neurons (Chang, Dell & Bock, 2006). 
This spreading activation would then potentiate the structure being reproduced in the 
listeners’ speech above a competing form. Crucially, however, this effect would be 
short lived and not impact upon processing outside of the situation. Another 
possibility is that priming of this type is an indicator of longer-term implicit learning. 
The cognitive processes that generate utterances adapt as a result of linguistic input 
and subsequent productive utterances reflect this adaptation. There is evidence from 
both adults and children that imitation effects do persist for longer than the 
experimental session itself (Bock & Griffin, 2000; Boyland & Anderson, 1998; 
Savage et al., 2006). Pickering and Garrod (2004) also emphasized a social 
motivation for such behavior. 
Pickering and Ferreira (2008) have set out three main reasons why the 
behavior of priming may be beneficial for conversational situations. (i) It promotes 
alignment between speakers both in terms of the language used but also through what 
features of a situation are being attended to and the mental/informational states of 
both. Pickering and Garrod (2007) in line with a spreading activation account suggest 
that comprehension of certain syntactic construction covertly activates production 
systems in readiness for generated an aligned response. (ii) There is also evidence that 
being primed through conversation promotes the ease of production fluency of that 
form. Processing effort is seen to decrease making subsequent speech more effortless, 
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Smith & Wheeldon (2001). (iii) Finally, priming is deemed to be a product of, and 
propagator for implicit learning. Information about syntactic/semantic mappings is 
repeated and stored for future use. 
With imitation in a linguistic context, however, it can be difficult to 
disentangle whether children understand the item or feature they are imitating, or 
whether simple mimicry is taking place. Young children have indeed been shown to 
imitate linguistic forms they do not understand (Fraser, Bellugi & Brown, 1963), and 
nonsense material (Shipley, Smith & Gleitman, 1969). 
 Grammar specifically can be positively influenced by the usage of words as 
yet not semantically grounded in the lexicon. Slobin (1968) noted that when engaged 
in imitation language learners are able to produce grammatical features that are not 
seen in their spontaneous utterances. This work and later work by Ruth Clark (1976) 
identify that imitation has “pervasive effects on speech” as the context in which the 
imitative behaviors take place serve as conceptual markers to infants about what 
sounds, words or phrases are semantically linked to the experience.  With time and 
repetition, the abundant phonetic, syntactic and semantic information held within the 
imitated sequences can be digested and gradually incorporated into ones knowledge 
structure to be flexibly redeployed elsewhere.  After initial imitation without 
understanding patterns are in time recognized and the initially “liberal” semantic 
contexts begin to be narrowed down and promote the formation of productive rules 
(Cazden, 1968). Another salient reason why imitation is a positive activity for a 
language learner to undertake is that familiarity of the content can foster more rapid 
and discriminatory recognition of similar forms in the speech stream of adults 
encountered in the future (Clark, 1976). By manipulating the perceptual sensitivity of 
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the child more opportunities for experiential and contextual learning will be made 
available in future, thanks to the initial imitation of a related form.  
Additionally the action, (or perhaps strategy) of imitating some feature of 
language which was previously unfamiliar is itself a pervasive quality of human 
communication. The frequent use of phrases, idioms and clichés by competent 
language users, which are cued by contextual or normative linguistic features and 
“bypass normal sentence processing routes,” aid communication and serve their 
purpose even if not fully analyzed by all those who utilize them (Ervin-Tripp, 1973 as 
cited in Clark, 1976). This communication alone is a desirable social outcome. 
6.3.2.1.7. Why Explore the use of Passive Verb Competence at Age 4? 
Using novel lexical items allowed us to assess how willing and able young 
children are to comprehend and incorporate such items into their own lexicon. We 
first looked at how often children incorporated these newly introduced lexical items 
into their own utterances. In addition we probed how flexible children could be in 
terms of switching between constructions in response to discourse pressure. 
Contrasting children’s willingness to produce two novel items, presented in 
two constructions, one familiar and one unfamiliar, will further allow us to assess 
their linguistic representations of syntax. At age four children’s spontaneous transitive 
constructions are overwhelmingly active, with passive, particularly full passive 
utterances being scarce. However, there is evidence that children can produce novel 
passive utterances through structural priming (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999a). One 
paper specifically has reported that truncated passives can be elicited from the 
majority of 3-year olds using discourse pressure (Marchman, Bates, Burkhardt & 
Good, 1991). Furthermore children at this age have also been shown, albeit in small 
numbers, to flexibly produce a passive using a verb only previously heard in and 
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active construction (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999). Given this evidence we chose to 
streamline the training procedure implemented by (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999) 
modelling two novel verbs for the participants, one in an active and one in a passive 
voice. We applied discourse pressure in the production phase in an attempt to elicit 
the production of these novel verbs in both active and passive constructions. Such 
flexible use would further point to imitation as opposed to mimicry. Furthermore we 
would assess the comprehension of these modelled verbs to contrast whether the 
construction in which a verb was learnt effected its’ likelihood of being understood. 
Children were asked to show the experimenter an example of the action in the active 
voice, regardless of the construction initially used. Previous studies have shown 
passively introduced verbs to be more poorly comprehended (Lovell & Dixon, 1967; 
Turner & Rometveit, 1967).  We could also probe how successfully and flexibly these 
same participants could comprehend the novel verbs being presented in the two 
contrasting transitive frames.  
To our knowledge this is the first study to experimentally combine both the 
comprehension and production of novel transitive verbs in the same set of 
participants. This design was chosen to elucidate whether children who used the novel 
verbs or unfamiliar syntactic structure were doing so in a truly imitative way vs., 
simple mimicry. Children who produced the target utterances but failed the 
comprehension questions could be identified as having mimicked the utterances 
modeled while not understanding them. Conversely participants who both produced 
and comprehended the items could be labeled as imitating the model, that is replicated 
the communicative goal and the means by which it was realized. Our second question 
then was centered round whether our sample appeared to be imitating the use of novel 
verbs or mimicking form only. For both production and comprehension elements of 
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this study we expected to see a range of individual differences in the following 
aspects of performance: how often a participant used a novel verb; how often they 
produced a passive utterance; how sensitive they were to discourse pressure and; how 
well they comprehended the verbs.  
How frequently participants use a novel word could be mediated by several 
factors. Children love to imitate intention actions so may simply mimic the use a 
novel lexical item, without fully understanding its semantic or syntactic features but 
wishing to achieve the same goals. Children may use the verb and do so flexibly, 
indicating the item has been incorporated into the lexicon and become subject to the 
grammatical rules associated with other items of this class. Children may have taken 
these lexical addition steps but be unable or unwilling to translate this knew 
knowledge into novel productive utterances. The newly formed representation of the 
verb meek for example may not be strong enough to support productive utterances in 
anything other than the construction in which it has been modelled. Or the 
representation may be strong enough but children have not picked up upon the cues 
inherent in the discourse of the experimenter, they may not correctly identify that 
discourse pressure is present. 
When compared to Experiment 1, Experiment 2 affords children many more 
options as to how they choose to respond to the elicited production questions 
presented to them. How children organize the hierarchical goals of the situation 
consequently many differ along several dimension. Children could choose to copy all 
the features that the model produces, novel word, syntax and beyond. Some children 
might reject imitation in favour of answering in a way they feel most competent, i.e., 
with familiar English verbs and constructions. In such a task there are less clearly 
defined intentional features when looking at the literature. With object imitation the 
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salience of contrasting goals (such as in the mouse house task) has been explored. 
Spatial goals are replicated first, then process goals, then intentional goals etc. In 
relation to the features of language there are no such defined orders of importance. 
One might intuitively suggest that a top the hierarchy is replicating the ultimate goal 
of effective communication, replicating lexical items may come after this, followed 
by the replication of syntax. However, such goal directed distinctions have, as yet, not 
been discussed in the context of language development. As such predictions about 
what, and why, children imitate from the speech of others’ in this experimental 
paradigm are difficult to make.  
Broadly speaking, however, we expected many children to imitate the novel 
verb due to its salience as a shiny and new lexical item that has been repeated many 
times by the experimenter. In addition we expected that following passive models 
there would be an increased number of passive utterances produced by the 
participants as seen in previous experimental studies (e.g., Bencini & Valian, 2008; 
Bock & Griffin, 2000; Branigan, Pickering, McClean & Cleland, 2007; Brooks & 
Tomsello, 1999; Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva & Shimpi, 2004; Kashack & Glenberg, 
2004; McClure, Pine & Lieven, 2006; Kidd, 2012; Messenger, Branigan & McClean, 
2012; Pinker, LeBeaux & Frost, 1967; Savage, Lieven, Theakston & Tomasello, 
2003; 2006; Thatcher, Branigan, McClean & Sorace, 2007; Vasilyeva, Huttenlocher 
& Waterfall, 2006; Whitehurst & Novak, 1973). Further we expected comprehension 
of the passively introduced verbs to be poorer than those actively introduced. 
If children showed high levels of novel verb and syntax use coupled with poor 
comprehension, however, they could be identified as engaging in mimicry, the 
replication of surface levels features of a behavior without understanding the means 
and the goals of the model. If children showed imitation and flexibility with novel 
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verbs combined with good comprehension, however, it would be clear that they not 
only replicated the linguistic behavior of the model but further understood its’ 
function. 
 
6.3.2.3. Method 
6.3.2.3.1. Participants 
 Data was collected from the same participants presented in section 2.3.1. 
6.3.3.3.2. Materials 
Replicating Brooks and Tomasello (1999), two novel verbs, meek and tam, 
were chosen to refer to two novel transitive actions the children would see being 
modeled by an experimenter. Each action had an agent and a patient. In total 36 
objects were used in these roles. 18 were animate e.g., stuffed animals or dolls; and 18 
were inanimate common household objects or toys e.g., a toothbrush or a plastic car.  
Two pieces of apparatus were designed and constructed to enact our two 
transitive verbs (see Appendix G), one for each verb. Apparatus 1 was a rectangular 
trolley and track (60cm x 20cm) with a small ramp in the middle and a thin, vertical 
piece of tubing at one end (40cm). A wooden ball sat atop this tubing. The ball 
attached to chord that ran down the tube and affixed to a small wooden trolley with 
wheels (15cm x 20cm). When the ball was pulled upwards vertically the trolley would 
move horizontally along the track and across the ramp. Apparatus 2 consisted of a 
rectangular wooden frame (30cm wide and 60cm high) attached to a rectangular 
wooden base for stability. Suspended from the center of the frame by two pieces of 
thin rope affixed to either side was a transparent cylindrical container 10 cm in 
diameter and 15cm tall. An upturned plastic cup formed a pedestal placed 10-15cm 
from the base of the frame. When swung gently the container knocked off an object 
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placed upon the pedestal. For both Apparatus 1 and 2 both an agent and a patient are 
required to model the transitive action (meeking/taming). In Apparatus 1 the patient is 
placed on the trolley whilst the agent “pulls” the wooden ball thereby moving it along 
the tracks and over the ramp. In Apparatus 2 the patient is placed on the pedestal 
whilst the agent inside the plastic container swings toward it thereby knocking it over. 
6.3.2.3.3. Procedure 
Parents and children were invited to the on-campus lab for their session. Visits 
began with a short warm up time before the experimental tasks were introduced in a 
separate room. Tasks were administered in a purpose built testing room with inbuilt 
digital audio and visual recording capabilities. All actions were modeled using an 
apparatus placed in the centre of the black testing mat between the experimenter and 
participant. The position of the apparatus remained constant throughout the trials. 
First training, production and comprehension tasks were completed for one novel verb 
using one apparatus. Once these three phases were concluded, training, production 
and comprehension elements for the second verb and second apparatus were 
undertaken. Following are details for these three phases each of which children went 
through. There were four possible combinations of novel verb and voice in this within 
subjects design with children seeing both verbs and both verb constructions once. 1) 
Meek 1st passive/Tam 2nd active. 2) Meek 1st active/ Tam 2nd passive. 3) Tam 1st 
passive/Meek 2nd active. 4) Tam 1st active/Meek 2nd passive. 
Training phase. Prior to seeing the apparatus children were told by the 
experimenter; “I am going to show you something, something I am pretty sure you 
will have never seen before.” The first apparatus and supporting objects (agents and 
patients) were then removed from behind a neutrally shaded curtain that skirted the 
testing room. The participants were shown the 18 items to be used with the apparatus 
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and were asked to identify them. Errors were immediately corrected by the 
experimenter. The experimenter then selected randomly selected one animate and one 
inanimate object and proceeded to model the novel verb eight times. Two types of 
modeling procedure were used, active or passive. Each verb was only modeled in one 
construction condition. Which condition and verb combination came first was 
counterbalanced across participants. In the active condition the novel verb was only 
used in the active voice with the focus on the agent of the transitive action, e.g., 
“Look! The toothbrush is going to meek/tam something.” In the passive condition the 
focus of the sentence was reversed to highlight the patient of the transitive action, 
e.g., “Look! The toothbrush is going to get meeked/tammed.” Three of the eight 
constructions were truncated: the remaining five were full. See Appendix G for the 
full script. Throughout the process the participant was asked questions about the 
patient or agent to engage their attention during the procedure. After the initial eight 
models children were asked to say the novel verb. Two new items were chosen for 
agent and patient, reversing whether the animate or inanimate was the agent/patient. 
The verb was then modeled a further eight times in the same voice and using the same 
frames as before. Again the participant was asked to say the verb following this 
phase.  
Elicited production phase. Three forms of production question were utilized 
designed to exert differing discourse pressures on the participants; neutral, agent 
focused and, patient focused (adapted from Ahktar & Tomasello, 1997). These 
production questions were asked, one at a time by the experimenter following each of 
the three new combinations of agent/patient being used to carry out the action that had 
been previously modeled in the training phase. These questions were, neutral, agent 
and patient focused. The neutral question did not highlight either agent or patient of 
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the transitive action e.g., “What just happened?” The agent-focused question asked 
specifically about the action’s agent e.g., “What did the Cellotape just do?” Finally 
the patient focused question asked about the patient of the action e.g., “What just 
happened to the duck?” If children failed to respond or were non-compliant the action 
was repeated once and the question repeated. All participants were asked all three 
questions once: Neutral, then agent and finally patient focused. Each time they 
witnessed a different agent and patient pair. This was counterbalanced with 
alternating animate/inanimate items.  
Comprehension phase. This directly followed the elicited production phase 
for the same novel verb. Eight objects, four inanimate and four animate, were ensured 
to be within reach and view of the participants. The experimenter indicated that it was 
the child’s turn to play with the toys. Two forms of comprehension question were 
asked:  “1. Can you show me the cow meeking/tamming the train?” or, “2. This time, 
can you make the cow tam/meek the train?” Question 1 was asked twice, and then 
question two was asked twice. Each time the question involved one animate and one 
inanimate object. Again an alternating system was used so that the agent’s animacy 
was different from one question to the next. If the child failed to respond or was non-
compliant the request was repeated once. Following completion of the first 
comprehension phase the second novel verb is trained, then its’ production is elicited 
and comprehension assessed. 
6.3.2.3.4. Data Analysis 
Verb production. All utterances were coded to identify the effects of training 
condition and discourse pressure on production. 20% of videos were secondary coded 
and inter-rater reliability was at 100%. Multiword utterances were categorized on 
several dimensions. Was the utterance grammatically correct or incorrect, active or 
256 
 
passive, transitive or intransitive, full or truncated and, was a novel or familiar verb 
used. If the child altered or repaired their construction in an unsolicited manner the 
revised version was retained. On N=4 occasions children failed to respond or stated 
they did not know the answer. These were coded as incorrect. 
Verb comprehension. Responses were coded only as correct or incorrect. A 
correct response was defined as the placing of an agent and patient in their correct 
respective positions on the apparatus and subsequently carrying out the transitive 
action requested to completion. If a child initially placed the protagonists in the 
incorrect position and then corrected their mistake independently, before carrying out 
the action, this was coded as correct. Any other responses and non-compliance were 
coded as incorrect. 
6.3.2.4 Results 
6.3.2.4.1. Novel Verb Utterances  
We first examined the utterances children produced looking at the number of 
English versus novel utterances.  We were interested in assessing which verb type 
was being favored in the productive utterances in our sample (Figure. 6.4.). 
Furthermore we were interested in the transitive structure of the utterances 
participants’ produced utilizing the novel verb, active, passive or incomplete (see 
Figure. 6.4.) 
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Figure 6.4. Overview table showing the number of English and novel verb utterances 
in the ellicited phase and the transitive structure of those novel verbs produced. Error 
bars represent standard error. * Represents a significant difference between bars 
p<.05. 
 
Means were calculated from the total number of utterances children were 
prompted to produce and hence could be between 0-6. The mean number of English 
verbs produced=3.14, where the novel verb mean =2.1607. This difference was 
statistically significant with more English than novel verb utterances, t(55)=2.39, 
p=.020. Novel verb here refers to the amalgamated scores of all utterances poduced 
using the novel verb regardless of the linguistic construction in which they were used.  
Box 1 highlights the constructions of interest, active and passive, that were 
produced using the novel verbs. There were significantly more active than passive 
novel utterances, t(55)=-2.64, p=.011 overall. There was a significant main effect of 
training condition on the number of active utterances, significantly more were 
produced using verbs actively trained, F(1,109)=7.7, p=.007. Similarly there were 
significantly more passive utterances using passively trained verbs than actively 
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trained, F(1,109)=-12.96, p<.001. 
Additionally there was a main effect of training condition on the number of 
incomplete novel utterances produced overall, F(1,108)=6.65, p=.011, with more 
incomplete utterances following passive training. 
 
Table 6.2. Mean number of active and passive utterances using novel verb following 
active or passive training. 
 Number Mean Standard Dev. 
Active Training Active .87 1.17 
 Passive .17 .43 
 Total .63 .96 
Passive Training Active .38 .59 
 Passive .56 .79 
 Total .35 .67 
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Figure 6.5.. Overview column chart showing the mean number of utterance types 
produced in response to the three elicited production question types and following 
both active and passive verb training. Error bars represent standard error. * 
Represents a significant difference between bars p<.05. 
 
Active Utterances. For active utterances there was a significant main effect of 
training condition on; the number of actives produced in response to the neutral 
question, F(1, 109)=6.35, p=.013 and the patient focused question, F(1,109)=11.46, 
p=.001. There was no difference between conditions for the agent-focused questions. 
There was a significant main effect of question type on the number of active 
utterances F(1,218)=14.69, p<.001. Within the active utterances there were 
significantly more active utterances in response to agent focused than neutral focused 
questions, t(109)=--3.14, p=.002, significantly more in the neutral than the patient 
focused questions, t(109)=-2.15, p=.034, and significantly more in the agent than the 
patient focused, t(109)=5.1, p<.001. 
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For the actively trained cases there was a significant difference between the 
agent and patient focussed questions in the form of fewer active utterances for the 
latter, t(54)=3.25, p=.002.  
For the passively trained condition there were significantly more active 
utterances in response to agent focussed than neutrally focussed questions, t(54)=-
2.63, p=.011, there were significantly more actives also in response to neutral focused 
questions than patient, t(54)=-2.058, p=.044. Finally there were significantly more 
active utterances in respone to agent than patient focused questions, t(54)=3.93, 
p<.001. 
Passive Utterances. For passive utterances there was a significant main effect 
of training condition on; the number of passives produced in response to neutral 
questions, F(1,108)=13.2, p<.001 and, the number of passives produced in response to 
patient focused questions, F(1,108)=6.94, p=.01. 
There was a significant main effect of question type on passive production, 
F=(1,217)=21.33, p<.001. Within the passive utterances there were significantly more 
passive utterances in response to patient focussed questions than agent focussed, 
t(109)=-4.62, p<.001. There were also significantly more passives produced in 
response to neutral than agent focused questions, t(109)=4.92, p<.001. 
For the actively trained cases there was significantly more passives in respone 
to patient than agent focused questions only, t(54)=-2.06, p=.044. For the passively 
trained condition there were significantly more passive utterances in response to 
patient focussed than agent focussed questions, t(54)=-4.29, p<.001 and, significantly 
more passives in response to neutral than agent focused questions, t(54)=4.92, p<.001. 
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Incomplete Utterances. For passive utterances there was a significant main 
effect of training condition on the number of incomplete utterances produced in 
response to the neutral focused question, F(1,108)=4.99, p=.028. 
Within the incomplete utterances there were no significant difference between 
the number of incomplete English utterances produced in response to the three 
questions types. Within both the actively and passively trained conditions there were 
no between question differences reaching significance. 
Question Type. As reported earlier there is a significant main effect of 
question type on both the number of actives and passive produced overall. There is no 
main effect of question type when you look within the active training group only. The 
passively trained verb shows more variation with questions type. If you run the 
analysis with only the agent and patient questions and not the neutral, however, there 
are strong main effects on passive utterances, a significant interaction between 
question type and training condition training F(3,219)=6.94, p=.009. There is also a 
significant main effect for actives F(2,164)=7.4, p=.001 and passives F(2,164)=12.4, 
p<.001 (see Figure 6.6.). 
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Figure 6.6. Mean number of passive and active utterances produced in response to the 
three question types. Error bars represent standard error.  
 
 
Figure 6.7. Column chart showing the number of English utterances, either active or 
passive, that were produced in response to the three question types. Error bars 
represent standard error.  
 
Figure 6.8. Column chart showing the relative number of novel passive utterances in 
response to patient focused questions compared to novel active utterances in response 
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to agent focused questions. Error bars represent standard error. * Represents a 
significant difference between bars p<.05. 
 
There were significantly fewer passives produced in response to patient 
focused questions than active utterances produced in response to agent focused 
questions, t(109)=-3.58, p=.001 (Figure 6.8.). 
6.3.2.4.2. English Utterances 
 Given that children preferentially chose to use an English verb rather than the 
modeled novel verb we also wanted to examine the transitive structure of their 
subsequent utterances. Our task was not only interested in novel verb production but 
also syntactic structure, hence in the following section we focus on the transitive 
structure of those utterances that contained familiar English verbs. 
 
 
Figure. 6.9. Column chart showing the number of active, passive and incomplete 
utterances using an English verb following both active and passive training. Error bars 
represent standard error. * Represents a significant difference between bars p<.05. 
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There were significantly fewer passive than active utterances, t(54)=-7.52, 
p<.001 (Figure 6.9.). There were also significantly fewer incomplete utterances than 
active one, t(54)=7.21, p<.001.  There was no significant difference between the 
number of passive and incomplete utterances and no between training condition 
differences. 
 
Figure 6.10. Overview column chart showing the mean number of English verb 
utterance types produced in response to the three elicited production question types 
and following both active and passive verb training. Error bars represent standard 
error. * Represents a significant difference between bars p<.05. 
 
Active utterances. For active utterances there was no significant main effect 
of training condition on the number of English actives produced overall, 
F(1,109)=.31, p=.58, or in response to the different questions types. 
Within the active utterances there were significantly more active utterances in 
response to agent focused than neutral focused questions, t(109)=-2.24, p=.027, and 
significantly more in the patient than the neutral focused questions, t(109)=-2.17, 
p=.032.  
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For the actively trained cases there were no significant differences in the 
number of active utterances produced for the different question types. For the 
passively trained condition there were significantly more active utterances in response 
to agent focussed than neutrally focussed questions, t(54)=-3.42, p=.001. There were 
significantly more actives also in response to patient focused questions than neutral, 
t(54)=-2.21, p=.032.  
Passive utterances. For passive utterances there was no significant main 
effect of training condition on the number of English passives produced overall, 
F(1,108)=.64, p=.34, or in response to the different questions types. 
Within the passive utterances there were only significantly more passive 
utterances in response to patient focussed questions than agent focussed, t(109)=-2.9, 
p=.004.  
For the actively trained cases there were no significant differences in the 
number of passive utterances produced for the different question types. For the 
passively trained condition there were significantly more passive utterances in 
response to patient focussed than agent focussed questions, t(54)=-2.32, p=.024. 
Incomplete utterances. For incomplete utterances there was no significant 
main effect of training condition on the number of English incomplete utterances 
produced overall, F(1,108)=1.47, p=.23, or in response to the different questions 
types. 
Within the incomplete utterances there were no significant difference between 
the number of incomplete English utterances produced in response to the three 
questions types. Similarly within each training condition there were no significant 
differences across the question types. 
266 
 
There were significantly fewer passives produced in response to patient 
focused questions than active utterances produced in response to agent focused 
questions, t(109)=-6.6, p=<.001 (Figure 6.11.). 
 
 
Figure 6.11. Relative number of English passive utterances in response to patient 
focused questions compared to English active utterances in response to agent focused 
questions. Error bars represent standard error. * Represents a significant difference 
between bars p<.05. 
 
There were significantly fewer passives produced in response to patient 
focused questions than active utterances produced in response to agent focused 
questions across both English and novel verb utterances, t(109)=9.36, p=<.001 
(Figure 6.12.). 
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Figure. 6.12. Column chart showing the relative number of passive utterances in 
response to patient focused questions compared to active utterances in response to 
agent focused questions, using either English or a novel verbs. Error bars represent 
standard error. * Represents a significant difference between bars p<.05. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13. Composite of Figures; 8.5, 8.8 & 8.9. 
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6.3.2.4.3. Passive Verb Comprehension 
The main effect for training type on comprehension scores was marginally 
significant, F(1,101)=3.79, p=.054. When a pairwise comparison was carried out the 
mean comprehension score for actively trained verbs, M=3.5 was significantly higher 
than for passively trained verbs, M=2.9, t(50)=-2.71, p=.009 (Figure 6.14.). 
 
 
Figure 6.14. Column chart showing the mean comprehension performance scores 
following active and passive training. Error bars represent standard error. * 
Represents a significant difference between bars p<.05. 
 
Comprehension was significantly better than production overall, t(51)=10.03, 
p<.001 (Figure 6.15.). 
Children’s passive, but not active comprehension scores related significantly 
and positively with their discourse sensitivity scores, r=.3, p<.03 versus r=.23, p>.05. 
Children who were more responsive to the demands of the question were also more 
successful in comprehension of the more complex syntactic form.  
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Figure 6.15. Proportional total scores for total verb comprehension and production. 
Error bars represent standard error. * Represents a significant difference between bars 
p<.05. 
 
6.3.2.5. Experiment 2: Discussion 
 The passive verb construction was chosen for this experimental paradigm as 
children younger than age four to five years are not typically seen to produce it 
spontaneously (Harris & Flora, 1982; de Villiers & de Villiers, 1978). When given the 
opportunity to narrate transitive actions children sistently demonstrate a preference 
for the active construction  (e.g., Kidd, 2012; Savage et al., 2006; Shimpi et al., 2007; 
Whitehurst et al., 1975). Comprehension of this construction is also much reduced 
when compared to the more common actve construction (Lovell & Dixon, 1967; 
Turner & Rometveit, 1967a). There is dissagreement in the literature as to how 
children develop their ability to produce and understand the passive construction. The 
use of syntactic priming studies in which children are given passive models prior to a 
free description opportunity has led some researchers to hypothesise that children 
hold abstract representations of the construction (e.g., Bencini & Valian, 2008; 
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Gentner et al., 2000; Shimpi et al., 2007; Thothathiri & Snedeker, 2008). The 
constrasting set of theories, item-based accounts instead deem children conservative 
verb users, instead preferring to use items only in the construction in which they have 
been previously heard (Tomasello, 2000). Using novel verbs, to ensure young 
children brought no prior experience to the experimental setting, Brooks and 
Tomasello (1999) reported that children were strikingly conservative with their verb 
use. They suggest that children build a verb-island and only with time and experience 
do verb-islands begin to connect, supported by semantic relationships, and syntactic 
rules be used flexibly with novel items.  
We too chose to use novel items in our experimental paradigm. Although the 
majority of responses to our ellicited production questions were answered in a 
semantically appropriate manner, overall children were more willing to substitute in 
familiar English verbs than produce utterances with the novel verbs. At the group 
level then children were unwilling to imitate a newly introduced novel verb, 
regardless of construction, into their own utterances. There were more English than 
Novel verbs generated in the passive training condition, however, these differences 
did not reach significance.   
 As reported in previous literature, there were significantly more active vs., 
passive utterances produced. In addition we observed the expected significant main 
effect of training condition on our sample’s productive constructions using the novel 
verbs: there were significantly more novel active utterances produced following 
active training and; significantly more passive utterances produced following passive 
training. Additionally there were significantly more incomplete novel utterances, not 
adhering to a transitive structure following passive training. It is clear from these 
findings that at age four children are beginning to imitate the linguistic structures of a 
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social partner. In addition at first glance such results would seem to support a verb 
island hypothesis of early linguistic development as there is eeidence of more actives 
following active models and vice versa (Tomasello, 1992). However, when looking 
back to Table. 7.1. or Figure. 7.1., children by no means exclusively retain the novel 
verb in the construction that they have heard it modelled: some children are being 
flexible in their production of newly learned verbs. Particularly in the case of the 
passivly modelled verb a high proportion did revert to using the more familiar active 
construction with the newly presented verb, they were not construction specific. For 
children to have been flexible in this way they must have recognised these new lexical 
items as belonging to an abstract category pertaining to something like the adult 
classification of a “verb.” More over they would have had to import knowledge 
relating to the rules of this category and apply them to the novel item in order to 
switch between constructions in this way. Children have been able to take newly 
acquired knowledge from their experience of reality, integrate it with previous causal 
knowledge relating to the rules surrounding verb forms, and move into a new 
linguistic reality of their own making having generated a truly original utterance. 
 When looking at the effect of training condition and agent vs., patient ellicited 
production question type there was a significant interaction. For active utterances 
there were significantly more produced in response to agent focused questions than 
patient focussed. Converesly then for passive utterances there were significantly more 
produced in response to patient than agent focussed questions. Our sample then 
showed evidence of discourse sensitivity with different question types elliciting 
different proportions of verb constructions in line with the attentional focus prompted. 
Particularly interesting was the observation that no child produced a passive utterance 
in repsonse to a agent focussed question. 
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 Also interesting, however, was the finding that following passive training, 
patient focussed questions yielded significantly fewer passive utterances than neutral 
questions. One explanation for this could be the unconstrained nature of the neutral 
question. No discourse pressure was being applied, congruent or otherwise, therefore 
no additional demands were being made on the participants to generate a particular 
linguistic state. In the case of the active construction, it being a more familiar form, 
both to comprehend and produce, may have worked to eliminate this effect. 
 Finally incomplete utterances did not vary as a function of question type, they 
were of a statistically comparable level for neutral, agent and patient focussed 
questions. Between training conditions, however, there were more incomplete 
utterances following passive training in both the neutral and patient focussed 
questions. There were significantly more novel active utterances overall than passive 
or incomplete utterances. Passive and incomplete utterances were at a statistically 
comparable level. In light of this it seems clear that passively trained novel verbs were 
difficult for children to produce transitively and more difficult to manipulate in 
response to discourse pressures. Despite having models of both active and passive 
constructions children were just as likely to produce passive utterances as produce 
intransitive, incomplete utterances. There was much more success with actively 
trained novel verb,  highlighting that the less familiar construction, and not the novel 
verbs per se, was responsible for the productive difficulties. There were significantly 
fewer passive utterances produced in response to patient focussed questions than 
active utterances produced in repsonse to agent focussed. 
 As seen in Figure. 6.4. there were a great deal more English active utterances 
than passive or incomplete. When children rejected the use of a novel lexical item 
they more often than not chose the most familiar type of transitive construction to fall 
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back on: the English active. There were no between condition differences in the 
numbers of English utterances of each type produced. 
 However, when looking only at the active English utterances, the most 
common type of English utterance, there were significantly more produced in 
response to the agent focussed question following passive training. This make 
intuitive sense as children struggled to flexibly apply the necessary syntactic rules to 
the newly learnt passive verb in the face of discourse pressure. Instead then children 
reverted to a familiar English verb in the active form, therby succesfully adhering to 
discourse pressure and communicating successfully.  
There were significantly more active English utterances in response to neutral 
questions following active training. Possible suggestions as to why this was the case 
were not so forthcoming. Perhaps some children were interpreting the neutral 
question as an opportunity to redescribe the scene, hence using different words.  
There were very few passive English utterances, however, there were 
significantly more in response to patient focussed questions when compared to agent 
focused. This suggests that even when children abandon the use of a novel verb they 
are still attempting to conform to discourse pressure. Incomplete utterances were 
statistically comparable across training conditions and question types. Finally children 
were significantly poorer at comprehension questions relating the verbs they had 
encountered only in the passive construction when compared to actively trained verbs. 
To summarise then (i) across training condition and question type children 
were more likely to revert to an English verb than incorporate a newly learnt lexical 
item. (ii) Children were more likely to revert to English verbs following passive 
training, however, highlighting a fundemental difficulty with this construction for 
young children. (iii) Children were more likely to use novel active, than novel passive 
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constructions in their own utterances. (iv) There was evidence of children being 
sensitive to discourse pressure with more passives produced following patient 
focussed questions and more actives produced following agent focussed questions. 
Finally, (v) children were significantly poorer at comprehending passively trained 
verbs than actively trained verbs. 
Imitation versus mimicry. In our sample there was very little evidence to 
support a view that children were simply mimicking the language they heard 
modeled. Mimicry could be identified in situations where production scores exceeded 
comprehension scores. Firstly comprehension was significantly higher than 
production with the novel verbs: children were more able to comprehend than 
produce novel items in any form. Secondly the comprehension scores for those 
children who did not produce a novel verb were significantly lower than for those 
children who did. Looking only at children low on the passive verb comprehension 
measure though they showed significantly fewer novel transitive utterances and 
significantly more English utterances: they were less imitative overall. Children in 
this context were often fairly innovative in their linguistic responses, however, the 
children who were more lexically innovative (by substituting an English verb) may 
have been doing so to mask the fact they did not fully understand that the novel item 
related to the novel action. They had not been able to build a robust enough 
representation of the verb to support either comprehension or production. 
In terms of construction faithfulness only ten participants on our sample stuck 
to the modeled construction only. Furthermore there were no differences in the 
comprehension scores of these groups. It does not seem then that children are 
producing novel transitive utterances in a mimicking way, without comprehension. 
Imitative production patterns alone are similar regardless of comprehension scores.  
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Children’s imitation, particularly the flexibility of imitation does seem then to 
be related to comprehension. Language comprehension supports language production 
rather than the converse. Willingness to use a novel verb then seems to be indicative 
of advanced development, a verb seems more likely to be used when it’s semantic, 
causal properties are understood. Understanding of syntax facilitates the production of 
novel items. 
To explore this further we inspected children’s discourse sensitivity, our 
measure of how flexible participants were in response to questions exerting different 
agent foci. This further index of linguistic competence was also positively related to 
passive comprehension. This would suggest that flexibility within imitation is indeed 
related to comprehension. Critically then discourse sensitivity was very highly 
correlated with novel verb usage, r=.53, p<.001, but negatively correlated with the 
number of English utterances, r=-.33, p<.02. This lends more support to our theory 
that causal understanding about a verb’s semantic properties supports, and the causal 
affordances of syntax more generally support language production. 
It is clear that children who better understand language are more willing to 
imitate it.1 It is not the case that children are simply imitating linguistic items in a 
construction specific way. This chimes with the verbal imitation task where 
grammatical sentences were more likely to be imitated, and with the action imitation 
task where imitation was greater when actions were understood as necessary. 
Imitation is initially organized instrumentally, with goals being hierarchically defined 
                                                      
1 In the following chapter we generate a language competence score combining 
aspects of children’s productive and receptive language skill in addition to their 
flexible use of language assessed by the discourse sensitivity score mentioned. 
Verbatim imitation in both the grammatical and ungrammatical conditions of the first 
task introduced in this chapter correlated positively with language competence scores. 
This lends further support to our assertion that language imitation is not based on 
simple mimicry but that it is grounded in and supported by linguistic knowledge. 
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(Bekkering et al., 2000). Children often imitate the goal of an action before they 
imitate the means through which that goal was achieved. The primary goal of 
language is communication and the vast majority of participants responded in some 
form in the vast majority of cases, fulfilling this instrumental goal through whichever 
means they could. The attentional focus of the question can subtly modulate this 
communicative goal, if realized, and hence make one transitive form more or less 
appropriate than the other. In addition to this instrumental, communicative goal then 
the means of communication can be entered in the hierarchy. Then the exact surface 
features of the utterance may be imitated including the lexical items or syntactic 
constructions utilized. 
Surface imitativity was clearly evidenced through: the majority of children 
using a novel verb transitively at least once, 75% and; children using a novel or 
English transitive utterance over an intransitive or incomplete one, t(54)=10.6, 
p<.001. So having established that the majority of children replicated the 
communicative goal of using a transitive utterance to describe an action sequence we 
further showed that the majority of children imitated the use of a novel lexical item at 
least once. The next question to ask is there any contiguity in children’s imitativeness 
across different linguistic and action tasks? 
6.3.3.1. Analysis 3: Introduction 
In the first two sections of this chapter we presented data concerning 
children’s imitation and innovation when given the opportunity to imitate the 
language of others around them. Children were avid imitators of both grammatical 
and ungrammatical sentences, they reverted to English verbs more often than they 
adopted novel verb forms and they showed evidence of imitating the syntactic 
structure of a model. The next step for us then was to look for patterns of imitation 
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across the linguistic tasks and finally relate children’s imitativity in the language 
domain with their imitativity in the action domain as assessed in Chapter 5. 
6.3.3.1.1. Imitation of Actions and Speech 
 As discussed in earlier sections (see 5.1 and 8.1.5) children’s imitation is 
influenced by numerous structural and social factors and are often organized around a 
hierarchy of goals. Goals are extracted from the individual’s representation of some 
event in the world and can be identified whether or not the model actually achieved 
the goal in some situations (Meltzoff, 1995). Furthermore in very young children 
Sakkalou et al. (2013) reported that there was stability in goal directed imitation with 
participants having correlated scores across imitative tasks where intentionality was 
indicated via diverse vocal and object means. Based on these two seminal findings we 
expected there to be a strong individual relationships in imitation within the verbal 
tasks and also across the action and language domains. We expected children who 
imitated more faithfully in one task to also imitate more faithfully in the other. 
 Indeed within and across many of the action and verbal imitation tasks 
reported in Chapters 5 and 6 children showed a striking tendency towards faithful 
imitation. Additionally there was evidence of selective imitation more often in one 
condition than the other across domains. In this final analytical section of Chapter 6 
we will investigate the cross-domain relationships between action and verbal 
imitation.  
6.3.3.1.2. Aims  
In Analysis 3 we shall combine the experimental verbal imitation data 
collected in Experiments 1 and 2 of this chapter with the action imitation data 
reported in Chapter 5. We expected that imitation patterns in all three would be vary 
together given that imitation is reported to be driven by both the intentional behaviors 
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of the model and the necessity of these behaviors as was reported in Chapter 5 (eg., 
Bekkering et al., 2000; McGuigan et al., 2007). Furthermore we expected there to be 
strong cross-domain relationships with children’s imitative proclivity being consistent 
in both action and verbal domains. Although this cross domain relationship from a 
productive stand-point has not, to our knowledge been explored as fully before a 
contiguity in object versus vocally cued imitative behavior has been reported 
(Sakkalou et al., 2013). 
Our first aim for this final section was to investigate whether there are 
correlations between the imitative verbal behaviors related to our three features of 
language themselves: repetitions; novel verbs and; syntax. This would help us answer 
the question of whether verbal imitation patterns are consistent across different 
features of productive language before we set about extending the analysis to include 
object related behaviors. Our second aim then is to relate these language imitation 
indices to the imitation of actions reported in Chapter 5. 
6.3.3.2. Results 
 We first looked at imitation within the verbal domain following which we 
moved to include action imitation also. Results are separated into sections for clarity. 
We were looking specifically for contiguity between imitation patterns, between 
verbal tasks and across the verbal and actions tasks. 
6.3.3.2.1. Language Imitation: Between Task Relationships 
Repetitions and novel verbs. When the total number of novel verb utterances 
were compared to the total number of sentences repeated verbatim the positive 
correlation found was marginally significant r=.24, p=.08. When only the target 
sentences containing a repetition were included this correlation increased in strength 
but remained marginal r=.25, p=.069 (see Figure 6.16.).  
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Figure 6.16. Scatterplot showing novel verb production scores following passive 
training on the x-axis and the total number of verbatim repetitions in the target 
conditions on the y-axis. 
 
Following active training, novel use was not related to children’s imitation of 
sentences containing repetitions r=.04, p=.75, be they grammatical or ungrammatical. 
Following passive training, however, children’s use of a novel verb was positively 
related to their verbatim imitation across the grammatical and ungrammatical 
sentences r=.35, p<.01. This was driven mainly by the ungrammatical condition with 
the correlation here reaching r=.36, p<.01 (see Figure 6.17). This same pattern was 
marginally significant in the grammatical condition, r=.24, p=.08. 
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Figure 6.17. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing the number of novel verbs 
produced following passive training on the x-axis and the number of verbatim 
repetitions in the ungrammatical sentence condition on the y-axis. 
 
Repetitions and syntax. Overall children who recounted sentences containing 
a repetition verbatim were more likely to produce a transitive utterance r=.33, p<.05. 
This was driven by the grammatical condition where verbatim imitation correlated 
positively and significantly with the number of transitive utterances produced r=.31, 
p<.05 (see Figure 6.18.). Conversely the number of repetitions removed in the 
grammatical condition related negatively with the number of transitive utterances 
produced r=-.32, p<.02. The number of novel passives but not actives or intransitives 
showed a marginally significant positive correlation with verbatim responses 
including a repetition r=.27, p=.05. This relationship was driven by more novel 
passives being produced by children also retaining the repetitions in the 
ungrammatical condition r=.27, p=.05. There was no such relationship seen with 
active or intransitive utterance. 
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Figure 6.18. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing the number of transitive utterances 
produced on the y-axis and the number of verbatim repetitions in the across condition 
on the x-axis. 
 
When looking at construction faithfulness, that is the number of passives after 
passives and actives after actives total construction faithfulness did not correlate with 
repetition imitation. However, when looking at passive construction faithfulness 
individually and repetition imitation in the ungrammatical condition a significant 
correlation was present r=.28, p<.05 (see Figure 6.19) but not in the grammatical 
condition r=.056, p=.7. Children who, regardless of verb, chose a passive construction 
after hearing it modeled were also more likely to retain ungrammatical repetitions. 
Structure not semantics remained key. 
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Figure 6.19. Scatterplot showing passive construction faithfulness on the x-axis and 
verbatim repetition in the ungrammatical condition on the y-axis. 
 
6.3.3.2.2. Imitation of Language and Actions: Cross Domain Relationships 
  Repetitions and actions. Initially each imitation apparatus was inspected 
separately. Neither two-action, or Just B responses were correlated with performance 
in the repetition task. However, when looking at the temporal order of the responses 
the number of simultaneous responses in the necessary condition did correlate 
significantly negatively with verbatim imitation in the grammatical condition r= -.28, 
p<.05 (see Figure 6.20). The opposite pattern was found in the unnecessary condition 
but did not reach significance r=.2, p=.09. 
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Figure 6.20. Scatterplot showing simultaneous responses in the necessary condition 
on the x-axis and verbatim repetition in the grammatical condition on the y-axis. 
 
 However, when looking at the specific temporal responses there were some 
significant associations. For the Tower, unnecessary condition there was a significant 
negative correlation between the number of B then A responses and verbatim 
imitation in the ungrammatical condition r=-.46, p<.02. Children who ignored the 
temporal sequence in the action imitation paradigm were less likely to imitate an 
ungrammatical repetition faithfully in a verbal imitation paradigm. Furthermore there 
was significant positive correlation between repetition removal in the grammatical 
condition and B then A responses in the unnecessary Tower condition r=.46,p<.03. 
 For the Rake apparatus then it was B then A responses in the necessary 
condition that correlated positively with additional repetitions in the grammatical 
condition, r=.46, p<.03. Children were ignoring the sequence of intentional actions in 
across both domains. 
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  Across apparatus, however, the number of faithfully imitated actions carried 
out in the critical unnecessary condition did not correlate with the total number of 
sentences containing repetitions recounted verbatim r=.01, p=.97.  
Imitation of novel verbs and actions. Again each imitation apparatus was 
inspected separately. For the Tower there was a significant negative correlation 
between novel verb use and single action, Just B responses in the unnecessary 
condition, r=-.4, p<.05 (see Figure 6.21). Novel verb use correlated negatively with 
selective imitation. Furthermore the number of novel passives correlated negatively 
with the number of simultaneous responses carried out on the tower in the 
unnecessary condition, r=-.52, p<.01. For the Rake there were no such significant 
correlations observed. 
 
Figure 6.21. Scatterplot showing number of Just B responses in the Tower 
Unnecessary condition on the y-axis and total novel verb use on the x-axis. 
 
Imitation of syntax and actions. With the Tower we inspected the number of 
novel and familiar transitive and intransitive utterances correlated with our action 
imitation measures.  The number of Just B responses in the unnecessary condition and 
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the number of novel transitive utterances correlated negatively, r=-.42, p<.04 (see 
Figure 6.22). 
 
Figure 6.22. Scatterplot showing Scatterplot showing number of Just B responses in 
the Tower Unnecessary condition on the y-axis and total transitive production on the 
x-axis. 
 
With the Rake there was a significant positive correlation between the number 
of faithful responses in the necessary condition and the number of transitive 
utterances, r=.41, p<.05 (see Figure 6.23). A then B utterances specifically were 
positively correlated in this way, r=.42 p<.04. This was mirrored by a significant 
negative correlation between Just B responses and number of transitive utterances, r=-
.41, p<.05. There were no relationships seen between our action imitation indices in 
the unnecessary condition and novel transitive production. 
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Figure 6.23. Scatterplot showing number of A then B responses to the Rake on the y-
axis and total transitive production on the x-axis. 
 
Across apparatus the total number of transitive utterances correlated positively 
with the total number of temporally faithful A then B responses, however, this 
relationship was marginal, r=.23, p=.08. A then B responses in the necessary 
condition only correlated significantly and positively with the total number of 
transitive utterances produced r=.31, p<.05. Total construction faithfulness and A then 
B responses in the necessary condition marginally correlated in the same direction 
r=.25, p=.06. 
The total number of transitive utterances, however, did correlate significantly 
negatively with the total number of Just B responses r=-.28, p<.05 (see Figure 6.24). 
Just B responses further correlated negatively with the number of active utterances 
after active models, r=-.35, p<.01. Particularly in the unnecessary condition Just B 
responses correlated negatively with active construction faithfulness r=-.27, p<.05, 
with the necessary condition only being marginally significant r=-.23, p=.09. Total 
construction faithfulness correlated marginally negatively with these Just B responses 
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r=-.26, p=.051. B then A and Simultaneous responses showed no relationship with 
syntax imitation. 
 
Figure 6.24. Scatterplot showing number of Just B responses on the y-axis and total 
transitive production on the x-axis. 
6.3.3.3. Discussion 
Children can be highly imitative at age four as evidenced in this data set and 
many more. In some cases they go above and beyond what is necessary to imitate. 
However, not all imitate-able behaviors are equal: children more often than not 
imitate a simple two-action sequence on an object; they more often than not imitate 
repetitions in short sentences; they more often than not do not imitate a novel verb; 
they imitate transitive versus intransitive structure at chance levels; they more often 
than not imitate active syntactic structure; they more often than not do no imitate 
passive syntactic structure. Some things children at this age readily imitate, some 
things they do not.  
The first aim for our third analytical section was to identify whether there 
were correlations between children’s imitative behavior during two differing tasks, 
with differing structures and features of language eligible for imitation. We had 
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expected there to be contiguity across tasks given that children’s imitation is 
organized around the intentions and goals of others. We had hypothesized that this 
shared underlying structure of imitation would result in cross task behavioral 
similarities. It was clear, however, that children much more readily imitated 
repetitions, be they grammatical or ungrammatical, than they imitated novel verbs or 
unfamiliar syntax. However, there were some patterns of significance evident 
between our two language tasks.  
Children who retained a transitive structure, producing either the active or 
passive construction in their own utterances, were more likely to repeat grammatical 
sentences verbatim. Furthermore there was a negative correlation between repetition 
removal in the grammatical condition, and the number or transitive utterances 
produced. There was a strong relationship then between children choosing to produce 
transitive sentences and choosing to recount grammatical sentences verbatim. 
Furthermore there was a positive correlation between novel passive production and 
verbatim imitation in the ungrammatical condition. Those children who produced the 
most complex lexical and syntactic combination in our paradigm were also more 
likely to have faithfully imitated an ungrammatical model. At first this might seem 
odd as one is grammatically correct and the other not so, but critically in the passive 
verb’s case no grammatically incorrect forms were produced. The interesting point 
then is that children who are productively grammatically competent in one sphere 
seem to show a paradoxical propensity to replicate an incorrect grammatical form in 
another task. This would suggest that imitating a modeled form is a beneficial strategy 
for children as it supports their syntactic competence. Children are imitative 
regardless of correctness in this case. 
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Particularly following passive training, there was a positive relationship 
between the number of novel verbs produced and the number of sentences imitated 
verbatim in the ungrammatical condition. Specifically the production of passives 
following passive training correlated with the verbatim imitation of ungrammatical 
sentences. The ungrammatical and passive training conditions were the more 
conceptually interesting of the two conditions in each task, and the place where 
imitation would have been the most challenging due to the unconventional, less 
familiar or simply ungrammatical content. Imitation in these two conditions would 
not have been bolstered by their intuitive representations as a result therefore 
imitation was more likely to be socially driven, based upon the intentions of the 
model. There were no instrumental or semantic reasons to retain the ungrammatical or 
unfamiliar structural elements of the utterances therefore we must conclude that a 
desire or strategy to imitate was responsible for this cross task relationship. 
Our second aim for analysis three was to investigate the cross-domain 
relationships between the imitation of actions and the imitation of the linguistic 
features reported. In our verbal imitation paradigm there were no clearly significant 
relationships between faithful action and verbatim verbal imitation when looking at 
both our experimental action apparatus together. There was, however, a negative 
correlation between the number of simultaneous responses in the necessary condition 
and the level of verbatim imitation in the grammatical condition. These children were 
not adhering to the models exact behavior in either domain. 
It seems that in this case the instrumental and semantic goals of the model 
were adhered to by some children over and above the conventional, social goals. 
Rather than imitating the exact sequences executed by the model children retained 
information in a more cognitively efficient way. Those children who were less likely 
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to imitate the conventional sequence of actions were also less likely to imitate the 
verbatim presentation of sentences. In both then the instrumental and semantic goals 
were retained, i.e., those goals that were most salient, at the expense of the 
intentional, social goals. 
In addition to these results from the repetition imitation paradigm there were 
supporting results with novel verb imitation. For the Tower apparatus, in the critical 
unnecessary condition the number of Just B, selective imitation responses, correlated 
negatively with the number of novel verbs used. Children who were more often 
choosing to selectively imitate in the action domain were less likely to imitate the 
precise verb modeled to them during experimental trials. Furthermore those children 
who faithfully imitated but disregarded temporal sequence by carrying out both 
actions simultaneously produced fewer novel passive utterances. Again children here 
who rejected carrying out actions in a given sequence also rejected the use of a novel 
verb, in favor of a more familiar and easily accessible option. In both cases children 
selected the path that most quickly and efficiently led to their instrumental end goal. 
Carrying out two actions simultaneously took a shorter time than doing so 
consecutively. Using a familiar verb took less cognitive effort that using a novel one. 
This additional evidence strengthens the idea that being highly imitative is a domain 
general feature of children’s cognition rather than being restricted to the type of task 
being modeled. Children again were imitating instrumental goals by generating the 
modeled end result or conveying correct semantic information but they were not 
doing so in an entirely faithful way. 
Finally then we reported how action and syntax imitation were related. Here 
the most striking evidence for cross-domain imitative contiguity was found. When 
looking at children’s production of transitive utterances there was a positive 
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relationship with both two action sequence globally and A then B (temporally 
faithful) responses specifically. Conversely children who produced fewer transitive 
utterances, and less active utterances after active training, were more likely to give 
selective Just B responses in the unnecessary condition. There is some form of 
structural chiming here in that children in both tasks here were either carrying out the 
most appropriate form of behavior across tasks or showing less structural and 
intentional awareness, therefore carrying out fewer conventionally imitative behaviors 
across tasks. 
For the Tower apparatus the number of Just B responses in the unnecessary 
condition correlated negatively with the number of novel transitive utterances. This 
pattern was replicated in Rake data. Furthermore two-action, specifically A then B 
sequence actions, using the Rake were correlated positively with the number of 
transitive utterances produced.  
It seems that overall children’s imitative patterns are relatively contiguous 
across action and verbal domains. Children who faithfully imitate those elements only 
conventionally necessary in action sequences are also more likely to copy sentences 
faithfully, use novel lexical items and respond in modeled syntactic forms.  
The relationships found were more complicated than we had originally 
envisaged. We had expected clear relationships between the imitation of language and 
the imitation of actions at the group level. Indeed as seen in earlier sections children 
at the age of four are sensitive to the necessity of actions, the grammaticality of 
utterances, the novelty of verbs and the familiarity and complexity of syntax. Children 
more readily imitate causally necessary, grammatically correct and familiar behaviors. 
However, perhaps due to the high levels of faithful and verbatim imitation we saw no 
bold and direct link between faithful two action responses and verbatim imitation as a 
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whole. It was only when inspecting more closely did we uncover the wealth of 
between task relationships contained within our two action imitation apparatus and 
our experimental language tasks.  
6.4. General Discussion 
 Many researchers have presented theories that seek to identify the 
fundamental principles that underlie imitative behaviors. Meltzoff’s (1995) behavioral 
re-enactment paradigm beautifully illustrated the importance of goals to the patterns 
of imitation seen in young children. Furthermore authors such as Bekkering et al. 
(2000), and Carpenter et al. (2005) highlighted that such goals are organized 
hierarchically and are identified differentially given certain task demands. In addition 
the intentions of a model are crucial in influencing what out of a sequence is 
replicated as illustrated so well by Gergely et al. (2002) using the head-touch 
paradigm. The identification of goals and the intentions of a model are just two of the 
aspects involved in determining what gets imitated in an action sequence. 
Other researchers such as Nielsen (2006) have emphasized the social 
component of imitation. Imitation by its’ very nature is a highly imitative behavior 
and has been show to be influenced by social mediators. As discussed in Chapter 5 
numerous types of social mediators influence imitation in children and these 
manipulations fall broadly into three categories (1) the model’s social behaviors (e.g., 
Bandura, 1971; Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme & Bushnell, 2007; Hartup & Coates, 
1970; Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen, Simcock & Jenkins, 2008); (2) the model’s 
characteristics (e.g., Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum & Carpenter, 2013; Jaswal & Neely, 
2006; Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 2011; Ryalls, Gul & Ryalls, 2000; Seehagen & 
Herbert, 2011; Zmyj et al., 2012) and finally; 3) increasing goal salience through 
social means (e.g., Brubacher, Roberts & Obhi, 2013; Chen & Waxman, 2013; Elsner 
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& Pfiefer, 2012; Hermann, Legare, Harris & Whitehouse, 2013; Simpson & Riggs, 
2011).  
Given these readily identifiable modifiers of imitative behavior (goals, 
intentions and social factors) and the conceptual assumption that such features could 
refer to either the action or verbal worlds we had expected there to be some 
parsimony between imitative decisions both within and across behavioral domains. If 
the underlying pillars of imitation are the same, goal, intention and socially driven, 
then it follows that imitative behaviors across a variety of tasks should be contiguous.  
At age four children: preferentially imitated repetitions faithfully, be they 
grammatical or ungrammatical; imitated grammatical repetitions more faithfully than 
ungrammatical repetitions; preferentially rejected the use of novel verbs following 
eight transitive models; preferentially used the transitive following transitive 
modeling; vastly more often imitated active than passive models; were sensitive to 
discourse pressure and; were poorer at comprehending passively introduced verbs 
when compared to those actively introduced. 
 Children readily imitated the instrumental goals of an action across the board, 
be it the achievement of some physical goal or the communication of some set of 
events. Across the action and language tasks there was evidence that children do 
imitate elements above and beyond those that are necessary, they imitate intentional 
but not causally necessary features of another’s behavior. Children need not imitate 
ungrammatical repetitions, they need not adopt novel words and they need not utilize 
unfamiliar syntactic constructions, yet they do. Of course some behavioral and 
linguistic features are imitated more readily, however, each element was imitated in 
differential ways dependent on condition. This provides evidence for children’s 
ability to flexibly incorporate elements of a social partner’s past behavior into their 
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own behaviors moving forward. In our sample children were not entirely imitative, 
and not entirely innovative: they were capable of different types of imitative 
responses across different tasks, and crucially these imitative responses were related 
across tasks.  
 There were some interesting relationships between task performances. 
Children who rejected the modeled sequence in one task did so more often in another. 
Some children were rejecting the implied, conventional structure modeled in favor of 
their own interpretation of or response to the event sequence. Conversely children 
who faithfully imitated in one task often imitated certain features more often in 
another. Certainly it was not the case that all children imitated all things, or indeed the 
opposite. However, there were demonstrable links between action imitation patterns, 
repetition imitation, the imitation of novel lexical items and the imitation of syntax. In 
every aspect of language production measured here there was some relationship with 
action imitation. These tantalizing aspects of contiguity across the tasks would 
suggest that imitation its’ self is a strategy that can be deployed in a similar manner in 
response to a variety of different situations, both physical and verbal. This could be 
based upon children’s identification of goals and intentions being crucial for both. 
 In the general introduction we set up two reasons as to why language is an 
invaluable habitat in which to study children’s navigation of actual versus possible 
worlds. Firstly language is a tool that can be manipulated and used to change the 
world. Secondly language is paradoxical as it relies on the contrasting behaviors of 
imitation and innovation. In our sample children proved capable at using language in 
both tasks, repeating target sentences and producing many transitive utterances. In 
addition they showed both imitativeness and innovativeness through their use of novel 
verbs and discourse sensitivity. It was not the case that children only used these newly 
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learned verbs in the constructions that they had been modeled, although they did 
follow that general trend. The verb island hypothesis (Tomasello, 1992) predicts that 
children around this age only have access to item-based constructions therefore 
should not typically apply the necessary verb general rules to produce novel verbs in a 
different construction. Our results then clearly challenge this hypothesis. Although 
children more often used the verb in the modeled construction, this was not an 
exclusive strategy.  
In our introduction to Experiment 1 we set out some features of imitation 
evident in the action domain that we may expect to see in the verbal domain if indeed 
a similar process is at work. In particular the first three can be spoken to by our data. 
(i) Children would more readily selectively imitate causally relevant features 
of the language i.e. those that achieve some communicative goal. Indeed the children 
in Experiment 1 were more willing to imitate grammatically correct than incorrect 
utterances. Furthermore they were less likely to imitate novel verbs and syntactic 
constructions that were not necessarily related to communicative goals. Bannard et al. 
(2013) reported that three year-old children were more likely to use novel words in 
situations that demanded them, unlike ours where English verbs could plausibly be 
substituted.  
(ii) Children would more readily imitate intentionally produced features of the 
language. Although we did not have conditions in which unintentional features of 
language were modeled it was clear that many children imitated intentionally 
produced, grammatically incorrect and novel items.  
(iii) Children would faithfully imitate more incidental or non-critical features 
of language with age. Again it was clear that children often imitated repetitions and 
syntax, two elements that were non-critical to the communicative outcome. However, 
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they were more likely to imitate repetitions than complex syntax at this age. Older 
children and adults have been shown to be more readily imitative with regards syntax 
in previous studies (e.g., Bock & Griffin, 2000). 
In conclusion then the imitation of certain features of language follows some 
similar trends to those evidenced in the action domain. Furthermore there were some 
direct patterns of correlation between performance both within the different language 
tasks and between the action and language data. Children are able to flexibly use the 
behaviors they see others model in their own repertoire as a means of manipulating 
the world through either their interaction with an object or their production of 
language. Children can be imitative and innovative in the same breath and their 
willingness to utilize novel lexical items and syntactic constructions in related to their 
understanding of the underlying causal structure of the utterances they have seen 
modeled. This replication is based on the understanding, and hierarchical organization 
of goals and intentions. 
6.4.1. Limitations 
 The first experimental paradigm detailed in this chapter saw children playing a 
game where there were asked to say what the experimenter had previously said. This 
task was adapted from a paradigm used with younger children, aged three years  
(Over & Gattis, 2010). As a result it may have been more appropriate for us to have 
generated and tested new target sentences. Levels of verbatim imitation were very 
high and it may have been the case that the sentences were simply too easy for our 
age group to elicit the levels of variance we had hoped to see. An example sentence is 
“Sam was a big big cat.” We could have manipulated sentence complexity in several 
ways whilst retaining the same premise of having grammatical versus ungrammatical 
repetitions. Sentences could have been made longer, the lexical items chosen could 
297 
 
have been less familiar or difference syntactic structures could have been utilized. 
With more complex sentences some children may have relinquished a faithful strategy 
as the communicative goal became increasingly tricky to fulfill alongside the social 
goal. 
 Bannard, Klinger & Tomasello (2013) generated a novel experimental 
situation in which imitation could be interpreted as instrumentally necessary (a 
contrastive adjective) in some situations and not so in others. Children were playing a 
game in which they requested an object from a confederate. Regardless of whether 
they modeled faithfully or otherwise the child received the requested object. They 
showed that the instrumental necessity of the word impacted upon its usage in their 
three year-old participants. Utilizing a similar paradigm but one in which utterance 
production did determine whether the instrumental goal was achieved would have 
been a fascinating addition to our repertoire of tasks. For example you could set up a 
necessary condition where the use of an additional contrastive adjective was 
necessary to distinguish between two similar objects i.e., Please pass me the blue 
duck when the options were a blue duck or a red duck.  In the unnecessary condition 
then the mode could the model could use the same contrastive adjective but the 
options were a blue duck or a blue frog. It would have allowed verbal imitation to be 
more closely compared and contrasted with action imitation with one condition 
having two necessary actions modeled and the other having one necessary and one 
unnecessary for goal completion. 
 In many ways the passive verb production task yielded the opposite problem 
in that performance rates for the target passive construction in particular were low. In 
the original paper using this methodology (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999) children were 
given eighty-eight models, this is compared to our sixteen. Production rates of the 
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passive have been shown to increase with increased production (e.g., Messenger, 
2009; Vasilyeva et al., 2006). Perhaps increasing the number of models would have 
supported children’s representations of the unfamiliar syntactic structure just enough 
to increase production rates. Furthermore explicitly tasking the children with 
repeating the models would have increased the salience and availability of the 
structure for subsequent manipulation in their own utterances (Shimpi et al., 2007). 
6.4.2. Conclusions 
 In Chapter 5 we reported that children were prolific imitators in an action 
imitation paradigm. In the current chapter we shifted our focus to language 
production. Competent language production embodies a necessarily paradoxical 
combination of imitation and innovation. We reported results that characterize 
children as prolific imitators of some aspects of language and not others. Despite 
being sensitive to grammaticality children preferentially imitated both correct and 
incorrect repetitions. Conversely children more frequently described a novel action 
using an English verb than the novel verb modeled during a demonstration. Further 
children more often than not rejected a complex syntactic form in favor of a more 
familiar one. Despite these group level findings there was also evidence that children 
were more likely to use the more difficult syntactic form following a model that used 
the same structure. This provides support for a theory that some children at least are 
beginning to imitate complex surface features of language. Additionally our results 
suggest that some children demonstrate discourse sensitivity, that is, they modulate 
the syntactic structure of their responses to the attentional focus of the questioner. 
 Finally we showed that although being highly imitative in one task does not 
dictate high levels of imitation elsewhere there are striking links between behavior 
both within the language tasks and across the language and action domains. How 
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children represent and replicate the intentional, goal directed actions of others, be they 
actions or utterances, show relative contiguity. 
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Chapter 7: The World as it Is, Was, Could Have Been and Could Be: The 
Relationship Between Reasoning About, and Manipulating the World Through 
Language 
7.1. Abstract 
In Chapter 6 we focused on the imitation of language. We characterized how 
readily the children in our sample would imitate certain features of intentionally 
produced language. However, as discussed in Chapter 6 language is paradoxical in 
that it is a behavior encompassing both imitative and innovative aspects. To become a 
truly competent language user children must be able to use the conventional tokens 
and structure of their native language in productive and flexible ways. The 
communicative flexibility that language affords us is one of, if not the single most 
powerful tool humans have to manipulate the world. Furthermore language is 
arguably the essential element required for the true navigation of the actual and the 
possible as it is through language that we as humans can uniquely represent and 
reflect upon how the world is, how the world was and crucially how the world could 
be. In this chapter we sought to characterize our sample’s use of language as a tool. 
We derived a language competence score for each participant from discrete aspects of 
the experimental language data we collected throughout the two testing sessions. 
We then sought to investigate whether the indices of reasoning and imitation 
reported earlier were too related to children’s use of language as a tool. If both causal 
and mental state understanding are involved in imitation, then it may be expected that 
they too are related to language learning more generally based upon language’s highly 
imitative origins. This chapter speaks to the question of whether reasoning about and 
acting based upon ones knowledge of the physical and social world as it was, could 
have been and could be, is predictive of linguistic competence more generally. 
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7.2. Introduction 
In the previous chapter the imitation and innovation of children’s utterances 
was our main focus. However, as outlined briefly at the start of Chapter 6 language is 
interesting for the purpose of our study not only because of this paradoxical 
relationship between imitation and innovation, but also because of language’s integral 
function as a tool. Language, in addition to action, is another instrument for change 
children can add to their arsenal. Productive language learners may suddenly be able 
to gain a social partner’s attention, request objects or information from others and 
provide information in return. Receptive language learners become privy to more 
complex ideas and can learn about events temporally or physically removed from 
their current reality. With increasingly complex lexical and syntactic skills children 
are better able to interact within the world. They are better able to appraise situations 
based on linguistic input, and better placed to alter their own worlds through verbal 
means.  Language then is a tool, a facilitator of expressing physical information, a 
vehicle for establishing conditional relationships and a means for communicating 
mental state information. In addition, according to some evolutionary theories of 
language, it is a pre-requisite for representing and reasoning about complex models of 
the world. Only with a competent grasp of language can we engage in counterfactual 
or mental state reasoning. 
In Chapter 5 (5.2.7.) we discussed in detail the types of cognitive demand that 
imitation may place upon children. Indeed many studies have probed some of the 
specific links mentioned in the action domain. However, imitation in the language 
domain could be hypothesized to require these very same cognitive and socio-
cognitive skills.  
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Executive functions are integral to imitation as children are required to 
represent a situation in linguistic terms, switch between their own and others 
descriptions of a linguistic and select their own language from a potentially infinite 
number of combinatory possibilities. As with the action domain if children were not 
engaging EFs then they would replicate failed and successful behaviors equally 
through not being able to select or inhibit one representation in favor of another 
(Behne, Carpenter, Call & Tomasello, 2005; Meltzoff, 2005; Olineck & Poulin-
Dubois, 2009). We see in both our action and verbal imitation paradigms that children 
do treat causally necessary or grammatically correct models differently. Children do 
not copy the coughs, stutters or other incidental vocal actions of others: they copy 
selectively at some level. 
In the action domain children build representations based around goals they 
have identified (Bekkering et al., 2002). Additionally, information about the model’s 
social behavior and their social characteristics are further incorporated into this 
representation. Children require the key executive functions of inhibitory control, 
cognitive flexibility and working memory to successfully imitate based on these 
representations in a way that fulfills both their instrumental and social goals. 
Identifying these linguistic goals, be they instrumental, i.e., communicative, or 
social, then is another key ability needed for imitation. In early childhood, social 
attention (Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2009), point following (Carpenter et al., 1998) 
and, pointing, reaching, showing and checking back (Bretherton, McNew & Beeghly-
Smith, 1987), are all suggested to facilitate imitative behavior. Measures related to 
sociability more generally also have been related to enhanced imitative behaviors 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; DiYanni, Nini & Rheel, 2011; Hilbrink et al., 2013; 
Uzgiris, 1981). These socio-cognitive skills highlight the goals of an action for the 
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observer and may too then be implicated in the imitation of language. Indeed early 
socio-cognitive indexes have been linked to language development specifically. 
Tamis-LeMonda and Bornstein (1989) reported that five month-olds’ who more 
rapidly habituated to visual stimuli have larger vocabularies at thirteen months. This 
work was replicated and extended by Dixon and Smith (2008) who found that in 
addition to decrement of attention, attentional focus also predicted vocabulary size 
over a year later. Much like imitation, temperamental easiness relates to greater, and 
temperamental difficulty relates to lesser vocabularies in early childhood (Salley & 
Dixon, 2007; Todd & Dixon, 2010).  
Such features contribute to joint attention: a state of shared, triadic focus 
between two social partners and some object or event in their shared environment 
(Mundy & Gomes, 1998). In turn joint attention is widely regarded as a key facilitator 
in language development (e.g., Akhtar, Dunham & Dunham, 1991; Brooks & 
Meltzoff, 2005). In imitation joint attention, although not always strictly necessary as 
children can imitate in a third party context, can be seen to play a huge part. A 
“referential triangle” constituted of children: following the gaze of others; using 
others as social “reference points” and subsequently; imitating their actions was 
suggested by Carpenter, Nagell and Tomasello (1998). It seems possible then that 
language imitation may similarly benefit from such joint attentional skills. In the 
language domain, however, there is often no present physical object or situation being 
discussed. Children may be reliant wholly on generating their own representations 
based on the language they are hearing. In our two experiments the demands of 
generating ones own representation entirely independently was present in the verbal 
imitation task, but not the passive verb task where the scene being described was 
plainly visible. 
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In addition to being able to attend to certain linguistic features, being able to 
understand the communicative or linguistic intentions of a model would also be 
expected to facilitate imitation as seen in the action domain (e.g., Lyons, Young & 
Keil, 2007; Over & Gattis, 2010; Gergely et al., 2002; Sakkalou et al., 2012) 
highlighted the need to represent behavior in terms of mental states. This too could be 
extended to included not only physical manipulations of objects, but linguistic 
behaviors also.  
In Section 5.2.9 we discussed at length the potential theoretical links between 
reasoning skill and imitative behaviors in the action domain. These included: the 
crucial need for mental state understanding when reasoning about goals and 
intentions; the importance of being able to reason about causality and counterfactuals 
for imitative behavior and; the necessity of executive functions during imitation. 
These same elements would be expected to contribute during the flexible use of 
language. As far as the authors know language competence has not been investigated 
in the context of MSU, CFR, EF and imitation in the same sample and at the same 
time point. Language competence is more regularly associated with reasoning skill.  
Guajardo et al. for example (2009) reported significant positive correlations between 
children’s language skills (as measured by the TACL-3: Carrow-Woodfolk, 1999) and 
their false belief scores (r=.72), generative counterfactual scores (r=.69) and several 
measures of EF. In fact Guajardo et al. suggest that the relationship between 
counterfactual reasoning (as measured using a generative paradigm) and MSU (as 
measured by false belief) is driven by shared variance in language and EF. Language 
has further been associated with CFR and MSU separately (e.g. Milligan, Astington & 
Dack, 2007; Guajardo & Turley-Ames, 2004; Perner et el. 2004). It is unsurprising 
that language is so closely related to reasoning. Comprehending language increases 
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the amount of information about situations and mental states that children are exposed 
to. Language provides access to mental states that may otherwise go unrecognized 
due to their internal nature. Conversely, however, reasoning about the words people 
use, and the way they chose to use them can allow children to infer meanings. In a 
sense then language and reasoning become synergistic. Language is a means to 
represent causal structure in a way that may be impossible without it (Chomsky, 
2002). Language can highlight mental states that may otherwise remain unknown and 
undetectable. Language too then may be able to influence, change or inform these 
previously incomprehensible situations in a positive way. 
Our aim for this chapter was to go above and beyond relating children’s 
language and reasoning. We wanted to assess whether their use of language as a tool 
was related to: their imitation of both actions and linguistic features and; their 
reasoning about and performance on tasks integrating information about different 
possible worlds. Lingustic competence reflects how skillful children are at 
understanding, producing and, acurately and appropriately using language as a tool to 
change their world. Being readily able to imitate certain linguistic features in a 
restricted context alone will not aid children in the real world to the same extent as 
their being able to understand and produce language flexibly, crucially integrating 
both imitative and innovative strategies. Causal knowledge affords an individual the 
ability to make wide ranging predictions about the world (Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz & 
Glymour, 2004). This world may be physical or social and may be altered through 
actions and utterances: these are children’s tools for manipulating the world based 
upon their knowledge of how their decisions will impact upon a desired future world 
and state of affairs. Competence of this sort is a more practical assessment of 
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children’s language sophisticaton than reliance on an assumption that the imitation of 
language is a suitable proxy. 
7.3. Method 
In order to assess children’s linguistic competence in this broader, productive 
way we utilized elements of the two experimental language tasks we had administered 
during testing. We chose not to use a parent report method or extensive vocabulary 
style measure but instead integrate a number of diverse features of children’s 
productive and receptive language skills inherent in our verbal imitation and novel 
verb tasks.  
We first choose a comprehensive list of the features of language we could 
acutely observe through our experimental methods but that were distinct from the 
experiments primary goals. From the verbal imitation task then we included 
children’s imitation of the filler sentences. These five sentences were grammatical 
utterances of a matched length to the target experimental sentences that contained 
repetitions. This was sensitive to children’s ability to recall and reproduce simple 
multiword utterances.  
From the transitive verb task we extracted seven more potential competence 
variables. The first two of these were comprehension based. Each participant was 
asked eight comprehension questions during this task, four following passive 
construction training and four following active construction training. These questions 
assessed whether children had understood the sentence structure fully enough to act 
out a requested scene using novel agents and patients. Two separate competence 
scores were yielded then, passive and active, each with a maximum of four. 
Four features of language production were then included for inspection. These 
were extracted from the utterances children produced when asked to describe a 
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modeled scene in either the agent, patient or neutral focused questions. We chose; 
how many transitive utterances, of either the active or passive construction were 
produced by the participants using the novel verb and overall; how many passive 
utterances were produced overall and; how many novel verbs were produced in any 
construction. Each of these variables could range from zero to six. 
Finally we coded each utterance made in response to an agent or patient 
focused question as being discourse sensitive or otherwise. Discourse sensitivity was 
based upon the syntactic construction of the utterance being appropriate in the context 
of the question (i.e., an active construction following and agent focused question) and 
could have included a novel or English verb. Scores on this final variable could range 
from zero to four. 
We first plotted each of these variables to visually inspect their distributions 
(see Figure 7.1.). Filler sentence imitation and verb comprehension had comparatively 
high scores in contrast to passive construction production that had lower scores. 
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Figure 7.1. Scatterplots showing the distribution of scores on our eight potential 
language competence indices. Scores are plotted against the y-axis and participants 
against the x-axis. 
 
We further carried out pairwise correlations between each of these variables to 
identify whether any were superfluous through large positive or negative associations 
(see Table 7.1. below). Some variables were unsurprisingly correlated due their 
procedural overlap with items being counted in two or more categories. These 
included novel and total transitive production scores, passive production scores and 
the number of novel verbs produced. 
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Table 7.1. 
Non-parametric correlation table showing size of linear correlations and significance values for our eight potential linguistic competence items. 
 Filler Passive 
Comprehension 
Active 
comprehension 
Novel 
Transitive 
Utterances 
Total 
Transitive 
Utterances 
Passives 
Produced 
Novel Verbs 
Produced 
Discourse 
Sensitivity 
Filler  .18 .16 .08 .24 .02 .1 -.03 
Passive Comp   .32* .4** .06 .09 .45** .3* 
Active Comp    .14 -.11 -.15 .18 .27* 
Novel Trans     .39** .37** .94*** .56*** 
Total Trans      .12 .29* .26 
Passives Pro       .33* .21 
Novel Verbs 
Pro 
       .52*** 
 p<.05* p<.01** p<.001*** 
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Only looking at relationships between independent indices then there were 
numerous significant positive correlations evident. Only active comprehension scores 
showed any negative associations and these were non-significant. Filler 
comprehension scores was the only item not to correlate significantly with another 
measure, however, a positive association with the total number of transitive utterances 
produced was approaching significance, r=.24, p=.09.  
Passive comprehension scores correlated significantly positively with the 
number of novel transitive utterances, r=.4, p<.01 but not the total number of 
transitive utterance, r=.06, p=.67. Passive comprehension further positively correlated 
with the number of novel verbs produced, r=.45, p<.001 and, discourse sensitivity, 
r=.3, p<.03. Active comprehension only correlated significantly with discourse 
sensitivity, r=.27, p<.05. 
The number of novel transitive utterances correlated significantly positively 
with discourse sensitivity, r=.56, <.001, whilst the correlation between the total 
number of transitive utterances produced was much smaller and marginally 
significant, r=.25, p=.052. Finally discourse sensitivity also positively correlated with 
the number of novel verbs produced, r=.52, p<.001. 
We selected five of these variables to comprise our linguistic competence 
score. We wanted to included variables that showed variation between individuals. As 
such we rejected active verb comprehension as there was only a limited amount of 
variance due to the generally high performance.  
Furthermore we wanted variables that were not highly correlated in order to 
avoid excess shared-variance being incorporated. Significant strong positive 
correlations were seen between the number of novel transitive utterances, and the use 
of novel verbs with many of the other variables so these two variables were 
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eliminated. Passive and active-verb comprehension were also highly correlated, 
strengthening the decision to eliminate active comprehension from our composite 
score. 
Finally we could not include sets of variables that were theoretically 
overlapping.  Both novel and total transitive utterances scores for example would 
count many of the same responses therefore only total transitive utterances were used. 
The same shared items would exist between novel transitive and total novel verb 
utterances again giving reason for us to eliminate them from our final composite 
score. 
Based on these statistical and theoretical requirements we selected: filler 
sentence verbatim imitation score; passive verb comprehension score; the total 
number of transitive utterances produced; the number of passive constructions 
produced and; discourse sensitivity. The distribution of these five final variables can 
be seen below in Figure 7.2. 
Only one significant positive correlation was present between these variables, 
that was passive comprehension score and discourse sensitivity with a correlation of 
r=.3, p<.05. This was deemed a low enough correlation to have avoided excessive 
parsimony. In addition one variable derived from participants’ language production 
and the other their language comprehension. 
To ensure that each variable contributed an equal amount of variance to the 
final composite variable we computed standardized scores between 0-1 for every 
participant on each of the five selected variables. These were then combined to 
generate their final language comprehension score. The resultant composite language 
competence score ranged from zero to five, M=2.9, Std. Dev. = .73. (see Figure 7.3.)
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Figure 7.2. Histograms showing the distribution of scores on filler sentence imitation, passive verb comprehension, total number of transitive 
utterances produced, total number of passives produced and discourse sensitivity. 
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Figure 7.3. Histogram showing the distribution of language competence scores. 
 
 
7.4. Results 
 
This section shall inspect the relationships between our language competence 
score and data collected during all our earlier experimental paradigms; counterfactual 
conditional reasoning, executive functioning, mental state understanding, object 
imitation and, verbal imitation. 
7.4.1. Counterfactual Conditional Reasoning 
 Parametric correlations were carried out between language competence and 
counterfactual reasoning performance scores (see Table 7.2.). There was a positive 
correlation between standard slide performance and language competence, r=.35, 
p<.001. Furthermore there was a strong positive correlation between story 
performance and language competence, r=.33, p<.05. This relationship was driven by 
the atypical condition with a correlation of r=.23, p<.05, while no such significant 
relationship was seen in the typical condition, r=.15, p>.05. The composite CFR 
score, combining the three tasks, was also correlated with language competence, r=.37 
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p<.01 (see Figure 7.4.). A linear regression was carried out to assess the variance in 
language competence that could be attributed to CFR reasoning. 9% of the variance in 
language competence can be explained by CFR performance R²=.09, F(1,53)=4.73, 
p<.05. It was found that CFR performance significantly predicted language 
competence β=.1, p<.05.  
 
Table 7.2.  
Non-Parametric Correlations Between Language Competence and Scores on the 
Three Counterfactual Conditional Reasoning Tasks. 
 Standard Slide Typical Stories Atypical 
Stories 
Composite 
CFR 
Language 
Competence 
.35*** .15 .23* .35*** 
 p<.05* p<.01** p<.001*** 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing composite counterfactual reasoning 
scores on the x-axis and language competence scores on the y-axis. 
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7.4.2. Executive Functioning 
 Given the distribution of our EF scores (discussed in Chapter 2) we performed 
one-way ANOVAs using first Flanker performance and then DCCS performance as 
independent variables and language competence as the dependent variable (see Table 
7.3.). Language competence scores were significantly higher for those in the high 
Flanker group than those in the low group, F(1,52)=5.1, p<.05 (see Figure 7.5.). 
Although this same pattern was evident when DCCS scores were used as the 
independent variable the results did not reach significance F(1,52)=2.5, p>.05. 
  
Table 7.3.  
F values Obtained Using One-Way ANOVA with Executive Functioning Scores Used 
as Predictors for Language Competence. 
 Flanker DCCS 
Language Competence 5.1* 2.5 
 p<.05* p<.01** p<.001*** 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Bar chart showing mean language competence scores on the y-axis for 
executive functioning task separated into high and low performance groups. *denotes 
a significant difference between group p<.05. 
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7.4.3. Mental State Understanding 
 Non-parametric correlations were carried out using the total MSU battery 
score. The correlation was positive but very weak and far from reaching statistical 
significance r=.14, p>.05 (see Figure 7.6.). 
 
Figure 7.6. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing MSU battery scores on the x-axis 
and language competence scores on the y-axis. 
 
 We then chose to inspect each battery item individually to ascertain whether 
performance on any of the items would be related to language competence scores. A 
series of one-way ANOVAs were performed using each MSU battery item in turn as 
the independent variable while language competence was the independent variable 
(see Table 7.4). One item, Q3 showed the expected pattern. Participants who 
answered this question correctly had significantly higher language competence scores 
than those participants who answered it incorrectly, F(1,52)=4.0, p<.05. 
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F-values Obtained from One-Way ANOVAs Using Each of the Five Mental State 
Understanding Items as Predictors for Language Competence. 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Language 
Competence 
.4 .01 4.0* .14 1.2 
 p<.05* p<.01** p<.001*** 
 
 
7.4.4. Object Imitation 
 The first step taken was to perform non-parametric correlations between the 
number of two action responses in each object imitation condition and language 
competence scores (see Table 7.5.). Correlation coefficients for both the necessary 
(see Figure 7.7.) and unnecessary condition (see Figure 7.8.) were very small and did 
not reach significance. Results were also separated into apparatus but this pattern 
remained. Just B, that is single action responses were also correlated against language 
competence scores with the same outcome, very small coefficients and results not 
nearing significance.  
  
Table 7.5.  
Non-Parametric Correlations Between Language Competence and Object Imitation 
Performance, Two Action and Single Action Responses, in Each Condition and 
Separated by Apparatus. 
 Necessary Condition 
Two Action 
Unnecessary Condition 
Two Action 
Language Competence -.03 -.02 
 Rake Tower Rake Tower 
Language Competence -.29 .08 -.16 .1 
 Just B Just B 
 Rake Tower Rake Tower 
Language Competence .29 .01 -.04 -.29 
 p<.05* p<.01** p<.001*** 
 
318 
 
 
Figure 7.7. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing faithful, two-action responses in the 
necessary condition on the x-axis and language competence scores on the y-axis. 
 
 
Figure 7.8. Scatterplot (including jitter) showing faithful, two-action responses in the 
unnecessary condition on the x-axis and language competence scores on the y-axis. 
 
 
7.5. Discussion 
Our aim for Chapter 7 was to extend our investigation of children’s imitation 
of language to include their proficiency in using language as a tool. We were 
interested in examining the relationship between children’s reasoning about and 
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acting based upon their knowledge of the physical and social world to see if these 
skills were predictive of linguistic competence more generally.  
Rather than use a parent report or checklist type measure of language 
competence we created a composite variable derived from the language opportunities 
given to our participants during their experimental visits. The resultant variable 
encapsulated elements of grammatical production and comprehension in addition to 
information about how responsive children were to the questions directed toward 
them. Language competence scores were then correlated with performance scores on 
the other main experimental tasks carried out over the two testing sessions. 
7.5.1. Counterfactual Conditional Reasoning and Language Competence 
 Counterfactual reasoning was investigated in Chapter 2. Participants were 
asked questions of varying difficulty aimed at elucidating their counterfactual 
reasoning skill. The slide task (Beck et al., 2006; Beck & Guthrie, 2011) was a simple 
state change counterfactual with a readily observable causal structure, no intentional 
agent involvement and language cues inherent in the questioning. The story task was 
much more challenging with causal structure not readily observable but supplied 
verbally by the experimenter, an intentional agent (the protagonist) was present and 
the question structure was less transparent. Despite these very different task demands 
performance on both the slide and story tasks correlated strongly with language 
competence. Language and counterfactual reasoning’s positive relationship has been 
reported before in Guajardo and Turley-Ames (2004). Furthermore when looking 
separately at the typical and atypical conditions of the story task only the atypical 
condition retained this strong positive correlation. Remember, the typical condition 
was so called as the correct counterfactual reasoning conclusion was also the 
conclusion supported by typicality and therefore could have been answered through 
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basic conditional, as opposed to counterfactual conditional reasoning processes. The 
atypical story condition’s correct answer could only have been derived through true 
counterfactual conditional reasoning through adhering to the nearest possible world 
hypothesis and the counterfactual world differing from the actual only in those 
elements causally necessary given the counterfactual assertion. That the atypical, and 
not the typical story performance correlated significantly with language competence 
is a striking result. It seems that children’s ability to reason about the causal structure 
of the world in this hypothetical, and truly counterfactual way is distinctly related to 
language competence. Such a relationship, upon inspection is not entirely surprising. 
Children being able to reason not only about how the world is, but how the world was 
and could be, allows for them to cognitively explore and reflect upon more 
possibilities and situations than they have physically experienced or perceived: it 
increases the size of the child’s cognitive world immeasurably. Just like physical 
cause effect relations, linguistic cause effect relations can too be reasoned about and 
experimented with through counterfactual conditional reasoning processes. What 
seems clear in our data is that children’s reasoning about physical counterfactual 
conditional scenarios is consistently positively correlated with their linguistic 
competence at age four. 
7.5.2. Executive Functioning and Language Competence 
Next we focused on the relationship between executive functioning and 
language competence in our sample. Executive functioning has previously been 
shown to predict linguistic ability in young children (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; 
Hughes, 1998). As expected those children who performed better on our two 
measures of executive functioning also had higher language competence scores. 
Those high in inhibitory control, as measured by the Flanker task, had significantly 
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higher language competence scores. Those in the high DCCS group also had higher 
scores but this difference did not reach significance. Executive functions are the 
hallmark of effortful, goal directed and flexible actions and as such we expect them to 
be involved in a diverse variety of actions. The positive relationship between EF and 
language in our sample support this assertion. That inhibitory control, a process so 
vital in avoiding realist answers during counterfactual reasoning, relates to language 
alongside counterfactual reasoning as seen earlier is very interesting. Children who 
are more reflective and base their actions or responses on causal structure rather than 
heuristic, pre-potent responses also have concurrently better language skills. 
7.5.3. Mental State Understanding and Language Competence 
 In Chapter 3 we collected data on our sample’s mental state understanding 
using a five-item battery (Wellman & Liu, 2004).  Mental state understanding has 
many times been related to language sophistication (e.g., Bretherton & Beeghly, 
1982; Brown et al., 1996; Chiarella et al., 2013; deVilliers & Pyers, 2002; Milligan et 
al., 2007; Olineck & Poulin-Dubois, 2005). This is despite many different ways of 
investigating mental state understanding and of characterizing language performance. 
Our language competence score, however, did not correlate significantly with battery 
score performance. This result was puzzling due to the large amount of literature 
reporting strong significant correlations between these two abilities. When we looked 
at each item individually only one, question three, showed the expected pattern. Those 
who answered this item correctly had significantly higher language competence 
scores than their peers who answered it incorrectly. Item three is a knowledge access 
question. An opaque box is presented to the participant and they are asked to guess 
what is inside. The contents are then revealed: a plastic ball. The box is closed again 
and Polly the doll is introduced to the scene. Polly has never ever seen inside this box. 
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The participants are asked, “Does Polly know what is in the box?” It seems then that 
relationships between language and mental state understanding are more specific than 
definable through our battery and language competence scores alone. What is clear, 
however, is that mental state understanding and language are broadly related and task 
demands mediate this relationship greatly. 
7.5.4. Imitation and Language Competence 
 We then moved on to looking at how object imitation patterns related to general 
language competence. We expected a strong positive relationship due to language’s 
inherently imitative nature. However, there were no significant correlations between 
either two action or single action responses and language competence scores. Even 
when looking at apparatus and condition separately correlation coefficients were 
small and did not reach significance.  
 The newly assembled language competence score proved a worthy addition to 
the language data already collected as it allowed us to see more general relationships 
between language and cognitive development. There were striking relations between 
language competence and counterfactual conditional reasoning, inhibitory control, 
certain elements of mental state understanding and verbal imitation. What was 
surprising, however, was the lack of relationship between object imitation and 
language competence. Such a positive relationship was expected due to the inherently 
imitative properties of language and language development and the relationships 
shown in the previous chapter between action and language imitation. 
7.5.5. Limitations 
 Our limitations for this Chapter reflect those set out earlier in the individual 
chapters. We had hoped for a score of between 0-8 for the final counterfactual 
conditional reasoning measure. However, the unconstrained nature of the open slide 
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task meant that in the end we yielded a score of 0-6. Furthermore having used two 
conditions in the stories task we removed chances for children to demonstrate their 
truly counterfactual reasoning abilities. Rafetseder et al. (2010) used a different 
paradigm in which counterfactual reasoning only could be used to correctly identify 
the correct state of affairs. Had we used this paradigm and perhaps generated 
complimentary scenarios to increase the number of test questions we could have 
generated a more comprehensive score of reasoning skill. 
 For the executive functioning measure it would have been preferential to also 
include a measure of working memory to give a fuller picture of how executive 
functions work alongside reasoning, action and language at this age. Further having 
measures that yielded ratio scores as opposed to pass/fail distinctions would have 
been highly beneficial and increased the scope of any analyses carried out. 
 For our mental state understanding measure the seeming independence of 
many of the measures, evidenced through the distinct patterns of relationship 
identified with other skills was problematic. The distinctive nature of the questions 
made the use of the battery as a scale difficult. Battery scores themselves were not as 
informative as the pass/fail information for each item. Further we did not include a 
classic false belief task that included deception such as the Sally/Ann task. The 
inclusion of such a prolifically reported task would have made our results more 
directly comparable to others.  
 It would have been more powerful for our subsequent analyses had the 
apparatus used in Chapter 5, the Tower and Rake been more directly comparable. The 
affordances of the objects were diverse enough for distinctly different behavioral 
types to be seen for both. Particularly in the necessary condition children were less 
likely to be temporally faithful imitators using the tower than the rake given that the 
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temporal sequence of action was critical for modeled goal success in one and not the 
other. Having had two apparatus that had identical causal sequence outcomes, whilst 
maintaining independent forms would have allowed for the data from both to be 
combined across conditions increasingly the size and power of the data set.  
 The imitation of repetitions too could have been improved as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Levels of verbatim imitation were almost at ceiling level and as 
such more complex sentences and sentence structures could have been used to 
challenge the children and produce a greater spread of data points to work with. 
Further it would have been an interesting addition to look at how the causal 
implications of the language we use impacted upon children’s imitation in a paradigm 
influenced by Bannard et al. (2013). Finally supporting the production of higher rates 
of novel verb use and passive verb constructions would have allowed for differences 
between participants to be identified more readily. In contrast to the imitation of 
repetitions the imitation of passive verb constructions were very low. We concluded 
that the decreased number of models we chose to use in comparison to the original 
study (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999) had induced this suppression of production. Had 
we seen more variance in verb production and syntax choices we may have been able 
to identify a richer story of how reasoning, imitation and language support one 
another. 
 Finally we chose to use a measure of linguistic competence derived from the 
elements of our own experimental procedures. This decision was based upon our 
desire to assess language in an interactive and relevant manner. It may have been 
beneficial to have further included a standardized linguistic measure such as the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-III (PPVT-III; Dunn & Dunn, 1997). Doing so 
would have added an additional layer of information about children’s linguistic 
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competence and would have been free from any task specific demands placed upon 
the sample. Further it would have broadened the scope for comparison with other 
work. 
7.5.6. Conclusions 
 Language competence as measured using our composite variable was 
positively predicted by counterfactual conditional reasoning. For executive functions 
too, those high on the Flanker task had significantly better scores than their peers in 
the low group. Finally the mental state understanding battery as whole did correlate 
with linguistic competence. Only participants who passed Q3 showed significantly 
higher language competence scores than their peers in the low group who failed. We 
then moved to look at how imitative behaviors in the action domain related to 
language scores. None of our action imitation behaviors showed any significant 
relationships with language competence.  
We have provided evidence that children’s ability to successfully utilize 
language as a tool is related to their ability to reason about the causal structure of the 
world more generally. Counterfactual conditional reasoning, inhibitory control and to 
a lesser extent mental state understanding were all positively associated with language 
competence. Acting about the world physically, in contrast to linguistically, however, 
showed no strong correlation. Children’s actions on novel objects with a clearly 
implied causal structure did not relate to their language competence as formulated 
here.  
When speaking about linguistic competence more generally, that is not only 
language repetition but language productivity, comprehension and discourse 
sensitivity there are strong links with reasoning about the world abstractly, but not so 
with acting upon physical objects in this context. Action imitation as measured 
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through our necessary and unnecessary conditions was not related to language 
competence more generally as derived from performance on our experimental tasks. 
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8. Navigating the Boundary Between the Actual and the Possible at Age Four: 
Conclusions 
 
8.1. Summary of Results 
The explorative theme for this thesis was centered around investigating and 
understanding how children navigate the boundary between the actual world and other 
possible worlds at age four. These possible worlds may be different by virtue of being 
semantically incongruent with the actual world, being temporally distinct from the 
actual world or, being represented differently in the mind of another. We wanted to 
identify whether children’s proficiency, or lack there of, in reasoning about such 
actual versus possible worlds related to their use of actions and utterances as a tool for 
manipulating the world. Along the way we have reported specific details about 
children’s counterfactual reasoning, executive functioning, mental state 
understanding, imitation of action and language and, productive and receptive 
language skills. 
Firstly in Chapter 2 we looked at counterfactual reasoning ability at age four 
as measured by two structurally and conceptually contrasting tasks. Children were 
very good at reasoning about a counterfactual alternative when; the number of 
counterfactual possibilities are constrained, when causal structure is simple and, the 
question being asked is unambiguous. As these parameters were extended, however, 
children’s reasoning became increasingly poor. When additional counterfactual 
options were introduced into a counterfactual world where the causal structure was 
not concretely observable, children’s reasoning performance was significantly 
reduced. Despite children having greater difficulty predicting the counterfactual 
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location of a protagonist, when compared to identifying the correct counterfactual 
location of a ball, performance on these two tasks was positively statistically related. 
 Performance on two Executive Functioning tasks, the Flanker and the DCCS, 
were reported in Chapter 3. Children were better able to inhibit incongruent stimuli 
than they were at moving flexibly between differing object sorting rules. We chose to 
include EF for two distinct reasons. Firstly EFs are domain general cognitive 
processes required for all effortful, purposeful and goal directed actions (e.g. Carlson, 
2005; Gioia, Isquith & Guy, 2001). As such we wanted to eliminate any relationships 
between tasks being solely a result of shared EF involvement. Secondly EF tasks 
themselves challenge children in much the same way as CFR and MSU. EF tasks ask 
children to apply some previously imposed rule to a current situation in order to select 
the ‘correct’ possible response. Children must respond to the actual world and select 
the correct possible world to be successful. 
 In Chapter 4 then we presented our final cognitive reasoning measure, mental 
state understanding. A five-item battery was used to generate a MSU score for each 
participant (Wellman & Lui, 2004). Mental state reasoning, as with CFR requires 
children to reasoning about a world different to their own. MS worlds are different by 
virtue of psychological perspective whilst CF worlds are different due to them once, 
but no longer, being possible. Children performed as expected on the battery with 
items becoming increasingly difficult along the scale. 
 Performance between our three cognitive measures was then investigated. 
CFR, EF and MSU are all forms of conditional reasoning where past information 
must be integrated with ones pre-existing knowledge in order to respond 
appropriately. As such we expected strong relationships between all three variables. 
There was a trend for children with higher EF scores to perform better on both the 
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CFR and MSU tasks, however, there was not the initial strikingly relationship we had 
anticipated. As such it was concluded that EF was necessary for, but not sufficient to 
support CFR and MSU. In addition we did not find any observable linear relationship 
between CFR and MSU as we measured them. This was surprising as both tasks 
challenge children to select a response less salient and personal than their own. 
Furthermore CFR and MSU questions both ask children to reason not in line with 
reality as they actual experience it, but in line with the causal structure of another 
possible reality. Instead we saw that generally MSU questions were answered more 
successfully than conditional reasoning questions, particularly those that challenged 
CFR processes uniquely. It was concluded then that perhaps the difference in content 
knowledge, physical causal understanding versus mental state understanding can 
alone account for such divergence in performance. Whilst both rely on conditional 
reasoning CFR also requires a disengagement from temporal reality whilst MSU 
requires a disengagement from egocentric reality, children appeared to find this 
egotistical disengagement significantly easier than the temporal alternative. Reasons 
as to why this may be the case were discussed further in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 5 we moved away from reporting how children answer questions 
about the world and towards how they choose to impact upon it. Children were highly 
imitative of an adult model performing two actions on a novel object. Over imitation 
was the preferred strategy regardless of causal necessity or goal salience. Much like 
as was the case with CFR and MSU, EF showed some positive relationships with this 
over-imitation phenomenon but was not predictive of it at the group level. The 
domain general processes we reported alone do not account for faithful imitation. 
CFR too was related to imitative performance with positive correlations being found 
between faithful imitation performance using both of our experimental apparatus. In 
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addition negative correlations were found between single action responses on the 
Tower and CFR. The temporal order of the two action responses across apparatus was 
further related to CFR performance as children who replicated but reversed actions in 
the unnecessary condition had lower CF story scores.  Altogether then this is striking 
evidence that faithful imitation is driven by causal knowledge with children who 
reject socially implied causal structure also being poorer at reasoning about causal 
structure more generally in a counterfactual way. 
Chapter 5 also investigated any link between MSU and imitation. Only one of 
the battery items, and not the battery as a whole related to imitative performance. Item 
5 target-question performance alone correlated with faithful imitation in the critical 
unnecessary condition. No children answered the control memory questions of this 
item correctly, however, making this link additionally surprising. Reasons as to why 
this item alone may be significantly related were explored in detail in Chapter 5. Item 
5 was unique in contrasting two different faces of the same mental state in a way 
much more cognitively akin to the contrasting realities of an actual and counterfactual 
world. This may have driven the relationships between these two items. MSU, CFR 
and Imitation then, despite their strikingly similar structural demands had relatively 
independent performance patterns for the most part. Relationships although evident 
are diverse enough to conclude that task specific demands play a significant role in 
performance.  
In Chapter 6 we extended our exploration into imitation through the inclusion 
of the language as a to be imitated behavior. Three distinct features of language 
imitation were investigated; grammatical vs., ungrammatical repetitions, novel verb 
usage and, transitive structures. Like with action imitation children preferentially 
imitated repetitions faithfully, be they grammatical or ungrammatical. Furthermore as 
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with action imitation, verbal imitation was lower in the ungrammatical condition. This 
mirrored the necessary/unnecessary action imitation condition differences. Children, 
however, were reluctant to imitate newly introduced verbs and less familiar transitive 
verb structures. Children often reverted to English verbs, rather than novel verbs. 
Further they often reverted to the more familiar active transitive construction despite 
having heard numerous models of the passive construction. Their comprehension of 
passive sentences was also much lower than their comprehension of active sentences. 
There was evidence of discourse sensitivity, however, with children attempting to 
answer questions with a clear attentional focus in the congruent transitive structure. 
Within our language imitation tasks then there were numerous relationships 
between imitation patterns. Children who retained a transitive structure in their own 
utterances (regardless of active or passive training) were more likely to repeat 
grammatical repetitions verbatim. Furthermore novel passive production, although 
relatively infrequent, was related to ungrammatical repetition imitation. Novel verb 
use following passive training was also uniquely related to repetition imitation in the 
ungrammatical condition. 
 When the imitation of actions and language were looked at together there were 
clear similarities between children’s imitative proclivity. Patterns of imitation, 
regardless of the medium being observed, were not consistent enough to conclude that 
if children imitate one item, they shall imitate another. Instead a more complex inter-
task picture was observed. This was in part due to the differing causal configurations 
of our two imitation apparatus. When each was looked at separately, however, there 
were several interesting findings. The temporal order of actions following a necessary 
condition tower model related to the removal of repetitions in our first language task. 
Those children who altered modeled actions also altered modeled speech. Using the 
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rake apparatus children who reversed responses in the necessary condition were more 
likely to add repetitions in the ungrammatical condition. Although this pattern is 
strikingly different it further suggests that instrumental goals are imitated faithfully 
while social goals may be more often altered.  
When looking at the imitation of novel verbs further evidence of cross-domain 
relationships were unearthed. Novel verb use correlated negatively with single action, 
selective imitation responses using the tower following an unnecessary model. 
Children who rejected the modeled causal structure of tower and imitated only the 
modeler’s instrumental goal were less likely to utilize the newly introduced verb. 
Finally we looked at children’s use of transitive structures during the experimental 
task and found that temporally faithful response patterns in the action domain were 
positively correlated with the use of a transitive structure. Children who adhered to 
the modeled action structure also retained a transitive construction when answering 
questions about a verb action sequence. 
This combined evidence provides support for a theory of imitation in which 
there are some cross task consistencies, despite obviously contrasting task demands. 
These task demands come on the form of both the medium of input and output, 
however, there are strikingly similarities across our four conditions. 
Finally in Chapter 7 we compiled a language competence score to combine 
elements of comprehension, production and flexibility in performance. This 
competence score was designed to generate a proxy for children’s skill at using 
language as a tool rather than simply a to-be imitated feature of behavior. 
Competence scores were positively associated with counterfactual conditional 
reasoning, inhibitory control and certain distinct elements of MSU. Language 
competence, above and beyond the ability to repeat what is heard, is related to how 
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well four year-olds reason about the world abstractly. Language competence is related 
to their ability to apply causal rules, to reason about events removed in time and 
events as observed and experienced by others. How children interact with the world 
through the use of language as a tool is directly related to their conditional reasoning 
about not only the actual world, but also other possible divergent worlds. How well 
children navigate the actual and possible then is directly related to how proficiently 
they can use language as a tool. 
8.2. General Discussion 
8.2.1. Reasoning at Age Four 
As humans navigate the world we build a representation of reality and 
causality based on our inferences about the events and behaviors we are exposed to. 
As we act, both physically and verbally we alter this reality and often times these 
selected actions and utterances are grounded in past experiences (either personal or 
vicarious) that help us predict that they will achieve the desired outcome from a host 
of possibilities. It is this limitless and flexible number of possible world decisions that 
make human cognition remarkable and unique. 
When we engage in counterfactual reasoning the perception of this reality can 
be changed through the addition of positive or negative affect resultant from said 
musings. We may also engage in counterfactual reasoning to plan the behaviors 
required to reach a positive future reality, often prompted by goal failure on the first 
attempt. Our sample provided ample evidence that children’s conditional and 
counterfactual reasoning still has a long way to come. When comparing performance 
on two different tasks designed to assess children’s counterfactual reasoning we 
showed that questions that can be answered using basic conditional processes are 
significantly easier than those requiring counterfactual reasoning exclusively. As the 
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demands on the reasoner increased, with the addition of multiple possibilities and a 
less concrete causal structure, performance decreased. At age four children are 
struggling to correctly integrate all the necessary causal information of a presented 
situation, and therefore fail to consistently select the logical counterfactual outcome 
from a set of possibilities.  
Executive functioning tasks measure how well children process and deal with 
information free from context and the influence of prior knowledge. They, on a very 
basic level, challenge children to select a possible world response based on some 
feature of the actual world. They can give us an idea of how well children choose a 
possible response that contrasts with the actual in some way. In our sample there was 
a great diversity in the performance of children on tasks designed to assess their 
inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility. Children are not yet entirely proficient in 
rejecting one possible response in favor of another. 
Mental state understanding further allows us to gather information about the 
world to aid our own decisions. Observing and making inferences based upon how 
another person’s mental state changes in response to some stimuli or situation 
embellishes our causal knowledge for future use. At age four children were highly 
competent in MSU questions related to diverse desires and beliefs but with the 
addition of more complex items related to knowledge access, expectations and real 
versus apparent emotions children in this age group began to struggle. Children’s 
conditional and mental state reasoning is clearly still developing and we were 
interested in seeing whether these developments in reasoning about the world were 
impacting upon concurrent developments in impacting upon it. 
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8.2.2. Reasoning Skill versus Action on the World 
Our data set is the first to combine executive functions, counterfactual 
conditional reasoning and mental state understanding with imitation. It was clear that 
children who were better at reasoning conditionally and counterfactually were 
generally and consistently performing to a higher level in other tasks. Conditional and 
counterfactual reasoning success was reflected in increased faithful imitation of 
actions and in particular the replication of the temporal order of modeled actions on 
objects. We showed that the children in our sample who reasoned in line with the 
causal structures presented during CFR tasks were not only more likely to replicate all 
the actions modeled by an experimenter, but they did so in the same temporal order. 
Children who reversed the temporal order of actions had lower CFR scores than their 
peers, as did children who selected a single action response as opposed to imitating 
faithfully.  
Similar links were found in the verbal domain as the same pattern was seen 
between CFR and language competence more generally. These results suggest that 
being able to successfully incorporate information about the actual world, into a 
representation of the possible world that supports both inferences and behaviors is a 
pervasive ability spanning both counterfactual reasoning tasks and linguistic 
proficiency. Having good counterfactual reasoning skills support the comprehension 
and incorporation of novel lexical items into representations that support said items’ 
replication in a semantically appropriate way. Finally children’s sensitivity to 
discourse pressure was uniquely related to our simplest conditional reasoning task, the 
Slide task. We have shown that reasoning counter to fact is related to language 
comprehension and production, in addition to being related to complex social 
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language skills such as discourse sensitivity. How well children reason counter to fact 
is positively related to their use of language as a tool for change in the world. 
 In our sample we found that executive functions were related to action 
imitation and the imitation of language. We reported that children with lower 
inhibitory control were less likely to faithfully imitate a model’s necessary and 
intentional action. Furthermore, we showed that participants who performed well on 
EF tasks recorded significantly better comprehension scores for both active and 
passive verb constructions. We therefore showed EFs to be influential in numerous 
facets of imitation and language. 
 Finally, to a lesser extent MSU also showed similar relations to CFR and EF. 
We reported evidence that MSU is involved in imitation in that children who 
answered the target questions only correctly for item 5 of the MSU battery (the real-
apparent emotion question) had significantly higher rates of faithful imitation in the 
unnecessary condition.  Here it is clear that how children interpret the ‘possible 
world’ that is the world seen by others, impacts upon how they choose to move 
forward. Furthermore children who answered item 3 of the battery correctly had 
significantly higher language competence scores. Although the scale as a whole did 
not relate to our measures of tool use as expected it was clear that certain aspects of 
mental state understanding do indeed mediate how children interpret the actual world 
and inform their choices when acting upon it. 
8.2.3. Imitation Across Actions and Utterances 
Children copy behaviors to induce physical outcomes and they copy behaviors 
to induce psychological outcomes for both themselves and others. Children begin 
copying actions and vocalizations in selective and concrete ways but with time they 
begin to copy many behavioral features, both intentional and incidental. This move 
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may initially emerge due to social reasons (Hilbrink et al., 2013) or alongside 
developments in their navigation of the actual versus the possible, but is a prevalent 
and highly robust strategy used by four-year-olds in our sample and many others (e.g., 
McGuigan et al., 2007; 2011; Lyons et al., 2007; Nielsen, 2006). Often proclivity of 
imitation is related to the necessity of the behavior. Concurrently the complexity or 
familiarity of behavior impacts upon imitation. In our action imitation chapter it was 
evident that faithful imitation is a highly pervasive phenomenon. Causal necessity, 
although influential, did not remove this propensity. 
Further when looking at verbal imitation some features of language were more 
readily imitated than others, regardless of their causal or grammatical properties. 
Children readily imitated ungrammatical repetitions, although less so than 
grammatical ones. Sometimes they even added repetitions to ungrammatical 
utterances in a ‘hyper-extension of imitation’. Children less frequently copied simple 
novel words, but the majority did so at least once. Children even less readily imitated 
an unfamiliar syntactic structure with the majority not doing so at all. With age 
children and adults do begin to robustly imitate novel words and less frequent 
syntactic forms as their ability to manipulate and integrate linguistic rules and tokens 
increases. They also more readily imitate more complex items if task demands are 
reduced or exposure is increased. 
When relationships between these two distinct imitative domains were 
examined there was definitive evidence for some contiguity. In both action and 
language imitation tasks children readily imitated intentional features of the model 
that went above and beyond those required for an instrumental or communicative 
goal. There were correlations between the rejection of a modeled sequence in physical 
and verbal tasks. Although certainly not the case that children’s imitativity was stable 
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across all tasks there were tantalizing glimpses of contiguity that suggest imitation is a 
strategy not confined to either/or behavioral domain, but that can be flexibly deployed 
across domain and is influenced by causal knowledge, executive functions and 
intention understanding. There were some shared features of action and verbal 
imitation identified including children more readily imitating features of a modeled 
sequence that were instrumentally or communicatively conventional than otherwise. 
Further children in both domains clearly imitated intentional actions that were not 
necessary or correct for instrumental goal completion. Finally in both genres children 
showed a willing-ness to copy actions that were incidental or non-critical to the 
primary goal. 
The message we present here is clear, children’s reasoning skill related to 
navigating various forms of actual versus possible world boundaries are instrumental 
in their subsequent actions upon the world moving them into the realms of the 
possible. In conclusion, children’s skill at reasoning about a reality temporally distinct 
from their own, or psychologically distinct from their own is directly reflected in their 
manipulations of the world as it is in pursuit of some representation of a future 
possible goal state. 
8.2.4. Limitations 
 In Chapter 2 it was hoped that the inclusion of two forms of the slide task 
would add to an embellished our determination of their basic conditional reasoning 
skill related to a concrete, readily observable causal structure. However, the open 
slide task was not constrained enough in that children could theoretically respond 
with a location anywhere other than the realist response. As such the breadth of 
conditional reasoning tasks was diminished and the subsequent variance in 
conditional reasoning scores was decreased. On reflection the inclusion of the typical 
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and atypical stories were superfluous to our most important aim: characterizing the 
counterfactual reasoning ability of our sample. It would have been preferable to 
utilize the Sweet story example given in Chapter 2 (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas & 
Perner, 2010). The sweets paradigm focused solely on teasing apart CFR vs., BCR 
and did not include any between congruency manipulations. Using this structure of 
paradigm would have afforded us a more comprehensive picture of true CFR 
reasoning ability and given the results more clarity. 
In Chapter 3 what we had really aimed for was a continuous measure of 
executive functions. This would have given us much clearer results and afforded us a 
more utilizable variable when identifying relationships with other variables. 
Furthermore, given the mix of results pertaining to EF and CFR in particular we 
would ideally have given children a working memory task in order to have data on the 
three main pillars of EF. 
In Chapter 4 there were two main concerns about the battery used. Firstly 
Question 5 seemed far removed from the other, both conceptually and given the low 
number of correct memory check responses. Additionally, to have given our study 
greater comparability to other contemporary researchers a traditional false belief task 
could have been added. Although Item 4 the unexpected contents task did in some 
ways tap children’s reasoning about a false belief the addition of a deceptive element 
could have proved crucial in unifying our results. The battery items often related to 
different elements of the other variables and as such did not act like the true 
continuous measure of mental state understanding that we had striven for. Perhaps we 
could have used a more interactive paradigm. One in which the child played an 
integral role in the experimental procedure and as such truly had to contrast their 
perceptions of an event to another’s, i.e., the experimenter or a confederate. 
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When looking at Chapter 5 we saw that in a similar way to the typical and 
atypical story conditions contrasting experimentally so too did the necessary and 
unnecessary conditions of the action imitation apparatus. Rather than having two, 
similar but fundamentally different models it would have been better to have two 
diverse, but structurally comparable ones to increase the amount of comparable data 
collected between them and bolster the assertions drawn from the results. 
Another consideration was that the tasks, or apparatus themselves were too 
easy. Had they been left alone children would have presumably carried out the same 
actions given a few opportunities to explore the object independently. As such there 
was very little variation in performance with children completing two actions in the 
majority of cases. Have a more complex, causally challenging structure inherent in 
the testing apparatus could have yielded more diverse results to feed forward. This 
formulation may prove more useful when looking for a link with language 
competence. Language competence reflects children’s skill at both being imitative 
with language but also innovative in response to situational and social pressures. The 
inclusion of a more complex action imitation task, or a task where some action 
innovation is required alongside imitation may be more fruitful in helping to 
understanding the link between imitation as a strategy more generally and language 
competence in an ecologically valid way. 
In Chapter 6 the verbal imitation task again yielded very high verbatim 
imitation rates. The sentences were short, and despite containing repetitions very 
simple. Longer sentences, sentences with a more challenging structure or even 
sentences encapsulating less familiar or more physically challenging lexical items 
could have been used to generate more diverse results. The passive verb paradigm had 
the opposite problem in that production rates for the target utterance structure were 
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low. In the original paper using this methodology (Brooks & Tomasello, 1999) 
children were given 88 models, this is compared to our 16. Perhaps having even 
doubled the number of models would have supported children enough to increase 
production rates. 
8.2.5. Conclusions 
We have presented the first in depth investigation into how children aged four 
years navigate the boundary between the actual and the possible through a variety of 
experimental tasks. To our knowledge no other projects have attempted to unify the 
underlying global similarities between navigating the actual and the possible through 
diverse reasoning tasks and realizing the move from the actual to the possible through 
physical or linguistic manipulations on the world. We uniquely within one sample 
collected performance measures from four cognitive tasks we had identified as 
challenging children to reasoning about possible based on the actual world: 
counterfactual reasoning, the Flanker task, the DCCS task and a mental state 
understanding battery. Further more we concurrently investigated performance on 
these tasks alongside performances in imitative tasks where children could carry out 
the process of navigating the actual and the possible through their own actions: an 
action imitation paradigm, a grammatical versus ungrammatical repetition paradigm 
and a novel verb learning task. In addition we related children’s navigation of the 
actual and the possible, both through reasoning and behavior to their competence in 
using language as a tool for change in the world. 
 Our aim was to first identify any correlations between cognitive reasoning 
tasks that challenge children to select a response and make inferences based on a 
possible world that contrasted from the actual world in some way. For counterfactual 
reasoning tasks the possible world adhered to all the same conditional rules as the 
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actual world but was different due to some counterfactual antecedent: here contrast 
between the actual and the possible included a temporal distinction. For the executive 
functioning tasks the target questions challenged children to select an incongruent 
response that contrasted with their pre-potent response in some way. Finally mental 
state understanding tasks the possible world differed by virtue of the perspective of 
another intentional agent: their thoughts, beliefs, desires and access to knowledge 
contrasted with the reasoners’. There were indeed correlations between CFR and EF, 
and EF and MSU but not a bold link between CFR and MSU despite the striking 
structural similarities between the task demands. 
We have shown that all three cognitive reasoning measures were in some way 
implicated in the imitation of actions and utterances in our sample. How well children 
understand the actual versus possible boundaries in the world indeed impacts upon 
their attempts to manipulate it. We have reported evidence that performance on 
measures of counterfactual conditional reasoning, executive functioning and mental 
state understanding all uniquely relate to the way children use imitation as a strategy 
to impact upon the world. Better performance on these three tasks cognitive tasks 
relates to higher levels of faithful imitation, more adherence to the temporal qualities 
of imitation and even in some circumstances a hyper-extension of imitation. How 
children think about the world, and the contrasts between actual and possible worlds, 
impacts upon their own actions moving them from the actual to the possible.  
Furthermore we reported that features of our samples’ performance on 
counterfactual reasoning, executive functioning, mental state understanding and 
language imitation tasks were related to language competence more generally. How 
well children use language as a tool for change in the world is related to how well 
they can reason about actual versus possible distinctions within it.  
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We chose to take a global view of numerous cognitive develop indices 
together rather than selecting several of these tasks in isolation. We did so because we 
wanted to understand whether the conceptual similarities between the tasks chosen, 
all requiring children’s navigation of the actual and the possible, was indeed a 
powerful underlying feature unifying performance on them at age four. Studies have 
in the past related performance on some of the tasks we administered, particularly in 
the case of executive functions and language. None, however, have taken such a 
broad view in an attempt to identify an underlying supporting ability in tasks which 
on the surface look quite different: the ability to flexibly navigate the boundary of 
what actually occurred, what could have occurred and crucially what could yet occur 
in the world. 
8.2.6. Future Directions 
 We choose to look at one age snap-shot of how well children navigate 
between the actual and the possible. For us, the next logical step would be to assess 
these same abilities longitudinal in a single sample of typically developing children. 
For all of the abilities were characterized in this thesis there are comparable 
paradigms and methods for both younger and older samples. Being able to observe 
the emergence and development of conditional and counterfactual reasoning, 
executive functions and mental state understanding and relating it to concurrent tool 
use, both physically and linguistically would provide and invaluable insight into how 
these relationships may coalesce. Indeed within the sample presented throughout this 
thesis were children who had been involved in data collection from birth. A range of 
data was collected every month from birth to 18-months, and again at 24-months 
relating to children’s imitative proclivity, cognitive development, motor development, 
temperament and other socio-cognitive/attentional abilities. In addition maternal-
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infant free-play interaction data and parent diary data were recorded (see Ellis-Davies, 
Fowler, Hilbrink, Sakkalou & Gattis, 2012 for more information on this CUE diary 
method). As such in future we would hope to look retrospectively within this portion 
of our data set to understand if tasks relating to this actual versus possible navigation 
in the pre-school years predicted later reasoning and tool use performance. Given that 
reasoning flexibly and in a way that integrates what is actual and what is possible is 
central to adult human cognition, being able to observe the emergence and 
development of this skill will, we believe, be an exciting and invaluable endeavor. 
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Appendix A 
 
Counterfactual Reasoning Story Task 
 
 
Doctor Story 
 
 
Fireman Story 
 
 
 
 
 
Policeman Story 
 
 
Teacher Story
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Counterfactual Stories 
 
1. Typical condition 
Doctor 
• Swimming Pool 
• Hospital 
• Park 
Before work a Doctor was sitting in the park enjoying the beautiful weather. She left 
the park to go to work in the hospital. When she got there he received an emergency 
phone call. Look, there has been an accident at the swimming pool and little Jacob has 
slipped and hurt himself. Jacob needs a Doctor. The Doctor lifts her emergency first 
aid case and walks from the hospital to the swimming pool to help Jacob. 
Control – Where is the Doctor now? 
CF – What is Jacob hadn’t slipped and hurt himself, where would the Doctor be 
now? 
Forced choice – Would the Doctor be at the park or at the swimming pool? / 
Would the Doctor be at the swimming pool or at the park? 
 
Example of a correct answer: She would be at the hospital. 
Example of an incorrect answer: She would be at the swimming pool/park. 
 
Fireman 
• Living Room 
• Fire Station 
• Forest Fire 
A Fireman was sitting at home in his living room before it was time to go to work. He 
then left there to start work in the fire station. When he got there he received a 999. 
Look there is a fire in the local forest! The fire brigade will need to come quickly. The 
Fireman got into his fire engine and drove to the forest to help fight the fire.  
Control – Where is the Fireman now? 
CF – If the fire hadn’t started, where would the fireman be now? 
Forced choice – Would the Fireman be in his living room or would he be in the 
fire station? / Would the Fireman be in the fire station or would he be in his 
living room? 
 
Example of a correct answer: He would be at the fire station. 
Example of an incorrect answer: He would be at the forest/home. 
 
Teacher 
• Playground 
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• Classroom 
• Ben’s Living Room 
Before school started a teacher was in the playground looking after the school 
children playing. When the bell rang he went inside to the classroom to begin the 
lesson. Ben, one of the school children wasn’t feeling very well so the teacher needed 
to bring him home to his mother. The teacher left the classroom and took Ben home. 
Control – Where is the teacher now? 
CF – If Ben hadn’t been feeling well where would the teacher be? 
Forced Choice – Would the teacher be in the classroom or the playground? / 
Would the teacher be in the playground or in the classroom? 
 
Example of a correct answer: He would be in the classroom. 
Example of an incorrect answer: He would be in the playground/Ben’s living room. 
 
Policeman 
• Shop 
• Police Station 
• Car Park 
At lunchtime a Policeman was in the local shop buying some fruit and vegetables. 
Once he had finished he went to the police station where he worked. After he got to 
the police station he heard on the police radio that there had been a car accident. The 
Policeman got into his car and drove to the car park to take care of the accident. 
Control – Where is the Policeman now? 
CF – If the car hadn’t had an accident, where would the Policeman be now? 
Forced Choice – Would the Policeman be in the local shop or would he be at the 
car park? / Would the Policeman be in the car park or would he be in the local 
shop? 
 
Example of a correct answer: He would be at the police station. 
Example of an incorrect answer: He would be at the car park/shop 
 
2. Atypical condition 
 
Doctor 
• Swimming Pool 
• Hospital 
• Park 
After finishing work a Doctor was sitting in the park enjoying the beautiful weather. 
Suddenly she received an emergency phone call. Look, there has been an accident at 
the swimming pool and little Jacob has slipped and hurt himself. Jacob needs a 
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Doctor. The Doctor left the park to go to the hospital. The Doctor lifts her emergency 
first aid case and walks from the hospital to the swimming pool to help Jacob. 
Control – Where is the Doctor now? 
CF – What is Jacob hadn’t slipped and hurt himself, where would the Doctor be 
now? 
Forced choice – Would the Doctor be at the park or at the swimming pool? / 
Would the Doctor be at the swimming pool or at the park? 
 
Example of a correct answer: She would be at the park. 
Example of an incorrect answer: She would be at swimming pool/hospital. 
 
Fireman 
• Living Room 
• Fire Station 
• Forest Fire 
A Fireman was sitting at home in his living room after he had finished work. He 
received a 999 call. Look there is a fire in the local forest! The fire brigade will need 
to come quickly. He then left home to go to the fire station. The Fireman got into his 
fire engine and drove to the forest to help fight the fire.  
Control – Where is the Fireman now? 
CF – If the fire hadn’t started, where would the fireman be now? 
Forced choice – Would the Fireman be in his living room or would he be in the 
fire station? / Would the Fireman be in the fire station or would he be in his 
living room? 
 
Example of a correct answer: He would be at home. 
Example of an incorrect answer: He would be at the forest/ fire station 
 
 
Teacher 
• Playground 
• Classroom 
• Ben’s Living Room 
After school had finished for the day a teacher was in the playground looking after 
some of the school children playing. Suddenly the Principal sent him a message that 
Ben, a boy in the homework club was feeling ill. The teacher needed to bring him 
home to his mother. The teacher left the playground to collect Ben from his classroom 
and then took him home. 
Control – Where is the teacher now? 
CF – If Ben hadn’t been feeling well where would the teacher be? 
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Forced Choice – Would the teacher be in the classroom or the playground? / 
Would the teacher be in the playground or in the classroom? 
 
Example of a correct answer: He would be in the playground. 
Example of an incorrect answer: He would be at Ben’s house/the classroom 
 
 
Policeman 
• Shop 
• Police Station 
• Car Park 
After he had finished work a Policeman was in the local shop buying some fruit and 
vegetables. However suddenly on his radio he heard there had been a car accident in a 
nearby car park. Quickly he went to the police station where he worked. Once he got 
to the police station the Policeman got into his car and drove to the car park to help 
take care of the accident. 
Control – Where is the Policeman now? 
CF – If the car hadn’t had an accident, where would the Policeman be now? 
Forced Choice – Would the Policeman be in the local shop or would he be at the 
car park? / Would the Policeman be in the car park or would he be in the local 
shop? 
 
 
Example of a correct answer: He would be at the shop. 
Example of an incorrect answer: He would be at the car park/ police station. 
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Appendix B 
 
Location Change Counterfactual (Pipe) Task 
 
 
 
Counterfactual pipe target apparatus 
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Appendix C 
 
Excerpt from NIH Toolbox Scoring and Interpretation Guide 
© 2006-2012 National Institutes of Health and Northwestern University. 
 
NIH Toolbox Flanker Inhibitory Control and Attention Test (Flanker) 
Description: The Flanker task measures both a participant’s attention and inhibitory 
control. The test requires the participant to focus on a given stimulus while inhibiting 
attention to stimuli (fish for ages 3- 7 or arrows for ages 8-85) flanking it. Sometimes 
the middle stimulus is pointing in the same direction as the “flankers” (congruent) and 
sometimes in the opposite direction (incongruent). Twenty trials are conducted for 
ages 8-85; for ages 3-7, if a participant scores ≥ 90% on the fish stimuli, 20 additional 
trials with arrows are presented. The test takes approximately three minutes to 
administer. This test is recommended for ages 3-85. 
Scoring Process: Scoring is based on a combination of accuracy and reaction time and 
is identical for both the Flanker and DCCS measures (described below). A 2-vector 
scoring method is employed that uses accuracy and reaction time, where each of these 
“vectors” ranges in value between 0 and 5, and the computed score, combining each 
vector score, ranges in value from 0-10. For any given individual, accuracy is 
considered first. If accuracy levels for the participant are less than or equal to 80%, 
the final “total” computed score is equal to the accuracy score. If accuracy levels for 
the participant reach more than 80%, the reaction time score and accuracy score are 
combined. 
Accuracy Vector 
There are 40 possible accuracy points: 
· Flanker o Fish: 20 Points o Arrows: 20 Points 
Individuals age eight and older automatically receive 20 accuracy points for the Fish 
Trials of the Flanker. (It was determined previously that they typically score at the 
ceiling on these trials.) 
The accuracy score varies from 0 to 5 points. For every correct behavioral response, a 
participant receives a value of 0.125 (5 points divided by 40 trials) added to his/her 
score for Flanker: 
Flanker Accuracy Score = 0.125 * Number of Correct Responses 
Reaction Time Vector 
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The task-specific reaction time scores are generated using individuals’ raw, 
incongruent median reaction time score from the Flanker. Median reaction time 
values are computed using only correct trials with reaction times greater than or equal 
to 100ms and reaction times no larger than 3 SDs away from the individual’s mean 
(for respective trial type). 
6 
Like the accuracy score, the reaction time score ranges from 0 to 5 points. One issue 
regarding reaction time data is that it tends to have a positively skewed distribution. A 
log (Base 10) transformation is therefore applied to each participant’s median reaction 
time score from the DCCS, creating a more normal distribution of scores. Based on 
the validation data, the minimum reaction time for scoring is set to 500ms and the 
maximum reaction time for scoring is 3,000ms. Participants with median reaction 
times that fall outside this range but within the allowable range of 100ms – 10,000ms 
are truncated (i.e., reaction times between 3,000ms and 10,000ms are set equal to 
3,000ms) for the purpose of score calculation. Scoring of the validation data indicates 
that this truncation does not introduce any problems with regard to ceiling or floor 
effects. Log values are algebraically rescaled from a log(500)-log(3,000) range to a 0-
5 range. Note that the rescaled scores are reversed; smaller reaction time log values 
are at the upper end of the 0-5 range while larger log values are at the lower end of the 
range. The formula for rescaling is: 
æ é logRT-log(500) ùö Reaction Time Score = 5-ç5*ê
log(3000)-log(500)
ú÷ 
Once these reaction time scores are obtained, they are added to the accuracy scores 
for participants who achieved the accuracy criterion of better than 80%. For 
participants who fail to reach this criterion, only accuracy scores are used. This 
combination score is then converted to a scale score with mean of 100 and SD of 15. 
Interpretation: The Flanker is a measure of executive function, specifically tapping 
inhibitory control and attention. It is considered a “fluid ability” – the capacity for 
new learning and information processing in novel situations – measure, in which 
performance reaches a peak in early adulthood, then tends to decline across the life 
span (based on health and individual factors, of course). To interpret individual 
performance, one can evaluate all three types of scale scores in which higher scores 
indicate higher levels of ability to attend to relevant stimuli and inhibit attention from 
irrelevant stimuli. In addition to the three scale scores provided, the Flanker 
Computed score provides a way of gauging raw improvement or decline from Time 1 
to Time 2 (or subsequent assessments). This computed score ranges from 0-10, but if 
the score is between 0 and 5, it indicates that the participant did not score high enough 
in accuracy (80 percent correct or less). A change in the participant’s score from Time 
1 to Time 2 represents real change in the level of performance for that individual 
since the previous assessment. One can also put such a score in a different context by 
390 
 
comparing scale scores from Time 1 to Time 2, which will show the participant’s 
performance relative to others (specific comparisons depending on which scale score 
is used). 
NIH Toolbox Dimensional Change Card Sort Test (DCCS) 
Description: DCCS is a measure of cognitive flexibility. Two target pictures are 
presented that vary along two dimensions (e.g., shape and color). Participants are 
asked to match a series of bivalent test pictures (e.g., yellow balls and blue trucks) to 
the target pictures, first according to one dimension (e.g., color) and then, after a 
number of trials, according to the other dimension (e.g., shape). “Switch” trials are 
also employed, in which the participant must change the dimension being matched. 
For example, after four straight trials matching on shape, the participant may be asked 
to match on color on the next trial and then go back to shape, thus requiring the 
cognitive flexibility to quickly choose the correct stimulus. This test takes 
approximately four minutes to administer and is recommended for ages 3-85. 
 
èë ûø 
7 
Scoring Process: Scoring is based on a combination of accuracy and reaction time. A 
2-vector scoring method is employed that uses accuracy and reaction time, where 
each of these “vectors” ranges in value between 0 and 5, and the computed score, 
combining each vector score, ranges in value from 0- 10. For any given individual, 
accuracy is considered first. If accuracy levels for the participant are less than or equal 
to 80%, the final “total” computed score is equal to the accuracy score. If accuracy 
levels for the participant reach more than 80%, the reaction time score and accuracy 
score are combined. 
Accuracy Vector 
There are 40 possible accuracy points: 
· DCCS o Pre-Switch (before changing to the other dimension): 5 Points o Post-
Switch: 5 Points o Mixed Trials: 30 Points 
Individuals age 8 and older automatically receive 10 accuracy points for the Pre-
Switch and Post-Switch trials of the DCCS. 
The accuracy score will vary from 0 to 5 points. For every correct behavioral 
response, a participant receives a value of 0.125 (5 points divided by 40 trials) added 
to his/her score for DCCS: 
DCCS Accuracy Score = 0.125 * Number of Correct Responses 
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The task-specific reaction time scores are generated using individuals’ raw, non-
dominant dimension (the one cued less frequently for sorting) median reaction time 
score from the DCCS. 
Reaction Time Vector 
The task-specific reaction time scores are generated using individuals’ raw, non-
dominant dimension (the one cued less frequently for sorting) median reaction time 
score from the DCCS. Median reaction time values are computed using only correct 
trials with reaction times greater than or equal to 100ms and reaction times no larger 
than 3 SDs away from the individual’s mean (for respective trial type). 
Like the accuracy score, the reaction time score ranges from 0 to 5 points. Reaction 
time data tends to have a positively skewed distribution. A log (Base 10) 
transformation is therefore applied to each participant’s median reaction time score 
from the DCCS and Flanker, creating a more normal distribution of scores. Based on 
the validation data, the minimum reaction time for scoring is set to 500ms and the 
maximum reaction time for scoring is 3,000ms. Participants with median reaction 
times that fall outside this range but within the allowable range of 100ms – 10,000ms 
will be truncated (i.e., reaction times between 3,000ms and 10,000ms will be set equal 
to 3,000ms) for the purpose of score calculation. Scoring of the validation data does 
not indicate that this truncation introduces any problems with regard to ceiling or 
floor effects. Log values will be algebraically rescaled from a log(500)-log(3,000) 
range to a 0-5 range. Note that the rescaled scores will be reversed; smaller reaction 
time log values will be at the upper end of the 0-5 range while larger log values will 
be at the lower end of the range. The formula for rescaling is: 
æ é logRT-log(500) ùö Reaction Time Score = 5-ç5*ê
log(3000)-log(500)
ú÷ 
 
èë ûø 
8 
Once these reaction time scores are obtained, they are added to the accuracy scores 
for participants who achieved the accuracy criterion of better than 80%. For 
participants who fail to reach this criterion, only accuracy scores are used. This 
combination score is then converted to a scale score with mean of 100 and SD of 15. 
Interpretation: The DCCS is a measure of executive function, specifically tapping 
cognitive flexibility. It is considered a “fluid ability” measure, like Flanker, with 
performance generally increasing through childhood and then declining across the 
adult age span. To interpret individual performance, one can evaluate all three types 
of scale scores, where higher scores indicate higher levels of cognitive flexibility. In 
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addition to the three scale scores provided, the DCCS Computed score provides a way 
of gauging raw improvement or decline from Time 1 to Time 2 (or subsequent 
assessments). This computed score ranges from 0-10, but if the score is between 0 and 
5, it indicates that the participant did not score high enough in accuracy (80 percent 
correct or less). A change in the participant’s score from Time 1 to Time 2 represents 
real change in the level of performance for that individual since the previous 
assessment. One can also put such a score in a different context by comparing scale 
scores from Time 1 to Time 2, which will show the participant’s performance relative 
to others (specific comparisons depending on which scale score is used). 
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Appendix D 
 
Mental State Understanding Resources 
 
 
Question 1 
 
 
 
Question 2  
 
 
 
Question 4 
 
 
 
Question 4 
 
394 
 
 
Question 5 Protagonist 
 
 
Question 5 Emotion Faces
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Mental State Understanding Script 
1-Diverse Desires  
1.“Here’s Mr. Jones. It’s break time, so, Mr. Jones wants a snack to eat. Here are two 
different snacks: a carrot and a cookie. Which snack would you like most? Would you like a 
carrot or a cookie most?”  
2. “Well that is a good choice, but Mr. Jones really likes cookies. He doesn’t like carrots. 
What he likes most is cookies.”   
3.Target Q - “So now it’s time to eat. Mr. Jones can only choose one snack, just one. Which 
snack will Mr. Jones choose? A cookie or a carrot?”  
2-Diverse Beliefs  
1.‘Here’s Linda. Linda wants to find her cat. Her cat might be hiding in the bushes or it 
might be hiding in the garage. Where do you think the cat is? In the bushes or in the 
garage?’’  
2. ‘‘Well, that’s a good idea, but Linda thinks her cat is in the garage. She thinks her cat is in 
the garage.’’  
3.Target Q - ‘‘So where will Linda look for her cat? In the bushes or in the garage?’’  
3-Knowledge Access  
1.‘‘Here’s a box. What do you think is inside the box?’’  
‘2.‘Let’s see .... it’s really a train inside!’’  
3. ‘‘Okay, what is in the box?’’  
4. ‘‘Polly has never ever seen inside this drawer. Now here comes Polly. So, does Polly 
know what is in the drawer?  
5.Memory Q -  ‘‘Did Polly see inside this drawer?’’ 
4-Content False Belief  
1.‘‘Here’s a Juice Bottle. What do you think is inside the juice bottle?’’  
 2.‘‘Let’s see...... it’s really a pen inside!’’  
3.Container closed ‘‘Okay, what is in the juice bottle?’’  
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 4.Target Q -‘‘Peter has never ever seen inside Juice bottle. Now here comes Peter. So, what 
does Peter think is in the case? Juice or a pen?  
5.Memory Q - ‘Did Peter see inside this case?’’ 5-Real-Apparent Emotion  
1.Check Q’s – “Can you point out which is the happy face, which is the sad face, which is 
the normal face?” 
2.‘‘This story is about a boy. I’m going to ask you about how the boy really feels inside and 
how he looks on his face. He might really feel one way inside but look a different way on his 
face. Or, he might really feel the same way inside as he looks on his face. I want you to tell 
me how he really feels inside and how he looks on his face.’’  
3.‘‘This story is about Matt. Matt’s friends were playing together and telling jokes. One of 
the older children, Rosie, told a mean joke about Matt and everyone laughed. Everyone 
thought it was very funny, but not Matt. But, Matt didn’t want the other children to see how 
he felt about the joke, because they would call him a baby. So, Matt tried to hide how he 
felt.’’  
4.Memory checks:  
‘‘What did the other children do when Rosie told a mean joke about Matt?’’  
“In the story, what would the other children do if they knew how Matt felt?’’  
Pointing to the three emotion pictures:  
 ‘‘So, how did Matt really feel, when everyone laughed? Did he feel happy, sad, 
or okay?’’  
 ‘‘How did Matt try to look on his face, when everyone laughed? Did he look 
happy, sad, or okay? 
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Appendix E 
 
Object Imitation Apparatus 
 
Apparatus 1. Rake 
 
 
 
Apparatus 2. Tower  
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Appendix F 
 
Verbal Imitation Sentences 
 
 
Grammatical Repetitions Ungrammatical Repetitions 
He was in a dark dark house It was dark dark outside 
There there don’t cry There there is the park 
He said bye bye to his horse He went to buy buy a horse 
Sam was a big big cat The cat was too big big for the chair 
  
Filler Sentences  
I like to eat cake Katie found an old toy 
Where is my blue hat She is a tall girl 
I have a new friend  
  
Practice Sentences  
Red Door 
Small mouse Blue car 
A brown cat A big apple 
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Appendix G 
 
Verbal Imitation Apparatus 
 
Trolley  
 
Swing 
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Verbal Imitation Example Training Script 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Passive construction Active Construction 
Look, the hammer is going to get meeked Look the horse is going to meek 
something 
The hammer is going to get meeked by the 
horse 
The horse is going to meek the hammer 
What’s going to get meeked? (Pointing to 
the hammer) 
Who’s going to meek the hammer? 
(Pointing to the horse) 
That’s right, the hammer is going to get 
meeked 
That’s right, the horse is going to meek 
the hammer 
The hammer is going to get meeked by 
who? (Pointing to the horse) 
The horse is going to meek what? 
(Pointing to the hammer) 
Yes, the hammer is getting meeked by the 
horse. (While modelling action) 
Yes, the horse is meeking the hammer. 
(While modelling action) 
Did you see what got meeked by the 
horse? 
Did you see who meeked the horse? 
Exactly! The hammer got meeked by the 
horse. 
Exactly! The horse meeked the hammer. 
